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Abstract 
In this study, we will analyze the political economy of Japanese foreign direct investment (JFDI) in 
the United States during the period through 1985 to 1993 from the perspective of International Political 
Economy (IPE). Within the sphere of IPE, the relationship between political and economic forces is an 
important dimension which must be examined. 
The core question asked in this dissertation is why and how the United States managed the entry of 
Japanese FDI during the above period. Specifically, we attempt to center on U.S. investment policy change 
which was a result from the entry of JFDI. The period covered in this dissertation is the most important 
development stage in U.S. investment policy during the past four decades. In this case, the United States 
was the largest economy in that time, while the Japan was the second largest economy. To examine the 
impact of JFDI and U.S. policy adjustment, the unitary actor model in traditional International Relations is 
not sufficient to grasp the complex dynamics of the problem. Furthermore, U.S. investment policy 
adjustment is essentially a political process and therefore requires a political economy approach.  
To accomplish this objective, we construct a more detailed analytical framework help us specify the 
relationship between JFDI and U.S. policy adjustment. This framework was a slightly revised one 
provided by the second generation of IPE scholars in the new century. It emphasizes that interest and 
institution are two crucial variables to examine policy adjustment. In this framework, unitary actor 
assumption is only a special case. Based on rational choice institutionalism, the logic is that the incentives 
rooted in economic interest strongly compel individuals, societal groups and states act. At the same time, 
whether the policy demand that these actors asked would be realized partly depend on the policy supply 
framed by institution. As a result, what needs to be clarified is which kind of interest created by JFDI and 
under what institution circumstance? 
This dissertation argues that U.S. policy adjustment is partly due to the nature of JFDI, and partly 
depends on the institution background. At the national level, if the U.S. industries that JFDI entered would 
create national economic gap between the United States and Japan, U.S. government will strongly oppose 
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this kind of FDI. Although there are debates on the policy to JFDI during the executive, inter-executive 
branches, and Congress, they acted as if a unitary actor in the name of national security or most accurate 
national economic security. At this level, the policy are managed by the federal government. 
At the states level, most of the states welcome the entry of JFDI. Most of the JFDI in the United 
States provides revenue and jobs, and helps local governments to promote economic growth. To states in 
the United States, the national economic security is not the most important problem confronted during this 
period. At the same time, the U.S. Constitution and unique federalism institution design does not allocate 
power clearly on regulating FDI. In the United States, “the war of the states” in attracting JFDI was a big 
problem in this period. Some issues, such as tax system reform, states role in international economic 
affairs, and local advantage in globalization are examined.  
At the international level, the mutual interest resulted from the mobility of JFDI lead to the creation 
of international investment institution. The unique complementary effects feature of JFDI on trade creates 
linkage politics and leads to multilateral solving way. It was in the Uruguay Round of General Agreements 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1986-1993) that investment issues were successfully integrated into GATT 
trading system. This dissertation argues that the cooperation between U.S. government and Japanese 
government to help establish the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) in GATT framework. 
Moreover, without the mutual interest which existed between JFDI and U.S. multinational corporations, 
this kind of international investment institution building could not be achieved in this period.  
In summary, U.S. investment policies to JFDI are located between free investment and protectionism. 
The diversity of policy adjustment is determined by the nature of JFDI as well as multilevel institution 
arrangements in the United State on this issue area. A relative theoretical inspiration from this study is that 
the impacts of globalization to developed countries are more complexity than conventional wisdom 
considered. The mobility of transnational economic factors between national states and in the national state 
created very different distribution of benefits and costs. To cope with this kind of challenge, institution 
design and compatibility between national, domestic, and international levels are crucial.
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Introduction 
 
This study aims to examine changes in United States inward investment policy, and in particular, to 
explore why and how the US managed the entry of Japanese foreign direct investment (JFDI) during the 
period from 1985 to 1993. The story of the U.S.-Japan FDI relationship is worth considering and 
investigating, because it relates not only to the largest and second largest national economies, but also to 
the growing importance of FDI in the world economy. Furthermore, the periods covered in this study are 
unique in the history of FDI, as it was the first wave of growth and the first instance of an increase faster 
than trade. Moreover, the United States as an investment-hosting country has unparalleled capability and 
willingness to control the benefits of FDI in its borders. In a broader sense, the balance of economic power 
shifted again to the U.S. rather than Japan during this period.   
For the purpose of this study, there are three important and related questions that need to be probed. 
First, this study will examine why the United States managed or regulated FDI, in particular JFDI. Given 
the profound consequences of United States international economic policy, its origins and evolution should 
be given considerable attention. Second, I try to illustrate the U.S. investment policy responses towards 
JFDI. Which measures the United States took to cope with the investment challenge from Japan is an 
interesting question. Third, given the fact that investment issues were integrated firstly into the Uruguay 
Round of GATT during this period, this study attempts to investigate U.S institutional adjustment 
centering on the kinds of JFDI and international investment building that resulted from this concern. Thus, 
U.S. inward investment policy change and related institutional adjustment are central to my study. 
This study finds that U.S. investment policies to JFDI lie between free investment and protectionism. 
The diversity of policy adjustments is determined by the nature of JFDI as well as by multilevel 
institutional arrangements in the United States in this issue area. A theoretical observation from this study 
is that the impacts of globalization on developed countries are more complex than conventional wisdom 
indicates. The mobility of transnational economic factors between and within nation-states creates very 
different distributions of benefits and costs. To cope with this kind of challenge, institutional design and 
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compatibility between national, domestic, and international levels are crucial.  
These lessons are derived from a more detailed analytical framework. This framework is a slightly 
revised one provided by the second generation of IPE scholars in the new century. It emphasizes that 
interests and institutions are two crucial variables to examine policy adjustment. In this framework, unitary 
actor assumption is only a special case. Based on rational-choice institutionalism, the logic is that the 
incentives rooted in economic interest strongly compel individuals, societal groups and states to act in 
certain ways. At the same time, whether the policy demands made by these actors would be realized partly 
depends on the policy supply framed by institutions. As a result, what needs to clarified is which kind of 
interests was created by JFDI and under what institution circumstance? 
The findings of this study not only help us understand the political implications of JFDI, but also the 
content and decision-making process of U.S. investment policy. Also, it provides a window through which 
to grasp the power of the U.S. and its foreign economic policy. Furthermore, these topics are linked to 
broader debates on relationships between the global economy and nation states.  
 
 
The Puzzle: U.S.-Japanese FDI Friction 
The political concern centered on multinationals and their operational FDI definitely originated from 
America. The modern history of multinationals began after the Second World War and was dominated by 
U.S. multinationals, and its expansion into other countries also aroused caution. In 1965, the Harvard 
Business Review published an article entitled “Should Europe Restrict U.S. Investments?” Although the 
author objectively criticized the pessimistic rhetoric expressed by the Europeans, it obviously tells us that 
Europeans were afraid of U.S. economic control resulting from the alarming flood of U.S. investments.1 A 
more influential and even stronger argument was developed by a French journalist. In his 1968 book The 
American Challenge, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber argued that Europe would become another economic 
                                                        
1 C.F. Karsten, “Should Europe Restrict U.S. Investments?” Harvard Business Review, September-October, 1965, 
pp.53-61. 
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colony of America.2 Confronting the emerging power of multinational corporations in the world political 
economy, some specialists warned that nation states would get stuck into “Sovereignty at Bay”3; some 
even predicted “coming investment wars” between developed countries.4  
Twenty years later, this story was partly reversed as the United State became the hosting country in 
relation to FDI, rather than home country. At the end of 1985, the New York Times ran three Buying into 
America series articles on foreign investment in the United States.5 These articles raised several important 
questions about the relationship between FDI and American political economy. The views on the impacts 
of FDI varied widely in the United States. However, concerns about the loss of political and economic 
freedom increased; in Democratic Senator Frank H. Murkowski’s words, “Once they own your assets, they 
own you. They employ you.”6  
Increasing inward FDI in the United States also triggered alarm among the intellectual community.7 
In 1987, for example, the MIT economist Paul Krugman commented that, “the political issue of the 1980s 
isn’t going to be imports; it’s going to be the foreign invasion of the United States.”8 In January 1989, an 
article in Harvard Business Review recalled that the debate in the United States on JFDI was similar to 
Canada’s view on American multinationals nearly twenty years before. The author criticized the view that 
America was becoming a colony of Japan.9 Raymond Vernon, a pioneer of multinationals study, noted 
that “in 1989, after a century of supporting the principle of national treatment for foreign-owned business, 
the United States abruptly began to discriminate against Japanese-owned enterprises that were seeking to 
                                                        
2 Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, New York: Atheneum, 1968. 
3 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: the Multinational Spread of US Enterprises, New York: Basic Books, 1971. 
4 C. Fred Bergsten, “Coming Investment Wars?” Foreign Affairs, Vol.53, No.1, 1974, pp.135-152. 
5 Branaby J. Feder, “Foreign Money Spreading to All Walks of U.S. Life,” December 29, 1985; Martin Tolchin, 
“Foreigners’ Political Roles in U.S. Grow By Investing,” December 30, 1985; Andrew H. Malcolm, “Foreign Money 
Changing U.S. Social-Cultural Life,” December 31, 1985. 
6 Quoted in Martin Tolchin, “Foreigners’ Political Roles in U.S. Grow By Investing.” 
7 Here we do emphasize the book-length analysis rather than journalists’ opinions. See books review article, Robert T. 
Kudrle, “Good for the Gander? Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,” International Organization, Vol.45, 
No.3, 1991, pp.397-424; in 1991, the Journal Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
published one special volumes on Foreign Investment in the United States. 
8 Quoted in Peter Gumbell and Douglas Sease, “Unwelcome Mat: Foreign Firms Build More U.S. Factories, Vex 
American Rivals,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1987, p. 1. 
9 Abraham Rotstein, “When the United States Was Canada’s ‘Japan’,” Harvard Business Review, January/February, 
1989, pp.38-43. 
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do business in the United States.”10 Some years later, a leading scholar in FDI study concluded that “the 
United States and Japan have fundamentally altered their economic relationship. What was once a simple 
bilateral rivalry has been transformed into a global contest dominated by the foreign direct investment of 
multinational corporations.”11  
What happened with the FDI issue between the United States and Japan during the late 1980s? The 
economic dimension of this story is clear. Since the mid-1980s, the United States had faced economic 
challenge with quite huge inward FDI flows, especially JFDI. JFDI in the United States grew at a much 
more rapid speed than United States direct investment abroad since 1980, and subsequently ranked as the 
second greatest source in 1988 and largest source in 1992. As a consequence, inward FDI changed the 
international position of the U.S. in the investment field. The United States once was the largest direct 
investor in the post-Second World War world economy; then the U.S. became the largest direct investment 
recipient country in the 1980s. Although JFDI in the United States declined in 1993 and was surpassed by 
FDI from the United Kingdom again, it recovered in 1994. We will discuss more about this transition 
period in FDI in chapter 2.  
On the policy dimension, the situation seems much more complicated. To cope with economic shock 
or for other purposes, the United States inward investment policy at the federal government level 
experienced a historic change. The Exon-Florio provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 gave the US president greater authority to block foreign takeovers of US domestic enterprises. 
According to C. Fred Bergsten, the director of the Institute for International Economics, “for the first time 
in American history [there was] set up a mechanism to screen some of the direct investment entering this 
country,”12 Some argued that the Exon-Florio amendment was “political protectionism” and one of the 
reasons that contributed to this shift was the Japanese affiliates.13 Even so, it is not so clear why the 
                                                        
10 Raymond Vernon, “Japan, the United States, and the Global Economy,” in Brad Roberts, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy 
After the Cold War, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the MIT Press, 1992, p.71. 
11 Dennis J. Encarnation, Rivals beyond Trade: American Versus Japan in Global Comparative, Ithca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1992, preface, p.1.  
12 C. Fred Bergsten, “preface”, in Edwar M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United 
States, third edition, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995 [1991, 1989]. 
13 Jose E. Alvarez, “Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The 
 11
United States only feared JFDI, but not other Western countries’ FDI in the United States. Compared to 
other Western countries, the quantity of JFDI still accounted for a relatively small proportion. Furthermore, 
the Exon-Florio amendment only covered acquisition types of FDI without considering Greenfield FDI, 
while the JFDI was composed of both of these two types during that period. Generally speaking, 
Greenfield FDI is a type of FDI that establishes plant in host country and creates jobs and revenues. As a 
result, we need to know more about the U.S. federal government investment policy.14  
During the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, looking at the United States policy response 
to JFDI, the situation was much more complex. There are some important questions worth probing. For 
example, why did other countries’ FDI not arouse so much concern in the United States? Do different 
industry distributions and locations lead to diverse conflict in the United States? As a hegemonic state, 
how did the United States react to and try to control this? In other words, how can we deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between a liberal host state, FDI and institutional adjustment?  
As a part of contemporary globalization, FDI has and continues to exercise influence on the world 
economy and international relations. Over a relatively long period, the United States has remained a super 
power and still has the greatest influence over other countries. The US appears to be a liberal state and 
maintains its open door policy to outsiders. However, international trade and international monetary affairs 
have already illustrated that the United States emphasizes its own national interests and has adopted 
various instruments to protect these interests. When inward FDI began to influence the U.S. interest, did 
FDI become the exception? In my opinion, International Political Economy (IPE) will help us to better 
understand these questions.   
 
 
Literature Review: Previous Works on U.S. Investment Policy Change  
With respect to U.S. inward investment policy, it seems clear that this issue is relatively new in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Hazards of Exon-Florio,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol.30, No.1, 1989, pp.1-187. 
14 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Multinationals and the National Interest: Playing by Different 
Rules, OTA-ITE-569, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1993. 
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United States foreign economic policy compared to the long history of dealing with other international 
economic affairs. Writing in 1980, political scientist Robert Pastor stated, “Until 1973, a host government 
investment policy was something other governments had” in the United States.15 With increasing FDI 
flooding into the U.S., policy makers had to consider how to manage it so that they could get the most 
benefits from FDI as well as control its probable negative effects. To most international lawyers, U.S. 
investment policy change compelled them to become more involved in foreign business affairs than ever 
before. As a result, there is a vast literature on the legal implications of U.S. investment policy change. 
This kind of research program mainly focuses on U.S. investment policies’ content and its influence on 
business activities.16  
Political scientists are more concerned with the politics of U.S. foreign economic policy, especially 
the political origins of policy. Although scholarly works on U.S. investment policy are not usually 
categorized according to narrower terms, it would be helpful to divide them into different views. Generally 
speaking, national security concern, Congress-administration conflict, and economic competition were the 
three main research areas for United States investment policy making. First, political scientists usually 
argued that inward investment policy-making in the United States is the outcome of Executive-Congress 
politics. In U.S. foreign economic policy tradition, the President is more liberal and institutionalist in 
foreign economic policy, while Congress is more protectionist.17 The main shortcoming of this kind of 
analysis is that political scientists take all kinds of investment as the same. Eliot Kang examined 
acquisition types of investment and U.S. policies to each type and argued that institutional factors are 
                                                        
15 Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980, p.209. 
16 Such as Harvey E. Bale, Jr., “The United States Policy toward inward Foreign Direct Investment,” Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol.18, No.2, 1985, pp.199-222; David Scott Nance and Jessica Wasserman, 
“Regulation of Imports and Foreign Investment in the United States on National Security Grounds,” Michigan 
Journal of International Law, Vol.11, No.3, 1990, pp.926-986; Jacqueline J. Ferber, “The U.S. Foreign Direct 
Investment Policy: The Quest for Uniformity,” Marquette Law Review, Vol.76, No.4, 1993, pp.805-832. 
17 Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976, pp.219-250; Robert T. 
Kudrle and Davis B. Bodrow, “U.S. Policy toward Foreign Direct Investment,” World Politics, Vol.34, No.3 1982, 
p.366; Barbara Jenkins, The Paradox of Continental Production: National Investment Policies in North American, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1992; Patrick Jude DeSouza, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in the United 
States, 1973-1993, and the Making of American Foreign Economic Policy, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 
1994; C.S. Eliot Kang. 1997. “U.S. Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment,” 
International Organization, Vol. 51, No.2, pp.301-33. 
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important for understanding U.S. inward FDI policy. However, in the late 1980s, JFDI entered into the 
United States through merger & acquisition (M&A) as well as new plant establishment. There is a need to 
discuss Greenfield investment policy due to its broader influence in the 1990s. As will be illustrated in the 
following chapter, different kinds of FDI have different political implications. 
The second kind of work argues that national security concern will empower government to protect 
their own assets. The logic is that some industries are too important for national defense for the state to 
lose its control; this argument can be traced back to Adam Smith.18 In regards to U.S. inward investment 
policy, national security is a strong argument to discriminate against foreigners. Many policy makers 
believe that foreign firms are unlikely to guarantee the supply of some critical materials under urgent 
conditions. Moreover, this view is broadly accepted not only by political scientists, but also by those in 
other disciplines.19 However, the further consideration on national security could be extended into the new 
circumstance, such as whether the nationality of multinationals really matters, whether national security or 
economic security is in essence different, and which parts of production processes are crucial and must be 
controlled by domestic firms. 
The third kind of view takes domestic interest groups’ policy demands into account. Economic 
transactions generate different interests. In IPE study, it has long been realized that internationally-oriented 
multinationals maintain a firm liberal position in foreign economic policy, while those import-competing 
firms somewhat prefer using policy instruments to protect themselves. This kind of research goes further 
toward understanding the mircoeconomic foundation of policy demand. It assumes that firms or industries 
are interest-maximizing actors in the international economy, and any change in volume or scope of 
                                                        
18 See Andrew Walter, “Adam Smith and the Liberal Tradition in International Relations,” Review of International 
Studies, Vol.22, No.1, pp.5-28. 
19 Donald J. Goldstein, “Foreign Direct Investment in the United States and National Security Policy,” Comparative 
Strategy, Vol.7, 1988, pp.143-158; Michael Hodges, “The Japanese Industrial Presence in America: Same Bed, 
Different Dreams,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.18, No.3, 1989, pp.359-376; David Bailey et al., 
“US Policy Debate toward Inward Investment,” Journal of World Trade, Vol2.6, No.4, 1992, pp.65-93; Davis B. 
Bobrow and Robert T. Kudrle, “Economic Interdependence and Security: U.S. Trade and Investment Policy for A 
New Era,” Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Vol.3, No.1, 1994, pp.61-96; Edward M. Graham and Paul R. 
Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, third edition, Washington, DC: Institute for International 
Economics, January 1995 [1989]; Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, US National Security and Foreign 
Direct Investment, Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2006. 
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international economic activity may influence their calculations on benefits and cost. In the contemporary 
world, governments still control a lot of resources and government policy instruments still impact on 
firms’ competitiveness. Scholars find that FDI policy involves much more than foreign ownership, and 
domestic firms’ policy demand varies across and within industries as well as over time.20 This kind of 
work specifically identifies which kinds of firms or industries will make trade-offs in different policy 
choices, such as tariffs, voluntary export restrictions (VER), and local content requirements. However, 
they only examine the demand side of policy and therefore finish the half part of works on policy analysis. 
The other side of policy analysis is the supply of policy. The big challenge is that the demand for policy 
may not translate directly into policy outcome. On this point, we will discuss more in chapter 2.  
Overall, the above works examine some facets of the story and reflect the importance of the topic. As 
U.S. investment policy in the past several decades was considered inconsistent and incoherent, scholars 
use more information to divide types of FDI policy. In addition to federal government policy change, we 
should keep in mind that individual state in the United States has authority to exercise its own investment 
policies. The states and other societal actors disagree about the conditions in which FDI mainly brings 
economic benefits. Thus, contrary to the federal government’s shift from liberalism to regulation of inward 
FDI, states usually welcome FDI entry. A fascinating story can be found at the international level, as 
Robert Kudrle strongly criticized that “the evaluation of policy initiatives so far has largely neglected 
America’s international relations,” and suggested further work must consider problems such as reciprocity, 
national treatment, GATT for Investment, and bilateral treaties.21 
To some extent, scholarly works are influenced and constrained by theoretical trends. In the long run, 
policy makers are in turn strongly influenced by academic works. U.S. policy makers from the 1980s to 
the early 1990s were in a period where academic study paradigms were in transition. This academic study 
                                                        
20 John B Goodman, Debora Spar, and David B. Yoffie, “Foreign Direct Investment and the Demand for Protection in 
the United States,” International Organization, Vol.50, No.4, 1996, pp.565-91; Jonathan Crystal, “A New Kind of 
Competition: How American Producers Respond to Incoming Foreign Direct Investment,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.42, No.3, 1998, pp.513-543; Tore Ellingsen and Karl Warneryd, “Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Political Economy of Protection,” International Economic Review, Vol.40, No.2, 1999, pp.357-379; Jonathan Crystal, 
Unwanted Company: Foreign Investment in American Industries, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
21 Robert T. Kudrle, “Good For the Gander?,”pp.421-423.  
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confusion adds analytic difficulty for us, but also creates opportunity to revise this process. As Raymond 
Vernon reminded us in 1994, under the condition in which the U.S. was flooded with JFDI in the later 
1980s, “some political scientists in that country [U.S.] began to rediscover arguments that had been 
popular among developing countries a decade or two earlier.” 22 In this regard, the situation in which 
“there [was] an amazing parallel between the U.S.’s growing fears about foreign ownership and those 
expressed by other nations” predicted by Robert Gilpin in the mid 1970s was repeated.23 However, history 
may not repeat completely on this issue, as policies on investment have become more liberal worldwide. In 
practice, since the late 1980s, more and more states adopted liberal investment policies to attract FDI.24  
To better understand the political economy of JFDI in the United States, we need to take a new 
perspective. Probably constrained by their own unique disciplines, previous scholars often neglected each 
other when they constructed their own questions. A similar situation was also confronted by economists as 
well as business scholars. To better understand FDI, in his review article on United Nations Library on 
Transnational Corporations, Vernon expected “participants from diverse fields.”25 
 
 
The Argument: Internationalization and Control over FDI 
Theoretical developments as well as changed real-world conditions require us to take a new approach 
to understanding FDI relations between the second-largest economy and the largest economy in the world. 
The idea for a new framework adopted in this dissertation was developed by the second generation IPE 
scholars.26 They accepted the first generalization’s emphasis on the interaction of political factors and 
economic factors in international relations, and they also realized that the great powers’ foreign economic 
                                                        
22 Raymond Vernon, “Research on Transnational Corporations: Shedding Old Paradigms,” Transnational 
Corporation, Vol.3, No.2, 1994, p.143. 
23 Robert Gilpin, “The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation,” American Political Science Review, 
Vol.70, No.1, 1976, p. 191. 
24 Zachary Elkins, et al., “Competing for Capital; The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,” 
International Organization, Vol.60, No.3, 2006, pp.811-846. 
25 Raymond Vernon, “Research on Transnational Corporations,” p.155. 
26 On generation division of IPE scholars, see Benjamin Cohen, International Political Economy: An Intellectual 
History, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008, especially pp.169-171. 
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policies are very important and gave it much attention. In contrast to popular threefold ideology in IPE 
categorized by Robert Gilpin, the second generation scholars attempt to use interests and institutions to 
analyze the interaction of political and economic factors in policy change. This framework is still an 
incomplete work in IPE study, and will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 2. To some extent, the case of 
JFDI in the United States can be used to improve and expand this framework. 
As noted above, IPE scholars have already realized that the state cannot always be considered as a 
rational actor that maximizes its utility in negotiating with multinationals. It depends in part on the details 
of the nation state, industry and firms involved; also it is influenced by the settings under which the 
transactions take place. In the case of JFDI in the U.S., there existed a complex interaction between 
domestic and international actors. In the inside of the United States, executives and Congress, states and 
federal government had diverse attitudes toward JFDI. At the international level, Japan as home country of 
JFDI strongly influenced the operations and strategies of Japanese multinationals. At the same time, this 
home country factor also exerted influence on policy makers in the United States. To the U.S., Japanese 
multinationals were an important part of Japanese power.  
These dynamics mainly rest on two basic variables—interests and institutions. The mobility of 
investment in the U.S. and between the U.S. and Japan created different interests for different groups. 
During the process of interest distribution followed by interest creation, actors were differentiated in their 
sensitivities to benefits and costs. Great powers are much more sensitive to their relative power, especially 
during periods of power decline. The debate over whether U.S. power decline had reached its peak in the 
late 1980s contributed to policymakers’ judgment on the seriousness of the threat of JFDI. Secondly, in 
contrast to the assumption of automatic interest adjustment and zero cost, political economists would like 
to consider who bears the costs. Thus, domestic institutions and international institutions matter in this 
process. Institutions are principles, rules, and decision-makings processes, which create convergence of 
expectations and credible commitment for actors in society.  
To political economists, not all actors can get what they want from the flows of FDI; the interest 
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distribution resulting from mobility of FDI can be partly attributed to politics. At the federal government 
level, policy outcomes were partly based on the balance between liberal commercial policy tradition in the 
Executive branch and pro-protectionism rhetoric in the Congress; outcomes also depended on which 
industries JFDI entered. For example, when the industry was particularly important to national security or 
economic security, there was no serious conflict between the executive and Congress. At the local/state 
level, interests created by JFDI were very different. From an economic perspective, the competition 
between local states reduced national welfare due to the fact that local states provided financial incentives 
to foreign investors. However, the U.S. federal government had little power to regulate states’ behavior in 
blocking, attracting and competing for JFDI. 
The traditional IPE paradigm in analyzing multinationals is constrained by the unitary actor model 
and a focus on national-level policy. In studying a relatively small country, these assumptions may reflect 
reality; as such a state can be compared to a firm in a competitive market. However, a great power has 
capability and willingness to influence the international system. Thus, a single case study that concerns a 
great power’s foreign economic policy needs a new approach. Moreover, the traditional IPE paradigm 
emphasizes that a great power’s foreign economic policy is either mercantilist or liberalist. On this point, 
we will discuss more in chapter 1. Here, I only want to point out that inward investment policy is generally 
mixed.    
This study concerns the policy outcomes that resulted from JFDI. The core question in my 
dissertation is why and how the United States regulated the entry of JFDI. Combining historical analysis 
with theoretical thinking, this study examines JFDI in the United States and the resulting policy change. 
Given the fact that various disciplines have their own advantages and disadvantages in FDI study, this 
study mainly uses a more eclectic approach. Firstly, this study will reconstruct a factual picture of JFDI in 
the United States through both sides’ FDI data, and analyze its economic benefits and costs to the United 
States. Secondly, this study combines various materials to trace and analyze the policy making process. 
Thirdly, in addition to careful historical tracing of JFDI and U.S. policy change, it also uses IPE analytical 
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instruments and theories to make various interpretations of greater rigor and coherence.    
In this way, this study develops several arguments. My first argument is that JFDI was substantially 
different from other Western countries’ FDI, and this contributed to the debate and policy results. JFDI in 
industries that had impacts on the national economic power gap may cause national level policy response. 
The United States central policy makers’ concerns were relative gains and economic international 
competitiveness due to the economic challenge from Japan. The United States considered JFDI to be a 
very serious challenge and threat. That means economic security was the specific rationale that compelled 
U.S. federal government policy change. According to two nations’ data on JFDI in the United States, its 
industrial distribution and location were very uneven and somewhat different from other Western 
countries’ presence in the United States. Although JFDI’s presence was increasingly important, it was still 
relatively small compared to the total United States economy. Even under this condition, the debate on 
JFDI in the United States was substantially different from that concerning other Western countries.   
As a result, my second argument is that protectionism in the federal government as well as in some 
states could not go further due to state governments’ varied policies and some domestic groups’ liberal 
policy preferences. It is widely accepted that FDI creates jobs, increases tax receipts and promotes 
economic growth. Under this condition, some domestic societal actors and states in the United States 
welcomed JFDI. This argument highlights the critical difference between local state objectives and 
national government function with regard to JFDI. The relatively liberal policy or protectionism in a state 
was determined by economic welfare considerations, not ideology, culture, or national security. The more 
JFDI a state attracted, the more liberal policy positions that state maintained.   
The third argument relates U.S. policy to investment issues in the Uruguay Round of GATT. I argue 
that success in building international investment institutions is based on the trade effects resulted from FDI. 
Furthermore, this kind of investment institution was established by the two countries’ governments and got 
the support of private business in both countries. During this period, investment issues gradually replaced 
trade as the focal point in bilateral negotiations. The unique trade-creation characteristic of JFDI 
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contributed to trade conflict between the U.S. and Japan. The United States exercised pressure on the 
Japanese government to adjust its companies’ behavior. One of the U.S.’s strategies was to use 
international institutions to integrate investment issues and help to approach investment symmetry between 
Japan and the U.S. As a result, the burden on Japan in the investment area increased and embedded its 
interest in a stable international economic order. In fact, the Uruguay Round of GATT first created 
trade-related investment measures to manage investment mobility. Thus, my third argument operates at the 
international level asserting that international obligations as norms or institutions may increase states’ 
contractual binding to existing liberal policy. Although JFDI led to the United States’ investment policy 
shift from liberal to somewhat protectionist, it is still a liberal state. In some sense, we can say it is a 
limited protectionism. 
In short, we can summarize that the United States tried to control and manage the expansion of JFDI 
through policy change and institutional adjustment. Control is not prohibition; the latter implies reduced 
volume of economic transaction. Although free market and rule-oriented approaches were the international 
standard, in practice, the U.S. tried to control the outcomes in international economic relations. For the 
United States, the sense of control over FDI was critically important. In the context of internationalization 
and liberalization of economic activities, not all sovereign states lost their authority to manage this process. 
The state power over globalization of economic activities is better illustrated in this case.  
  
 
The Organization of This Dissertation 
The first chapter introduces my analytical framework. This chapter borrows two important 
variables—interests and institutions—from the second generation of IPE scholars and focuses on this 
emerging new framework in IPE, in particular on its operation in the political economy of FDI. In this 
chapter, I try to illustrate why this framework is important as well as useful, and I will explain how it 
operates in the subsequent chapters. To analyze the complex state capacity of the United States in 
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confronting the expansion of JFDI, this framework suggests that three levels should be considered in FDI 
policy and related institutional change. In this regard, domestic-international interaction is also necessary 
to analyze the political economy of JFDI in the United States.  
The second chapter historically describes JFDI in the U.S. during this period, mainly concerning three 
characteristics of JFDI: geographical distribution, sectoral composition, and trade linkage. Its main 
purpose is to construct a factual picture of JFDI and clarify to what extent JFDI in the United States during 
this period was different from its predecessors as well as other Western countries’ FDI in the United States. 
The third chapter focuses on the national level. We often take the United States as a unitary actor. 
Specifically, the United States government regulates FDI in protecting national interest. In this chapter we 
will discuss how and why the United States policy decision makers considered JFDI as a challenge and 
threat. The expansion of JFDI in the United States influenced international competitiveness and its 
perception of relative gains while the United States was a declining hegemon. Thus, detailed federal level 
investment policy making process will be traced and discussed in this chapter.  
The fourth chapter turns to U.S. domestic policy covering individual policy preferences and states’ 
policy. This chapter tells us that FDI as a physical presence in a host country obviously influenced 
domestic politics through direct firms’ strategy and indirect states’ influences. Based on a simple 
econometric model, this chapter tries to analyze the micro foundation of the policy change and to give 
highlight on JFDI. In general, states in the United States may welcome JFDI, as the latter contributes much 
to its economy. Thus, they will prefer liberal investment policy.   
The fifth chapter tries to examine the international level. This chapter has two main purposes: 
examine how the United States used bilateral negotiation and international institution building to 
coordinate FDI issues. Also, this chapter tries to examine how the United States governed its domestic 
interests with international obligations. In this chapter we want to examine the evolution of the definition 
of national interests and the enlargement of U.S. national interest in the FDI field. During this period, the 
United States gradually exploited international institutions to protect and enlarge its national interest 
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compared to preceding unilateral actions. The FDI into the U.S. brings us a new viewpoint on Japan-U.S. 
relations and deepens our understanding of the world after the Cold War.  
The last chapter concludes the dissertation. On JFDI in the U.S., we use a three-level analytical 
framework and find that the United States adopted an active investment policy to cope with the JFDI 
shocks. More generally, in the FDI area, developed countries still consider their relative gains and 
competitiveness. As a hegemonic power, the United States has the capability and willingness to coordinate 
its interest change at three levels. At last, U.S. policy makers gradually reached balance between federal 
protectionism and liberalism, which was maintained by domestic interests and international obligations.  
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Chapter 1 Interest, Institution, and Policy Adjustment: Analytical 
Framework 
  
 
 
The core question asked in this dissertation is why and how the United States managed the entry of 
Japanese FDI during this period. There are three different but closely related research areas on this topic. 
First, this topic relates to Japan-U.S. economic relations. Just like trade or international monetary relations 
between these two countries, investment relations are an important element of bilateral economic relations. 
Second, FDI directly resulted from the operations of Japanese multinationals. Thus, understanding the 
economics of Japanese FDI is important to further understand U.S. action or reaction. Third, U.S. strategic 
reaction to the mobility of Japanese FDI constituted important parts of U.S. foreign economic policy. The 
interplay between these three areas poses many questions worth investigating. In this dissertation, we 
attempt to center on U.S. inward investment policy change that resulted from the entry of Japanese FDI. 
The foreign economic policy change is essentially a political process and requires a political economy 
approach. 
To accomplish this purpose, we need to construct a more detailed analytical framework to help us 
examine the dynamics. This framework was originally introduced by the second generation scholars in IPE 
study. Partly different from theories used in social science which emphasize the causal mechanism relating 
two kinds of variables, this framework mainly helps us understand relationships between multiple or 
multilevel variables. Moreover, this framework has an operational function in dealing with 
interdisciplinary issues. In this chapter I will introduce a revised emerging IPE framework and reconstruct 
it into a relatively rigorous and coherent one. The framework used here is designed to analyze political 
economy of FDI and investment policy. 
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1.1 New Framework of IPE  
     Academic works should be established on the grounds of plentiful materials and rigorous 
analysis. The empirical puzzle and theoretical agenda alike produced exciting research efforts in IPE. The 
second generation scholars in IPE not only drew lessons from the first generation in IPE, but also 
learned much from other disciplines, especially from mircoeconomics. Based on two important 
variables—interests and institutions—the second generation argues that the state as a unitary actor is 
not a necessary assumption and national policy is not enough for analysis in investment policy 
analysis in particular, and in IPE in general. Thus, future works may be more flexible in analyzing 
foreign economic policy, while maintaining coherence.   
 
 
1.1.1 Traditional Models in Multinationals Study  
Multinationals by their nature are a political economy subject. Since the birth of IPE, Multinationals 
study was an integrated part of this interdisciplinary subject. From different disciplines, scholars 
constructed varied theories, examined different facets, and gave different weights in the narrative.27 The 
first generation scholars in the IPE community took the state as a unitary actor in the international system, 
and focused on two basic questions related to Multinationals. It was well summarized by Robert Keohane 
in 1972, 
 
From the viewpoint of interstate politics two questions seem crucial: 1) how do the 
activities of multinational enterprises affect the relative power of states and thus the 
relations of dependence and interdependence between them? And 2) how do the activities 
of multinational enterprises affect the policies of states, whether by influencing the 
attitudes of governmental officials or by acting as catalysts for conflict between states?28  
  
                                                        
27 An excellent collection on FDI study from IPE perspective, see Benjamin Gomes-Casseres and David B. Yoffie, 
eds., The International Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment, Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 1993. 
28 Robert O. Keohane and Van Doorn Ooms, “The Multinational Enterprise and World Political Economy,” 
International Organization, Vol. 26, No.1, 1972, p.107. 
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These questions characterized the theoretical as well as empirical orientation in IPE. The most 
important implications of these trends revealed in Keohane’s review article signify that in IPE, non-state 
actors are also important to international politics. As Keohane stated, people must take multinationals 
seriously. At the same time, Robert Gilpin articulated three models on the relationship of nation states 
system and multinational corporations. In his view, liberalism, Marxism, and Mercantilism can be used to 
categorize the types of interaction between international political systems and Multinational 
Corporations.29  
Since then, the models used in multinational studies were dominated by Gilpin’s categorization. 
Firstly, developing countries as host countries received much consideration. The most popular analytical 
concept and paradigm is dependency theory which emphasizes the weak position of developing countries 
compared to strong U.S. multinationals in bargaining. In particular, the bargaining model was centered on 
developing countries’ capacity. In subsequent studies on this kind of work, many scholars found that 
developing countries’ learning capability and specific industries are very important in augmenting their 
power.30 However, the host country in our study is the largest economy in the world and the home country 
is the second largest economy. The two of them have much stronger state capacity and all-encompassing 
industries.  
Another kind of work mainly dealt with trans-Atlantic relations resulting from U.S. multinationals, 
and to some extent can be categorized as mercantilism. The American Challenge and Jack Behrman’s 1970 
work fall into this category.31 Although at that time, Yale University economist Richard Cooper’s ideas on 
economic interdependence between Atlantic communities began to influence policy circles across the 
Atlantic,32 not all issue areas were taken into account. The main concerns of developed countries’ relation 
                                                        
29 Robert Gilpin, “The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol.70, No.1, 1976, pp.184-191; as well as his U.S. Power and the Multinational 
Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, New York: Basic Books, 1975.  
30 Dennis J. Encarnation and Louis T. Wells, Jr., “Sovereignty En Garde: Negotiating with Foreign Investors,” 
International Organization, Vol. 39, No.1, 1985, pp.47-78; Stephen J. Kobrin, “Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in 
the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries,” International Organization, Vol41, No.4, 1987, pp.609-638. 
31 Jack N. Behrman, National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise: Tensions Among the North Atlantic 
Countries, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. 
32 Richard R. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community, New York: 
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with U.S. multinationals are to emphasize the threat of U.S. multinationals without emphasis on the host 
country’s state capacity.33  
The policy responses of the United States were particularly complex given the allies’ rise in the 1960s 
and 1970s. In his comparative historical study on Western European countries’ policy adjustments to 
America’s automobile industry till the early 1980s, political scientist Simon Reich found three models of 
liberal state policy response to foreign producers. 34 He argued that the most effective policy was designed 
by the West German government, because it tried to “combine unlimited access to MNCs with 
discriminatory government policies designed to aid local automobile producers.”35 The liberal welcome 
investment policy that the British government pursued reduced the long-term economic health of 
indigenous British firms. Reich continued to argue that the United States took a similar policy response to 
Japanese automobiles as Britain adopted towards the American multinationals in the twentieth century. 
According to his logic, this liberal policy led to the decline of U.S. automobile industry. However, this 
analysis and prediction did not take place in the United States. Thus, the liberal model cannot help us 
understand why the United States did not fall into this pattern. 
The period of the late 1980s witnessed a transition in FDI study paradigm. The ideas, concepts and 
instruments developed since the 1960s began to face new challenges. According to the editors’ 
expectations in two volumes of The International Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment, 
scholars in the 1990s should “take two tracks: (1) rediscover the virtues of the first wave, by addressing 
once again major, multi-disciplinary questions of political economy; (2) build richer models of DFI, using 
the tools and advances in the economics and political science disciplines.” 36 Since then, scholars have 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Columbia University Press, 1968. 
33 David Leyton-Brown, “The Multinational Enterprise and Conflict in Canadian-American Relations,” International 
Organization, Vol.28, No.4, 1974, pp.733-754; Theodore H. Moran, “Multinational Corporations and the Political 
Economy of U.S.—European Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol.30, No.1, 1976, pp. 65-79; Edward M. 
Graham, “Transatlantic Investment by Multinational Firms: A Rivalistic Phenomenon?” Jounral of Post Keynesian 
Economics, Vol.1, No.1, 1978, pp.82-99. 
34 Simon Reich, “Roads to Follow: Regulating Direct Foreign Investment,” International Organization, Vol.34, No.4, 
1989, pp.543-584. 
35 Ibid., p.546. 
36 Benjamin Gomes-Casseres and David B. Yoffie, “Introduction,” in Benjamin Gomes-Casseres and David B. Yoffie, 
eds., The International Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment, 1993, p.xvi. 
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made much progress in the study of the determinants and impacts of FDI. The events and topics involved 
in multinationals and FDI study are broader than ever.37 For the purpose of this study, the impacts of JFDI 
and U.S. policy response are considered. Thus, I examine the Japanese, rather than any other Western 
countries’ direct investment in the United States. This reflects the nationality of multinationals in the world 
political economy. That means the Japanese multinationals are dramatically different from those of other 
countries. It cannot be assumed that all FDI would have had the same impact on the United States. 
Influenced by national economy paradigm in international political economy, policy makers were greatly 
concerned whether assets or industries were owned by domestic firms or foreigners. In fact, the “Who is 
Us” problem was one of the heated topics in U.S. academics in the early 1990s, and influenced much of 
the Clinton Administration’s investment policy.38    
Moreover, the 1980s was a period that saw the structure of the international economy change 
significantly. Robert Gilpin in his classic The Political Economy of International Relations noted that the 
motivation and purpose of his book concerned “the relative decline of American power, the role of 
political factors in determining international economic relations, and the dynamic nature of economic 
forces in altering global political relations appear again below. Other elements, however, appear for the 
first time. I emphasize the meteoric rise of Japan and its challenge to the liberal international economic 
order. The remarkable shift in the locus of the center of the world economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
in the closing decades of the twentieth century is given special attention.”39 In a similar fashion, political 
scientist Robert Kudrle argued that there were “two paradigms” in international political economy: the 
Atlantic alliance was a liberal system, while East Asia was a mercantilist system. The economic friction 
between the United States and Japan in the late 1980s was different from the frictions within Atlantic 
                                                        
37 Such as global governance and company social responsibility, see Christopher May, ed., Global Corporate Power: 
(Re) integrating Companies into IPE, International Political Economy Yearbook, Vol. 15, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2006. 
38 The two opposed views on this issue see Robert B. Reich, “Who Is Us?” Harvard Business Review, 
January-February, 1990, pp.53-54; Laura Tyson, “They Are Not US: Why American Ownership Still Matters,” The 
American Prospect, Winter 1991, pp.37-49.  
39 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, 
preface, p.xiv. 
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capitalism.40 Any discussions on the subject of FDI certainly could not ignore this background. 
 
 
1.1.2 Emerging Framework in IPE  
To the second generation in IPE, Gilpin’s abstract and generalized models are not enough to grasp the 
dynamics in world political economy. The first challenge is that the unitary actor analytical assumption 
could not universally be used in foreign economic policy study. With the rising importance of economic 
issues in national strategy, there are skeptical voices about this assumption. One of them is “national 
interest” assumption. Some scholars argue that it is very difficult to identify what “national interest” is. 
Another is state autonomy to private societal actors.  
On the first problem, national interest is considered as an analytical concept. Generally speaking, it 
emphasizes state authority in some issue areas and common national level interests. The United States is 
the superpower in the world political economy; therefore, we would usually expect it to seek to integrate 
its economic and political aims. On this point, we should keep in mind that any theorization or 
conceptualization has its advantage and disadvantage in operation. Students of International Relations are 
often confused by the variety of theories and assumptions in applying theoretical conclusions. One way to 
avoid this mistake is to identify specifically why scholars attempt to construct a theory and where this 
theory is located. Which kind of purpose we consider and which levels we analyze are important concerns 
in helping us grasp the advantages of theory. As Krasner noted in his reply to critics on realist logic and 
his work on statism, “the primary focus on my study, Defending the National Interest, was not the 
international system. It was not, then, primarily a realist analysis but rather an effort to demonstrate the 
empirical plausibility of an important realist assertion: namely, that states could be treated as unified 
rational actors.”41 Although Kranser himself made it clear that his work was not a “realist analysis”, but 
rather assumed state as a unitary actor in foreign policy analysis, many scholarly works would like to treat 
                                                        
40 James R. Kurth, “The Pacific Basin versus the Atlantic Alliance: Two Paradigms of International Relations,” 
ANNALS, AAPSS, 505, 1989, pp.34-45. 
41 Stephen D. Krasner, “Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert,” Political Theory, Vol.20, 
No.1, 1992, p.46. 
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it as a classical realist one. Krasner’s deduction approach is very similar to realist analysis. In this sense, 
the rational choice methodology can be assumed. Scholars accept the utility-maximization assumption, and 
take self-interested behavior for granted. Even this assumption was challenged in some specific conditions; 
scholars deal with this logical contradiction by treating states “as if” they are.  
Furthermore, political scientists recognize that rational choice can be more productive in analysis of 
political behavior. Rational individuals must know the rules of the games in which choices are made and 
identify how to participate in the crafting of rules to constitute better games. The rational institutionalism 
is based on the assumption of utility maximization of self-interest individuals and considers institution as a 
strategic context. To rational institutionalism, whose concern is anout more specific and time-bound events. 
According to Barry Weingast, rational institutionalism examines the effects and the forms of institutions, 
and tends to understand when, why and which kind of institution come into play. In another words, 
rational-choice institutionalism not only became the content of analysis in IPE, but also a useful instrument 
to grasp the interaction between domestic and international forces.42 
On the second problem, Krasner’s earlier analysis is still worth rethinking. In his 1978 book 
Defending the National Interest, Krasner provides three “ideal-typical” relationships between the state and 
society. First, the state may be able to “resist societal pressure, but unable to change the behavior of private 
actors”; second, the state may be able to “resist private pressure” and to “persuade private groups to follow 
policies that are perceived as furthering the national interest”, but be “unable to impose structural 
transformation on its domestic environment”; third, “a state may have the power to change the behavior of 
existing private actors and also, over a period of time, the economic structure itself.”43 It is rare that a state 
is strong in all issue areas. Some states may be strong in particular issue areas; some states may be weak in 
these issue areas, strong in others. According to Krasner, “there is no reason to assume a priori the pattern 
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of strength and weakness will be the same for all policies.”44 
In 1988, International Organization published a special issue “The State and American Foreign 
Economic Policy” focused on U.S. strategies in the international economy. In this important volume, the 
authors develop an institutional approach to American foreign economic policy. They argue that the “state 
serves as an important independent or intervening variable between social and international forces, on the 
one hand, and foreign economic policy on the other.”45 Furthermore, they note that “black box” research 
techniques are “less useful when analysis…. focuses more closely on a small number of cases in a single 
country over time.”46For better understanding of foreign economic policy, we need to know policy 
processes, and how domestic and international forces and constraints are transmitted. They consider that 
societal and international approaches can be significantly enhanced by incorporating a conception of the 
state as an independent or intervening variable in the explanation. An understanding of how social and 
international forces are transmitted and mediated within the “black box” of government is particularly 
important when analysts are investigating small numbers of policy choices in a single country. 
Robert Putnam takes a similar view on the role of central policy makers in international negotiation. 
47 Putnam’s “Two-Level Game” model consists of two levels related to international negotiation. Level I 
is negotiators’ strategies; in level II, there are two steps: one is to identify preferences and coalitions, the 
other is to analyze institutional constraints. The logic is simple: international negotiation will change the 
domestic interest distributions, and the agreement needs domestic constituents’ ratification, so then it could 
not be judged solely by negotiators at the national or international level. Putnam regards central decision 
makers as state actor in his conceptualization, and considers it as an “honest broker”. This thinking is a 
particularly Anglo-American way of deduction. In his conclusion, Putnam emphasizes again that “unlike 
the ‘Second Image’ or the ‘Second Image Reversed’, the two-level approach recognizes that central 
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decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.”48 
Thus, we understand a unitary assumption is explicit in these works. As David Lake observed,  
 
The cumulative research of the last several decades clearly suggests that the state is autonomous, 
but only under some circumstance, conditions, and times. Likewise, business interests—and those 
of labor, agriculture, and consumers as well—also perform important but contingent roles in 
setting national policy…..The task before us is to integrate the isolated propositions produced by 
these separate agendas into a powerful and elegant theory of politics.49  
 
Perhaps a milestone in debating on whether the state should be taken as a unitary actor is Helen 
Milner’s “polyarchy” model. Writing in 1998, Milner argued that relaxing the assumption that the state is 
unitary and the most important actor in IR theory will make difference.50 Based on the emerging 
“rationalist institutionalist” research agenda in political science, Milner deconstructs the state into three 
connected but relatively independent institutions: the executive, the legislature and relevant interest groups. 
Milner reminds us that in international studies, “the appropriate specification of the units does not 
necessarily depend on the level of analysis.”51  
The criteria that determines the appropriate unit depends on the focus and the purpose of our study. 
Specifically, scholars should use the highest level of generality that the ability of this collectivity could be 
acted as a coherent unit. This methodological deduction helps us to identify a suitable unit. In international 
politics, the state is regarded as a machine that can automatically formulate diverse domestic interests. 
Furthermore, the central policy makers are regarded as acting on behalf of the state interest. 
Milner notes that the national interest formulation process is the aggregation of domestic preferences, 
and it must satisfy three assumptions. 52  The first assumption stipulates that decision makers are 
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utility-maximizing actors. In a democratic regime, their motivation is to realize reelection and control 
policy outcomes. The second assumption is that on a particular issue, all individuals have the same set of 
preferences and their preferences can be represented as a single function. The last assumption stipulates 
that the immediate process between the individual preferences and higher central policy makers’ 
preferences are taken as “black boxes”. This means that election systems guaranteeing their preferences 
will automatically be transmitted into central decision makers’ preferences.  
However, as Milner argues, the assumptions that one group controls foreign policy and strategic 
domestic agents have the same preferences cannot be realized in all circumstances. Milner criticizes the 
broadly accepted view on the difference between domestic politics and international politics. She argues 
that most politics lie in between the poles of anarchy and hierarchy. In most issues, there is no single group 
at the top. Thus, determining who can act as the representative actor is a big problem in political life. In 
this situation, “international politics and foreign policy are part of the domestic struggle for power over 
collective outcomes and the search for internal compromise.”53 
Recently, David Lake has argued that the concept of anarchy that once strongly divided domestic and 
international politics should be considered again due to the fact that there is a growing hierarchy in world 
politics.54 According to Lake’s view, hierarchy is a continuous variable varying degrees of authority 
relations in world politics. Thus, Lake argues that “rather than separating analysis into autonomous spheres, 
our understanding would be better served by arraying different sets of political institutions, issue areas, and 
historical periods along continua of more or less political hierarchy.”55 Certainly, this situation in 
economic affairs has much resemblance to polyarchy. With the rise of economic interdependence, 
domestic agents cannot be assumed to have the same sets of preferences as governments. One of the most 
important facts of economic globalization is that the distribution between domestic groups is different. 
Thus, if domestic strategic agents do not have the same preferences on some kinds of economic activities, 
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the national interest concept becomes much less meaningful.        
These two points are the analytical prerequisites that lead IPE scholars to regard the state as a 
composite institution. Policy decision making power is shared by many groups who engage in bargaining 
processes. These processes not only provide the opportunity for competing policy makers in the side of 
policy supply, but also leave room for social groups to rent-seek. Furthermore, the different policy 
preferences found in societal groups become a strong motivation to demand alternative policy. Another 
important implication from this kind of idea is that national interest can be taken as the outcome of strong 
groups’ preferences aggregated into an accepted common national interest.  
On this point, political scientist Andrew Moravcsik provides a comprehensive liberal theoretical 
explanation of national interest formation. He skillfully isolates the difference between preferences, 
strategies, and tactics according to time sequences. Liberal theory concerns the consequences for state 
behavior which result from fundamental preferences shift, not strategic interaction. Furthermore, he 
suggests that the state may be disaggregated into different elements, and state preferences are transmitted 
by domestic political institutions to reflect societal groups’ preferences. Moravcsik acknowledges that a 
non-unitary state can be analyzed “as if” it was unitary and rational. He continues to advise a two-stage 
process of social choice: “states first define preferences—a stage explained by liberal theories of 
state-society relations. Then they debate, bargain, or fight to particular agreements—a second stage 
explained by realist and institutionalist (as well as liberal) theories of strategic interaction. The two-stage 
model offers a general structure for research design and theoretical explanation.”56 In other words, this 
two-stage process of policy analysis can be regarded as an interest-based and institution-oriented analysis. 
Centering on interest change, various groups first identify what their own interests are, and then debate 
each other on which kind of national policy should be exerted.  
In IPE, scholars mainly discuss two functions of institutions: aggregation and delegation. 57 
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Aggregation is a bottom up process, and delegation is a top-down process. Some political institutions 
shape the process by which preferences are aggregated domestically. In this way, institutions authorize 
some groups to organize and mobilize to participate in the political process. In some sense, they are 
designed to resolve collective action problems. Still other forms of institutions are best understood as 
delegating authority from one group to another. In the former, the most cited example is electoral 
institutions. They affect the transmission of social interests to politicians. Thus, politicians need to respond 
to policy relevant concerns of the broad electorate. In other words, the more the electoral system reflects 
the preferences of the mass public, or as political economists call the “median voters,” the more policy has 
also to reflect these preferences.  
On the delegation side, scholars usually discuss two kinds of institutions: legislative organizations 
and bureaucratic institutions. In American national politics, two types of elected officials are most 
responsible for making authoritative choices about structure: legislators and presidents. Legislators are the 
center of attention and traditionally belong to politics.  
Thus, the state as a collective concept is organized by a variety of institutions. As Miles Kahler noted, 
“thinking of the state as an institutional composite—an institutional profile that changes over time—offers 
a third perspective on globalization and its effects on the state. Without such institutional specification, 
estimating the effects of globalization on the state quickly becomes an argument over how to define the 
state.”58 The institutional structure distributes power and provides different opportunities for groups to 
change their payments.  
Besides the influence of International Relations theory on IPE, the growing importance of economic 
theory is also explicit. The second generation borrows ideas, analytical tools, and methodology from 
mircoeconomics. The main reason is that economists have already produced much work on political 
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economy, especially on economic policy analysis. 59  Many works on developed countries’ foreign 
economic policy probably discussed the policy preference owned by domestic groups. In this regard, they 
only deal with a “partial equilibrium” analysis without concerning supply of policy.60   
Until the mid-1990s, the common feature of this kind of work attempted to locate domestic societal 
groups in the world economy. That means interest change is not constrained within territorial borders; 
rather, it is determined by the international economy. The degree of this international linkage strongly 
influences their policy preferences and political activities.61 Yet they also note that this process does not 
mean economic determinism. Policy preferences cannot be taken as equal to policy outcomes. The latter 
relies on the interaction between various forces related to specific topics. The advantages of both economic 
analysis and political analysis are well recognized by some specialists in political science and economics 
As Robert Baldwin, a well known political economist stated, “Our understanding of international political 
economy can be improved by integrating various elements in the approaches being followed by the two 
disciplines.”62 
Entering into the new century, the second generation reached a consensus on what is IPE, what has 
been accomplished during the past years and what the future research agenda should be. Nowadays, 
academic study in IPE uses interests and institutions to establish new a foundation of IPE analysis, 
especially domestic-international connection in foreign economic policy.63 Writing in 2002, Frieden and 
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Martin argued that, “despite imprecision about the definition of IPE, in the past twenty years the field has 
approached consensus on theories, methods, analytical frameworks, and important questions.”64 This new 
framework was improved mostly under the guidance of research programs in foreign economic policy 
study. Scholars try to do with the “interaction of domestic and international factors as they affect economic 
policies and outcomes.” 65  On the one hand, understanding domestic politics of foreign economic 
policymaking is necessary to further extend discussing the international outcomes. On the other hand, 
strategic interaction among nation states produces feedback effects to policy making. During the past 
decades, empirical puzzles and theoretical agendas alike produced exciting research efforts in this 
direction.  
The richness and variety of this framework depend on the linkage or interaction of interest and 
institution. As Frieden and Martin noted, “the core of the domestic-international connection is the impact 
of domestic institutions and interests on international interaction, and vice versa.”66 To begin with, 
economic interest is an important motivation to integrate domestic and international affairs. As economic 
globalization will induce price equalization between groups in different states according to new classical 
economic theory, people will seek for interest creation in a partly globalized world over national borders. 
In IPE, scholars deduce the interests of relevant groups from microeconomic theory and the accepted 
rationalism model. Followed by the process of interest creation and distribution, however, not everyone 
benefits equally from this globalization. Those losers caused by this process will seek protection from the 
government. However, collective action on this mobilization is a big challenge for organizations of 
individuals. Even if groups are organized to lobby for policy adjustment, it partly depends on the rules of 
the political game.  
The second step is to integrate institutions into the interest adjustment process. Although the demand 
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for policy resulting from societal groups is natural for policy analysis, it is not mobilized in a political 
vacuum. The supply of policy usually relies on the particular institutional environment. Institutions 
determine the rules of the political game. They define what political power means in a particular society, 
and whether the competition over policy will be conducted via votes, via contributions, or via ideas. In this 
sense, institutions are the means to aggregate agents’ preferences into choices or outcomes for the 
collective. When considering policy supply, government is not completely constrained by societal groups. 
The relations between government and society are diverse in different societies. In other words, state 
autonomy does not lose its meaning in policy analysis. Michael J. Hiscox, a political economist at Harvard 
University, succinctly summarized that, “these two analytical steps put together like this, combining both 
economic and political analysis in tandem, are generally referred to as the political economy approach to 
the study of policy outcomes.”67 
During this policy supply and demand process, scholars realize that international bargaining cannot 
be removed from policy analysis. In the case of developed democratic countries, international institutions 
become an important policy instrument in shifting and adjusting interest distribution. The great powers not 
only obtain power resources to control economic internationalization, but also critical managerial 
techniques to coordinate with other countries. This point is central to describing the purpose and process of 
great power’s international institution building.  
This framework has produced some interesting works in IPE. However, a fascinating fact in IPE 
study is that not all specific issue-areas have received equal research attention. As Frieden and Martin 
noted, “probably the best-studied area of IPE is trade, followed closely by monetary issues. Financial 
issues, including international investment of various types, receive little attention in the current 
literature.”68 This situation was influenced strongly by empirical puzzles in world political economy. 
However, as opposed to the long history of trade in human affairs, foreign direct investment was a rather 
new phenomenon mainly originating after the Second World War. Despite this unequal development in 
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empirical studies, scholars maintained a strong interest in this emerging interdisciplinary field. More and 
more scholars applied this framework “to undertake empirical investigations of a wide variety of 
international economic policies in a wide variety of settings.”69  
So far we can see the difference between the first generation and the second generation in their 
understanding of the content, scope, and analytical tools in IPE. Influenced much by International 
Relations paradigm, the first generation was inclined to take the nation state as a unitary actor and focus on 
national policy, as Keohane demonstrated above. However, the views on the definition and scope of IPE 
were not accepted by all scholars outside American academic study. British international political 
economist Susan Strange, among them, argued that IPE should not be constrained by American IPE.70 
Strange even argued that “far from a subdiscipline of international relations, IPE should claim that 
international relations are a subdiscipline of IPE.”71 
To the second generation, IPE has a much broader scope and expanded practical function. The actors 
can be any groups or individuals. The policy scope can be extended much further than national level (see 
Table 1.1). We will discuss below the conditions under which the United States can be taken as a unitary 
actor, or when it will be more productive to open this black box. It is not necessary to argue that the unitary 
actor assumption and “open black box” cannot be reconciled. It depends on the levels, policy preferences, 
and policy decision making processes with which we are concerned.     
. Table 1.1 Comparison between the 1st Generation and 2nd Generation’s Model  
 1st Generation 2nd Generation 
Unit of Analysis Nation state Nation state; non-state; societal group; 
individual 
Policy Scope National level foreign policy Much broader; foreign plus domestic 
Theories  Liberalism; 
Marxism; and  
Nationalism 
Either; 
Interest plus institution 
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Definitely, younger scholars would like to emphasize the reductionist methodology of neoclassical 
economics, and put forward what they consider important to the future. The well-defined behavior theory 
and solid microfoundations in economists’ models attract attention from younger scholars. In the FDI issue 
areas, the political economy approach has had an explicit impact on recent works.72 Even so, works on 
FDI still lack much and are behind trade or international monetary study in IPE. As David Lake, one of the 
second generation IPE scholars, noted, “the distributional implications of foreign direct investment, and 
especially the ownership of assets and production that such investment implies, remain the research 
frontier.”73   
The growing importance of mircoeconomic analysis is important to deepen our understanding. 
However, any academic works have their own advantages and disadvantages. As Benjamin Cohen recently 
pointed out, “no one can deny the benefits of a creeping economism, which brings both rigor and 
replicability to analysis. The Third Generation’s penchant for professionalism should be respected. Still…. 
there has also been a cost in terms of lost ambition and shrunken horizons. ”74 The trade-off between 
rigorous and coherent simple theories and an ambitious landscape is always a difficult choice. Sometimes 
we may need an “analytic narratives” approach to improve the framework and clarify the narrative.75  
In this dissertation, my concern is not any new theory of foreign economic policy or the determinants 
of FDI. Rather, this work attempts to accommodate a relatively comprehensive picture of the impacts of 
specific kinds of FDI on a great power’s investment policy change and related institutional adjustment. For 
this purpose, we need not only to examine the political economy of FDI, but also to discuss more about the 
United States. 
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1.2 A Political Economy of FDI  
Academic studies on FDI concern two sets of research questions. First, the determinants of FDI in the 
real world, such as why firms invest directly in host countries. Why do firms invest in this country rather 
than another country? Theoretical and empirical literature on this issue is substantial enough to give a 
longer literature review. 76 On this issue, dependent variables include at least firm-specific advantage as 
well as country-specific advantage. Works in this category use various analytical techniques to examine 
the economic as well as political factors that influence mobility of FDI. For example, monopolistic 
assumption, product cycle hypothesis, internalization theory, and eclectic paradigms occupy most FDI 
works from the 1960s to 1980s. Besides numerous approaches, theories and frameworks provided by 
economists, political scientists also developed some interesting theories on why firms operate through FDI 
and why some countries receive more FDI. Some trade economists go further and try to integrate 
multinational theory to new international trade theory helped by new trade theory developed since the late 
1970s.77 However, on this point, they are still far from reaching consensus on a general equilibrium 
analysis. Raymond Vernon once stated, “Economists will not have an easy time in mastering the 
complexities that the multinational enterprise introduces.”78  
Second, works examine the effects of multinationals’ activity on host and home countries. This set of 
research is one area that my dissertation tries to discuss. As a key part of globalization, FDI will strongly 
affect people’s economic welfare as well as the power of the nation-state. Economists are very interested in 
welfare effects induced by the mobility of FDI, such as trade effects, economic growth, macroeconomic 
stability and wages. Most economic theoretical answers are based on free trade thought, and mobility of 
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FDI will create a win-win situation for those involved in FDI. However, empirical studies illustrate that the 
outcomes depend heavily on industry, region and time. Most political scientists are concerned with the 
political activities resulteing from cross-border economic activities. Political scientists are concerned: why 
do some firms prefer liberal economic policy, while some firms do not? And why are certain governments 
exercising protectionism or free trade policy to some kinds of economic transaction?  
In the real world, these two aspects are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, we should 
know the economic welfare resulting from FDI before giving specific policy advice. As mentioned above, 
the second generation scholars in IPE try to use economic theory to identify interest change for better 
mircofoundation in policy analysis. Although economic variables are not the only factors influencing 
policy outcomes, the detailed economic distribution effects between states and within states are too 
important to ignore. Furthermore, the complexity of contemporary economic activity requires us to know 
exactly to what extent interest change is important. Given the strong linkages between economic welfare 
and policy trade-off in government, Vernon correctly noted that “until they [economists] produce more 
powerful generalizations, however, governments attempting to measure the consequences of the 
multinationals’ operations on their national interests must fall back on the many partial studies of their 
behavior that the literature provides.”79      
So far the political economy of FDI has at least three points different from other aspects of 
international economic issues. First, the economic theory foundations of trade, financial flows, and FDI are 
different, especially as the home country effect is very important to help us understand FDI behavior. 
Second, their distributional effects are different, which means collective action of social actors in political 
activities is different. Third, FDI itself is a process that goes beyond the border limitation and includes 
domestic policy. Traditionally, trade policy and international monetary policy are controlled by the federal 
government and mainly focus on the border. On the FDI issue, the federal government does not control all 
of the problems arising from FDI mobility. Moreover, FDI policy must include domestic economic policies. 
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For this study, we will discuss more on the distribution of FDI, and available policy instruments controlled 
by the government.   
 
 
1.2.1 Politics of Distributional Effects 
There are three levels of distributional effect resulting from the mobility of FDI. At international and 
national levels, we should examine to what extent the economic transaction will create power gaps 
between states. On this point, the first generation’s work still needs to be emphasized. This generation’s 
concerns basically originated from IR tradition in the 1970s, and obviously considered the multinationals 
as an important political actor. The distributional effects between the international economic system and 
nation states are not as popular in the contemporary era as in the 1960s partly because of the fact that 
multinationals are still under the control of the nation state system. What caused policy makers’ concern is 
the relationship between FDI and the nation state, and whether the flows of FDI will reduce or increase 
nation state power. Thus, the central issue of who benefits from FDI still remains.80 
The debate on whether outward capital will contribute to the home country can be traced back to the 
opening of the nineteenth century.81 Even some economists, such as David Richard, who on the whole 
accepted the free-trade principle, doubted whether it was desirable for government to permit the 
unrestrained export of capital. Some scholars attributed the economic decline of Holland and the 
depression in England during the latter part of the nineteenth century to excessive export of capital. Even 
in the early twentieth century, John M. Keynes once advocated government control of the volume of 
export of British capital as a safeguard against excessive export. In 1928, Herbert Hoove, while Secretary 
of Commerce of the United States, stated that: “A billion dollars spent upon American railways will give 
more employment to our people, more advance to our industry, more assistance to our farmers than twice 
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that sum expended outside the frontiers of the United States.”82 In the 1980s, the relationship between 
multinationals and competitiveness of the United States aroused the same concerns. Measured by shares in 
world manufactured exports, the importance of U.S. multinationals to the competitiveness of the United 
States increased.83 
The two fundamental works conducted by international political economists in the 1970s are still worth 
emphasizing. One is Robert Gilpin’s U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation; the other is Stephen 
D. Krasner’s Defending the Nation Interests. Although these two classics mainly dealt with the 
relationships between home country and MNCs, their analysis strongly demonstrated what kinds of basic 
national purpose are exercised by the United States and accepted by social groups. It is interesting to note 
that Gilpin’s study began as a report commissioned by the committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the 
U.S. Senate. Some scholars take it as “an early, but path-breaking, realist view of multinational 
corporations and the international political economy.”84 Gilpin declared that the growth of FDI is 
dependent upon U.S. hegemony, which established a stable regime conducive to such flows, and Krasner 
insists that the United States has unitary national interest in direct investment policy, which can resist the 
pressures from domestic companies’ policy lobby. These two books tell us of the close linkage between 
power and wealth, and these two purposes are also complementary in the long run.  
Gilpin argues that political stability only provided the necessary conditions for the FDI by MNCs; the 
sufficient conditions should be added by economic explanations. In economic explanations, FDI is an 
inevitable consequence of inherent aspects of economic factors. However, due to public policy view, FDI 
is a matter of policy choice and a function of the domestic political order. The political economy logic is as 
follows:, the unequal distribution of income in the core leads to an increase in the amount of capital 
available for investment. The subsequent flow of capital to the periphery results in the latter’s economic 
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growth, which increases its political power comparing to the core. Eventually, the growing wealth and 
power of the periphery leads to an increase in nationalism and a consequent weakening of its ties with the 
core. As in the earlier stages of the post-war world, the United States dominated the world economy and 
provided many public goods to its Western allies for ideology and defense, and the FDI was regarded by 
U.S. government as a foreign policy instrument. So governments provided tax avoidance and the 
minimization of tax liabilities. However, according to the product cycle theory, investing abroad would 
bring the comparative advantages to foreign economies. In the 1970s with the relative decline of U.S. 
hegemony and increasing challenges from other industrialized countries, U.S. governments should have 
adjusted their investment policies and encouraged innovation in domestic products. To central policy 
makers, the long term trend is important to national interest. Based on this logic, Gilpin suggested that the 
United States should develop a trade strategy rather than FDI strategy to defend and expand its liberal 
international economic order. 
The economic distributional effects that support Gilpin’s view are deduced from product cycle theory. 
In fact, liberal economist Vernon’s product cycle theory has the same economic logic, but he does not lead 
to politics in the initial formulation. James Kurth continues to extend the theme developed by Vernon and 
Gilpin. Kurth examines the political consequences of leading industrial sectors—textiles, steel, and 
automobiles —during the past two centuries. In his analysis, actor’s preferences are identified according to 
the industry’s position in the global product cycle. There are different political outcomes during the past 
two centuries relating to leading industry transformation. For example, the legitimation of the European 
liberal-democratic system was partly caused by the American automobile industry investing in Europe, 
causing the automobile boom of the 1950s-1960s in Western Europe. James Kurth concludes that political 
outcomes would be shaped not by one sector but by conflicts and coalitions between protectionist sectors 
and free trade ones since the 1970s.85   
In the 1980s, the product cycle hypothesis was not suitable to analyze the potential political problems 
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in developed countries. The first reason to challenge this hypothesis was that the dominance of U.S. 
multinationals began to fade. Product cycle hypothesis was developed by Raymond Vernon in 1966. Since 
the 1970s, the rise of European and Japanese FDI necessitated a new theory. Especially when many 
foreign firms began investing in the U.S. economy, the theory of FDI became more dynamic. For example, 
some theories on Japanese FDI are very different from the mainstream economic theory of FDI. Japanese 
economist Kiyoshi Kojima provided a macroeconomic theory of foreign direct investment opposed to the 
international business approach.86 The second reason is the assumption of product cycle hypothesis. The 
assumption of this model is a larger gap between income levels and wages between the United States and 
the rest of the world. With the outside environment change, these two assumptions could not hold. Ten 
years later, as Vernon himself put it, the convergence of income levels and wage rates in the industrial 
countries posed a challenge to the model.87 Gilpin borrowed partly from Vernon’s argument to explain the 
relationship between outflows of U.S. multinationals and U.S. power. Under the changed economic 
condition, we must revise the extension of Gilpin’s negative effects from outflows of FDI. 
In the 1980s, Japanese FDI in the United State also created distribution effect between the United 
States and Japan. Economist Terutomo Ozawa stated that Japanese FDI constituted “a 
house-cleaning-and-renovating vehicle” for Japan’s domestic structural changes. 88  Furthermore, this 
distribution problem was particularly complex in the context of the 1980s. The United States was 
experiencing serious economic decline since the 1970s. In academic and policy maker circles, U.S. power 
decline aroused debate on relative gains versus absolute gains from state cooperation in the late 1980s. 
Scholars from neorealism and neoliberalism academic traditions struggled over whether the state cares 
about relative gains from cooperation between states.89 Political scientist Samuel Huntington pointed out, 
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“economists argue that in economic competition what counts are absolute not relative gains; to economists 
this is a self-evident truth. It is, however, self-evident to almost no one but economists.”90 In the case of 
Japanese FDI in the United States, we should keep in mind that the United States is more concerned with 
relative gains in dealing with Japan in economic affairs. This point was thoroughly stated by Michael 
Mastanduno in the earlier 1990s.91 Thus, any serious discussion on the impact of Japanese FDI to policy 
should not avoid this point. 
At the domestic level, the logic of distribution effects in the FDI area is similar to trade. Globalization 
not only compels governments to more carefully exercise their policy responses, but also creates winners 
as well as losers in the domestic sphere.92 The common feature of the second generation’s works in the 
later 1980s is that they analyze the policy demand side without enough attention to the policy supply side. 
These works help us identify three kinds of unit of analysis in international economic policies: factor 
owners, firm and industry. However, all of these works deal with the partial equilibrium. They try to 
identify the policy demand side which is owned by societal groups. Theories in these kinds of work seem 
to provide an initial level of explanation for the supply and demand for foreign economic policy.  
In the 1990s, economists and political scientists conducted further studies on trade politics by 
integrating political institutions and policy processes. An important theoretical advance was provided by 
Grossman and Helpman in their article “Protect for Sale.” Economists’ works prove that a general 
equilibrium model can be used to examine trade policy is possible.93 In IPE, the works in the 1990s 
reached consensus on the integration of domestic politics in policy analysis.94 In contrast to traditional 
views on mutually exclusive relation between societal and statist approaches to foreign economic policy, 
scholars emphasize that these approaches should be considered as complementary. The combination and 
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interaction of these approaches are especially important to help understand trade policy.  
Recently, trade politics has progressed much in theoretical as well as empirical study, especially with 
regard to the two competing models. Michael Hiscox incorporates factor mobility into trade politics 
analysis. He pointed out that both Stopler-Samuelson and Richardo-Viner models examine extreme cases 
in which productive factors are assumed to be either perfectly mobile or completely specific. Thus, 
whether the domestic groups organized into class coalition or industry-based coalition should be explained 
due to the degree of factor mobility. The more mobility of factors, the more possibility of class coalitions 
formulating in politics.95 Hiscox acknowledges that cleavages and institutional interaction is important to 
help us understand trade politics. However, he emphasizes that “electoral and policymaking rules 
undoubtedly have important effects on trade politics. But the evidence presented in this book suggests that 
cleavages are powerfully shaped by economic forces.”96 This interests-based analysis contributed much to 
the question of why societal groups organized and politicians provided explicit incentives to elections. The 
future works, as Hiscox and others expected should be those that integrate and balance a mix of these 
factors. 
The theories or frameworks selected are partly determined by and reflected into our study purpose. 
For constructing a theory or a testing hypothesis, it is necessary to select fewer variables. If we want to 
understand detailed Japanese FDI in the U.S., all of these actors may affect the policy outcomes and need 
integration into our framework. The problem is how to balance various factors in our discussion. One way 
to help us is to examine clearly economic theory of FDI.  
Different theories of FDI may give different political implications. In his Ph.D dissertation, Pablo 
Martin Pintos developed a political party theory of investment policy, which was founded on the capital 
movement hypothesis and guided by Hiscox’s work on trade politics. He incorporates FDI into trade 
theory through regarding the investment as capital. This capital movement theory was popular in the 1960s; 
however, it was not accepted by most FDI theorists.  
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International economists, such as Paul Krugman, insist that horizon types of FDI are the second age 
of multinational enterprise, and can be explained by industrial organization theory. In his view, concepts 
from new trade theory, such as economies of scope, strategic moves, and deterrence should be useful to 
explain firm’s motivation and FDI.97 Recently, Krugman continued to argue this view in his very popular 
international economics textbook. He stated that “the factors that determine a multinational corporation’s 
decision about where to produce are probably not much different from those that determine the pattern of 
trade in general.” Stephen Cohen strongly disagrees with this point. Cohen emphasizes that to “integrate 
FDI’s impact on today’s trading system into the new generation of trade theory is to introduce a new 
criterion for explaining (in part) the product composition of a country’s exports.”98  
The problem raised by Cohen is very important in discussing contemporary FDI. In fact, the relations 
between trade and FDI have changed from competing relation to complementary relation. The critical 
factor behind this change is firm participation. Elhanan Grossman recently noted that organizational 
change has been central in the transformation of the world economy. The traditional classification of FDI 
into vertical and horizontal forms has become less meaningful in practice. 99  
For the purpose of this study, we need to note some facts of FDI up to the earlier 1990s. An important 
fact is that the FDI basically consisted of Greenfield investments and merger and acquisition (M&A). The 
political effects that resulted from these two kinds of FDI were different. Furthermore, the strategy that 
Japanese multinationals used for investment in the United States was a sequential process and strongly 
related to trade. On FDI as a sequential process, Bruce Kogut argued that FDI should be understood as 
largely sequential flows stemming from the advantages of flexibility of a multinational system 100 
Although Kogut’s argument was drawn from U.S. FDI from new inter-company outflows to reinvested 
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earnings, he provided essential contributions to Japanese multinationals as late comers internationalization 
strategy. Japanese FDI was strongly linked to trading companies and Japan’s unique keirtsu system.101 
The uniqueness of Japanese FDI in the United States will be discussed in chapter 2.  
Here, we want to emphasize the general difference in distribution effect between trade and FDI. First, 
FDI is directly linked to the host country’s local factors. In trade negotiations, the domestic arena was 
disintegrated into the international economy. It was assumed by scholars that domestic societal groups only 
express their opinion on policies through the central government. As trade means transaction at nation state 
borders, it is not directed by foreign production in the host country. However, in the FDI issue, this process 
is directly linked to the activities of multinationals. The economic theory of FDI, especially Dunning’s 
Eclectic paradigm, tells us the location advantage of the host country is an important factor in determining 
the flows of FDI. Thus, when a multinational establishes plants in a host country, it must deal with the 
face-to-face problem in bargaining with local forces.  
Second, the collective action problem in FDI is reversed compared to trade. As discussed above, 
export-oriented firms will adopt a pro-liberalization policy, while those import competing firms would 
tend to oppose trade. According to collective action theory, concentrated and visible interest gains or loses 
may lead to strong interest group activities. In the trade issue, the winners and losers can be categorized 
into three kinds of groups: firms, industries, and factor endowments. The costs are concentrated within 
particular localities and industries, while the benefits, in terms of cheaper goods or a wider choice, are 
diffused among the population as a whole. Thus, a broader accepted view in trade politics is that some 
small scale but well organized groups may have strong incentives to take part in political repercussions. In 
the case of FDI, the opposite is true. The benefits are localized and fairly immediate and the costs are 
diffused. For example, the federal government may restrict some kinds of FDI in the name of national 
security or economic security. However, to local government, they are more concerned with new jobs and 
higher tax revenues. That means the policy preference is different at different levels of government.  
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1.2.2 Policy instrument  
For political economists, “Economic policy is political because it affects the distribution of wealth 
and incomes in society. Therefore, understanding policy require understanding the distribution of power 
among major social interest. Economic policy is also political because it reflects decisions made by elected 
politicians in an institutional context.”102 The second aspect of this framework seeks to examine which 
condition of the institutional context may influence available policy instruments.  
The political market provides foreign economic policy to various actors, including domestic as well 
as international. In Almost all foreign economic policy, political leaders are assumed to retain office 
through providing second best policy. The role of international economic structure in determining the long 
run policy trends in a specific issue area resulted from its distribution consequences. Political leaders 
expected to improve the fundamental economic performances to increase their opportunity to remain 
standing in office. Nevertheless, available policy instruments also strongly influence policy outcomes. In 
foreign economic policy areas, policy instruments vary in degree in subsectors of international economies. 
 The different way economists and political scientists deal with foreign economic policy somewhat 
influences our judgment on some basic problems. Economist William Cline pointed out that economists 
like to emphasize the optimal policy composition in policy analysis. The underlying objective of such 
analysis is the maximization of both domestic and global economic well being through the identification of 
appropriate economic policies. This normative aspect of the analysis is of particular relevance to 
policymakers and scholars. However, there are three central reasons why economic results fall short of 
those suggested by normative analysis. The first is that the economic analytical framework may have a 
flaw. The second reason is that political factors influence policy outcomes. The third reason is that 
economics is not mechanistically determined; sometimes it is nonlinear.103   
Trade policy is typically reflected in the historical evolution of academic study, policy makers’ 
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knowledge, and conflict between protectionism and liberalism. Trade policy is not a stable category across 
time and borders. In the nineteenth century, the tariff was the most used trade policy and mainly served as 
a provider of revenues. Entering into the twentieth century, the policies purported to affect trade flows 
between domestic and international markets were more complicated. At the end of the Second World War, 
the basic elements of trade policy at least included tariffs, quotas, and export subsidies. The most 
frequently used measure of the average tariff rate is the ratio of total revenues from import duties to the 
value of dutiable imports. This relatively easy measurement provides an ideal case to quantity analysis. 
Because tariffs influenced much on the earlier American economy, tariff legislation was called a “paradise 
for pressure groups”. Partly due to the available data and theory for estimation of the incidence of the tariff, 
regression analysis of the cross-industry variation in tariff rates was one of the first empirical applications 
of the economic theory of economic regulation of rent seeking. For political economists, historical case 
studies and institution analysis are used to test existing economic or cultural explanations. Their findings 
add new perspectives into tariff politics.104  
Over the United States’ tariff history, the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Acts (RTAA) is the 
watershed of American foreign economic policy. The most important change was the power distribution 
between Congress and President. Before 1934, Congress directly controlled the tariff. After that, Congress 
delegated tariff-negotiating powers to the President to reduce interest groups lobbying and avoiding the 
historical Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill tragedy. Economic change provides substantial incentives for policy 
change.105 The policy instruments affect and reflect the institutional factors in American trade politics. 
This linkage is also useful in discussing FDI policy.  
Another important outcome related to policy instruments is the importance of tariff-reductions 
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quickly after that. The general reciprocal liberal policy helped to increase imports to the United States. 
Tariff rates in the U.S. changed drastically over the 20th century, from the relatively high tariff period from 
1865 to 1912, to the highest,50 percent protectionist rate in the 1930s, and to 10 percent in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. In the late 1970s, the tariff ratio in the United States fell to 5 percent after the 
Tokyo Round of GATT. 106 Thus, the importance of tariff policy was reduced to some extent and was no 
longer an overriding trade issue. As a consequence, the border barrier is not so significant to distinguish 
the domestic economic policies and international affairs.  
Since the mid-1970s, various kinds of non-tariff barriers to substitute for tariffs became the central 
focus of protectionism. Non-tariff barriers (NTB) refer to voluntary export restraints (VERs), orderly 
marketing arrangements, antidumping measures, countervailing duties, and safeguard codes. Compared to 
relatively transparent import tariffs and quotas, these kinds of policy instruments are more difficult to 
identify and measure. Tariffs change an import’s price, which affects resource allocation, but they work 
through the price system and leave the system unimpaired. Quotas, especially VERs, subsidies and other 
measures somewhat distort this system. The rise of NTBs contributed to international economic structural 
change as well as multilateral negotiations progress.107 According to Douglas Irwin’s calculation, over 
three-quarters of the decline in estimated tariff levels between 1934 and 1967 can be attributed to the 
dramatic rise in import prices in the postwar period. And the remaining one-quarter of the estimated drop 
in tariffs was actually caused by changes in policy.108 Thus, basic economic interest combined with 
government action together explained the furthering liberalization and remaining protectionism. 
In the 1980s, scholars coined some terms to describe this trend of new protectionism. For example, 
                                                        
106 Douglas A. Irwin, “Changes in U.S. Tariffs: The Role of Import Prices and Commercial Policies,” American 
Economic Review, Vol.88, No.4, 1998, p.1016, figure 1; Michael J. Hiscox, “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, 
Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization,” International Organization, Vol.53, No.4, 1999, p.672, figure 1; 
Karen E. Schnietz, “The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act,” International 
Organization, Vol.57, No.1, 2003, p.215, figure 1. 
107 Charles Lipson, “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change,” International 
Organization, Vol.36, No.2, 1982, pp.417-455; W.W. Rostow, “The World Economy Since 1945: A Stylized Historical 
Analysis,” Economic History Review, Vol.38, No.2, 1985, pp.252-275; Edward John Ray, “Changing Patterns of 
Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers,” Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business, Vol.8, 1987, pp. 285-327; Cletus C. Coughlin and Geoffrey E. Wood, “An Introduction to Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Trade,” The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol.71, No.1, 1989, pp.32-46. 
108 Douglas A. Irwin, “Changes in U.S. Tariffs,” p.1024. 
 52
“sectoral protectionism” was concentrated in a few manufactured product groups. In the case of  
U.S.-Japan trade friction, trade protection in the United States is highly product-specific109; “Negotiated 
protectionism” was used to explain the increasing VERs preferred by the United States that sought to 
cartelize industrial sectors threatened by imports, especially from Japan;110 “Fair trade” and “strategic 
trade” also began to gain popularity in the United States. Although fair trade is not new in American 
history, modern fair trade policies specifically center on related product market. Strategic trade is a new 
addition to trade policy thinking. The purpose of strategic policy is to create competitive advantage by 
subsidizing industries that may generate surplus profits, premium wages, and technological spillovers to 
the rest of the economy.111  
This new policy thinking not only grows in the United States; it also projects into multinational 
negotiations. A related and important change in trade structure and policy are the new issues conducted in 
the Uruguay Round. As early as 1972, OECD began to coin the phrase “trade in services”. Latterly, it was 
written into the GATT after concluding the Uruguay Round. In earlier times, comprehensive policies on 
service were precluded in the absence of systematic data and information on the nature and volume of 
services. Initially, the policy demand on services came from U.S. multinationals, and subsequently 
supported by trade theorists and industry analysts in the industrialized world. This relatively small 
academic research community expanded into a much broader “epistemic community” in the mid 1980s. 
For governments, however, they needed “strategic input on what a liberalization agreement might mean for 
their national policies and capabilities,” as trade in service can be used to redefine industry-specific 
policies as protectionism.112 
The updated trade policy instruments reflect the changed political economy as well as academic 
thinking in the 1980s. Intra-firm trade and intra-industry trade conducted by multinationals gradually 
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became the mainstream type of international trade. For example, one study reported that in 1982 affiliate 
trade was about one-half of U.S. merchandises trade, while intra-firm trade was about one-third.113 This 
performance improved highly in 1994: intra-firm trade accounted for more than one-third of U.S. exports 
of goods and for more than two-fifths of U.S. imports of goods.114 The pace and scope of international 
trade in the new environment required major trading powers to negotiate with each other to reduce 
domestic adjustment costs. The confronting dilemma is that further liberalism may increase domestic 
adjustment cost in some sectors. 
On the theoretical side, new trade theory rapidly provided evidence that free trade is not what it once 
was.115 Under this condition, foreign economic policy is far more complex than a free trade versus 
protectionism dichotomy. To put the point in another way, what was found in our study happened in reality 
and may not be an ideal classification in a textbook. As political economist John Odell stated “American 
scholars most accustomed to their relatively liberal state find it natural to focus on ‘trade policy’ rather 
than ‘industrial policy,’ even though the United States actually intervenes more in its economy than official 
U.S. doctrine reveals.”116 In this time, foreign trade policy should consider some contents of domestic 
policy. To some extent, domestic rather than international policies are much easier and usually the 
first-best responses to market distorting conditions. This change was also reflected in the FDI policy in the 
United States.  
Correspondingly, the content and scope of U.S. foreign investment policy also varied according to the 
period and position of the U.S. economy. In the late 1960s, Benjamin Cohen, a financial economist as well 
as a pioneer in IPE, defined foreign investment policy to “include principally taxes and administrative 
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regulations of various kinds, but also monetary policy to a certain extent. Their purpose is to manipulate 
the stock as well as the flow of private international investments in such a way as to jointly maximize the 
state’s national power and current income.”117 This definition reflected the specific condition in the 1960s 
and Cohen’s academic economist background. The state actor is the most important actor in world political 
economy to such policy analysts. Foreign economic policy was constrained by and reflected foreign policy. 
To economists, the unitary state is a basic unit of analysis. In the earlier 1990s, Cohen acknowledged 
weakness in this definition in “its failure to open the ‘black box’ of the state to evaluate the relevant 
domestic decision process.”118 
For the purpose of this study, we are concerned more with U.S. inward FDI policy. Compared to other 
areas of foreign economic policy, inward investment policy received must less attention. Political scientist 
Robert Pastor noted that,  
 
In the early 1960s, for example, foreign investment policy was quite correctly viewed as either 
an adjunct or an instrument of balance of payments policy. At the same time, foreign investment 
policy was often viewed as a part of foreign assistance when public sources were viewed as 
inadequate. Later, it was attached to foreign trade policy when labor unions evinced concern 
about rising imports from subsidiaries of U.S. corporations that relocated and produced abroad. 
Only recently has it been seen as a distinct policy in itself; or more accurately, two policies.119  
 
Even so, the general way of dealing with foreign economic policy still falls into the trade off between 
protection and liberalism. As Pastor stated, “On the issue of foreign investment in the U.S., the questions 
are whether the policy will be liberal or exclusionary, restrictive or discretionary, based on a double or a 
single standard.”120 Pastor’s clarification reflected the orientation of foreign economic policy between free 
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investment and protectionism. This relatively simple approach was accepted by trade politics study in 
earlier days. Since the 1980s, this classification has had to be substituted by a more accurate one. The 
starting point should not be liberalism or protectionism; it also should not be domestic or foreign. 
Protectionism to Helen Miler, for example, means “any policies that increase the price of a country’s 
imports or decrease that of its exports.”121 This general view gives us an opportunity to rediscover the 
demand and supply side of policy.  
On the demand of policy, as discussed above, trade policy has begun to integrate some contents of 
domestic policy due to the rising costs of adjustment process. An important reason behind this change is 
multinationals, which changed traditional interest coalitions and policy preferences.122 With regard to the 
relationship between trade policy and FDI policy, as Pastor noted, the latter belonged to the former in the 
earlier days. Only since the late 1970s have trade policies and FDI policies been regarded as “two policies”. 
The separation of these two policies does not tell us that there are no relations; rather it tries to emphasize 
the importance of FDI policy in the United States. Parallel to trade policy development, the dichotomy 
between free trade and protectionism cannot be suitable to analyze government policies. It does not 
provide a policy toolbox to analyze a particular sector. Recently, scholars have found out that 
multinationals may prefer regional rather than global level liberalization. Due to sunk costs and barriers to 
entry in host countries, firms would like to come promise between protectionism and liberalization.123 
The convergence of orientation somewhat reduces the difference between new trade policy and the 
emerging FDI policy again. Some elements of trade policies have gradually converged into industrial 
policies, although the United States insists that it never has this kind of industrial policy. Several decades 
ago, Edward Safarian, a well-known UN economist, stated that “policies on MNEs have tended to 
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converge into industrial policy more generally in the rapidly changing technological and globalizing world 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s.” 124 Some scholars go further to advise that students of IPE should care 
more about the complementary effects of trade policy and industry policy, and policy makers’ 
implementation of these kinds of policies.125  
Some basic criteria are necessary to any serious analysis of FDI policy. According to Deanne Julius, a 
well known multinational specialist, with the end of United Nations-led efforts to negotiate a Code of 
Conduct for Transnational Corporations in 1992 and the accomplishment of the Uruguay Round in late 
1993, the policy objectives of FDI are similar to free trade policy objectives. Specifically, she advised 
three broad principles that derive from the efficiency-seeking benefits of cross-broader investment: market 
access, national treatment, and free choice of means.126 This optimal policy advice does not guarantee the 
actual policies. Rather, it provides an analytical tool to measure or a focal point to avoid serious FDI 
friction between states. 
Furthermore, on the supply of policy, FDI is somewhat different from trade in power division of 
policy making. The most prominent feature of FDI activities is that it penetrated more deeply in the 
domestic scope than trade. In trade politics, tariff power is controlled by the federal government and 
mainly dealt with at borders. Even quotas, VERs, and other trade policies are controlled by the central 
government. Based on power division authorized by the U.S. Constitution, states and local government 
cannot take part in commercial affairs with foreigners. Thus, it is difficult for local governments to have 
much impact on trade. The FDI issue, as illustrated above, is a relatively new issue in the United States. 
The Constitution did not distribute policy control mechanisms very carefully on the FDI issue. The 
federalism in the United States as well as globalization gives local government power and incentives to 
attract FDI. State and local government can provide various financial incentives and service to compete 
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with each other. 
Partly reflecting this important structure change, scholars suggest that foreign economic policy 
analysis needs a new paradigm for grasping the interaction of domestic and international level policies.127 
Perhaps the rapid international economy structural change reduced the effectiveness of traditional 
economic policy, and it requires new perspective on policy analysis. The most cited as well as 
controversial reasons well illustrated by William Cline that “economic conflict in the late twentieth century 
differs from that in the late nineteenth. This time the territories in question are not geographic but sectoral 
and functional.”128 Scholars suggest that international economic policy experts may be more suitable to 
substitute foreign economic policy, as the former concept tries to integrate domestic and international 
levels related to transitional economic activities. The redefining of concept illustrates an important 
academic expansion on the content and scope of economic policy. It gives us an opportunity to 
disaggregate policies related to FDI into some separate elements. 
In describing the policy instruments which have been used in practice to control foreign investors, 
different authors have developed different classifications. The most cited works on policies composition 
are conducted by UNCTAD, where investment measures that affect entry and operations of FDI are mainly 
composed of five parts: admission and establishment, ownership and control, operational level measures, 
incentives, and investment-related trade measures.129 Other scholars also acknowledge this kind of 
classification and examined the right of establishment, ownership, national treatment, and various 
incentives.130   
Since multinationals choose where to produce according to the costs and benefits of alternative 
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locations and types of FDI, those foreign economic policies such as foreign exchange policies and trade 
policies, as well as domestic policies such as fiscal policies and financial policies all have effects on 
multinationals’ investment strategies. Recently, scholars began to use econometric models to evaluate the 
effects of government restrictions and find statistically important effect. The most heavily restricted sectors 
are those that are highly sensitive to national security or national sovereignty considerations. Usually, 
scholars give the highest weight of market access due to the fact that foreign ownership is a necessary and 
essential condition for FDI.131 Here, we do not comprehensively evaluate all the United States’ policies 
related to FDI, rather focusing on the most important policies change which are directly caused by entry of 
Japanese FDI during this period.  
FDI is defined as a form of long-term international capital movement and is usually composed into 
two types—Greenfield investment and M&A. While the former is mainly to establish new plants in host 
country, the latter tends to buy or merge with existing assets in a foreign country. Japanese multinationals 
enter into the United States by adopting Greenfield investment as well as M&A. Compared to traditional 
Greenfield investment, M&A was relatively new, really only starting in the 1980s. Under the conditions of 
quick acquisition and merger waves of Japanese FDI in the United States, the federal government of the 
United States developed relatively restrictive screen policies on the M&A type of FDI. 
 
 
 
1.3 Policy Adjustment at Three Levels 
Foreign economic policy provides the bridge between domestic and international politics. The second 
generation scholars in IPE advised that two core variables—interests and institutions—can be used to 
integrate different levels between domestic, national and international policies. This point is especially 
important to understand the greater powers’ international economic policy. The size and scope of a state 
strongly influences its interest inquiry, and is partly reflected in its foreign economic policy. Moreover, we 
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also realize that policy outcomes result from political bargaining. 
At the same time, FDI creates the room to reconcile the serious outcome of economic policies at 
domestic and international levels. By definition, multinationals span national boundaries and transcend 
national interest. Assessing the political impact of FDI in abstract ways is difficult, because it depends on 
the particular relationships among the countries, companies, and sectors involved. Based on the second 
generation idea on IPE, and the political economy of FDI disused above, I illustrate the operational 
framework below (see Figure 1.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 A Framework for Analysis 
  
The slightly revised framework in this study consists three levels. At any level, there are two parts, 
consisting of interest change and response policy. Building on the economic landscape of Japanese FDI, 
the following three chapters deal with national, domestic and international policies separately. The national 
policies, like a focal point, help us understand the balancing process in mediating the domestic and 
international levels. Followed by sub-national policies, we analyze the domestic levels, especially on the 
expanding role of states. Then, we extend to international levels. As discussed above, the challenge for this 
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kind of arrangement is to maintain the coherence and consistency of three levels. An interest-based, 
institution-oriented framework can realize this difficult task and emphasize that national government 
should be more responsible through various levels of policy instruments. 
The dilemma in policy is that it always tries to resolve the conflicting views between public order and 
private interest. Individuals are assumed to be self-interested, while the society needs pubic goods. 
Although economic interest is the fundamental motivation for individuals, it is incomplete to reduce state 
preference to economic sense. Political elites consider many more problems related to long term aims, 
such as power, prestige, and influence. In IPE, we take power resource as power. It mainly emphasizes the 
means that give one the capacity to exercise control or influence over others. Under this condition, 
economics is neither outside nor secondary to the state.132  
For political economists, institutional design and policy instruments are regarded as effective ways to 
adjust interest aggregation. Political institutions help mitigate collective-action problems, particularly the 
commitment and enforcement problems so debilitating to political exchange, and thus allow the various 
actors in politics to cooperate in the realization of gains from trade. Political institutions can also be tools 
of coercion and redistribution. They are the structural means by which political winners pursue their own 
interests, often at the great expense of political losers. This point was also reflected in international 
institutions. If an institution well reflects various groups’ interest inquiry, and is correctly delegated to 
some representatives, then we expect to reduce this confliction. The aggregation and delegation function of 
institution is a key consideration during the institutional design. Any institution analysis should note these 
two aspects.  
Generally speaking, this interest-based and institution-oriented analytical framework is mainly used 
to analyze the political economy of Japanese FDI in the United States during the period from the late 
1980s to the early 1990s. It does not develop a theory of political economy of FDI, but rather seeks to give 
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some weight to factors emphasized by the second generation IPE scholars. The impacts of FDI and state 
capacity for coping with economic internationalization are both much too complex to be explained by a 
single causal variable. For developing a theory on FDI, it is acceptable to choose coherence over 
comprehensiveness. However, as a historical case took place between the two larger economies in the late 
1980s, too many factors influenced the surrounding dynamics. Thus, a better framework probably seems 
more suitable to grasp dynamic interactions. The framework that is constructed in this chapter helps to 
avoid the problem of unitary actor assumption and narrowness of national level policy. Furthermore, three 
levels’ analysis improves and enriches our thinking on impacts of FDI and corresponding policy responses.  
Any extension of this revised framework should redefine the interaction of distribution and policy 
instruments. If we try to analyze trade politics in a single country or numbers of countries, we should note 
interest incentives are different. Furthermore, diverse economic issues probably have different meanings to 
nation states. Not all issues are connected to national security. It also argues that states’ institutional 
structures mediate the interests and capacities of individuals and groups within them. The United States is 
a powerful, independent state with a federalism political structure, which is different from a parliamentary 
system. When we apply this framework to analyze other states, we should keep in mind that political 
institutions play a great role in policy agenda setting and collective action. 
The emerging consensus in academic study creates problems. On the one hand, we have accepted what 
the works of the second generation IPE scholars, which means we have the common analytical tools and 
ideas on what is important and what should be discussed; and, on the other hand, we may lose some 
important ideas during this consensus shaping process. The paradox is that the newest work is not the best 
work, and sometimes the old one is not the worst. Some ideas may already exist in early works. For 
example, Putnam’s two-level idea can be traced back to the 1970s, whereas domestic institutions also 
received attention in their analysis of hegemony policy making. In the IPE field, the debate on whether the 
state should be assumed as a unitary or polyarchy is not as fierce as in IR. The economic issues are 
considered linked to domestic societal groups, only differentiated in scale or the extent of dependence 
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compared to different economic fields. In fact, Krasner already noted that domestic institutions are 
important in understanding a great power’s foreign economic policy.133 Thus, the implication of research 
technique is that which levels of state behavior we selected are determined by out research purpose and 
issue-areas we are concerned. In this study, I try to make a trade-off between analysis and description. 
Most scholarly works have pointed out the importance of this combination. The issue of FDI and 
investment policy adjustment may show which kind of aspects can and should be improved. 
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Chapter 2 The Economy of Japanese FDI in U.S.: Structure and 
Pattern 
 
 
This chapter tries to construct factual pictures of Japanese FDI in the United States during the period 
from 1985 to 1993, reporting some key characteristics of Japanese FDI in economic terms. Some 
characteristics of Japanese FDI in the United States may differ from what Kojima identified in the late 
1970s, as Kojima’s work focuses mainly on Asia and the industries are mainly resources or 
labour-intensive manufacturing.  
At the same time, my work attempts to review economists’ knowledge on Japanese FDI in the United 
States and presents what they thought about economic meanings in that time. While this chapter may 
provide some evidence on motivations of Japanese FDI, it is not intended to construct a new theory of FDI 
such as Vernon’s product cycle hypothesis or Kojima’s macroeconomic approach; not is it intended to 
develop some hypothesis about why or how Japanese multinationals invested in the United States. Instead, 
organizing information on aggregate economic effects of the FDI and its economic interests relating to the 
United States will help us understand more political implications in the next chapters.   
The chapter is organized as follows: first, discuss the global distribution of Japanese outward direct 
investment, and its contribution to the structural change of global FDI distribution as well as the United 
States’ investment position; second, the distribution of Japanese FDI in the U.S. by industrial sectors; third, 
its geographical distribution; and fourth, we will provide evidence on motivations of Japanese affiliates in 
the United States and outline the relationship between Japanese FDI and trade in U.S. Furthermore, this 
chapter reviews the debate on whether Japanese FDI in the United States resembled a new style.  
 
 
 
2.1 The Rise of Japanese FDI and the United States 
The history of modern multinationals is tightly linked with the United States. In 1958, a British 
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scholar John Dunning wrote the first empirical study on U.S. FDI in a host country. 134 In this pioneering 
book, Dunning argued that “the close association between the two countries occasioned by international 
investment of the kind described in this book is of mutual benefit. But this of course demands much more 
of the international, political, and social relations of the two countries than that of the trade of goods each 
produced in the separated countries.”135 The “mutual benefit” is not only established on economic interest, 
but also on the broader strategic considerations between two countries, especially the American policy 
makers.  
This special investment relationship dominated for nearly two decades. During the 1970s, it seemed 
that the postwar growth in FDI might have peaked due to economic stagnation and new protectionism. U.S. 
manufacturing firms in Europe did not grow much faster than the European economy overall, and on some 
measures world trade grew faster than world FDI.136 However, this relative stability and long-established 
situation was shattered in subsequent years.  
During the 1980s, FDI flows grew much more rapidly than world trade or income: worldwide 
nominal GDP increased at a rate of 7.2% percent per year between 1985 and 1997, whereas worldwide 
imports grew by 9.2 percent, and worldwide nominal inflows of FDI increased by 17.6 percent per year.137 
There was a growing understanding of importance of FDI in the world economy. As Peter Drucker stated 
in early 1987: 
 
   Increasing world investment rather than world trade will be driving the world economy. Exchange 
rates, taxes and legal rules will become more important than wage rates and tariffs. This is one of 
the major changes in the world economy and one to which neither government nor economists nor 
businessmen have given adequate attention.138 
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The year 1985 is an important watershed as it marked the turning point where growth flows of FDI 
exceeded those of exports and GDP. As Figure 2.1 shows, the growth of FDI inflows had grown much 
more rapidly than exports since 1985, and then decreased in the earlier 1990s. Even so, the level of FDI 
growth was still higher than the 1980s. The amount of FDI flows reflect that the world political economy 
was in transition: its spread and rise was not only due to technological diffusion and economic 
organization change, but was also the outcome of increasing competition between multinationals. Since 
1985, the gap between the growth of exports and that of FDI has widened dramatically, leading DeAnne 
Julius to suggest that “as a means of international economic integration, FDI is in its take-off phase; 
perhaps in a position comparable to world trade at the end of the 1940s.”139 Thus, the momentum behind 
the internalization of economic activities was being propelled by FDI rather than international trade. 
Moreover, the measurement of trade began to change due to the rapid expansion of FDI.  
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Figure 2.1 The Growth of FDI Inflows and Exports Worldwide, 1980-1996 
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The global pattern of FDI has changed since the late 1980s; at that time, it was characterized as 
tripolar with the European Community, the United States and Japan. This Triad accounts for four fifths of 
total outward stocks and flows, a percentage substantially higher than that in the area of trade, where the 
Triad accounted for one half of total world trade during the 1980s.140 This structural change mainly was 
made by Europe and Japan. The rise of Europe and Japan switched the sources and destination of 
multinational investment from the 1970s. With respect to sources, the major continental European 
countries and Japan resumed outward investment—partly as their competitive advantages grew and partly 
in response to the new protectionism.  
The outward FDI of Japan increased quickly in the l980s, especially from 1985 to 1989. According to 
Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics, Japan’s outward FDI exceeded a value of $10 billion on a 
notification basis for the first time in 1984. In 1989, outward Japanese direct investment reached its peak at 
a value of nearly $67 billion and declined quickly after that until some recovery in 1994. As a result, 
Japan’s cumulative outward FDI from 1986 to 1989 accounted for about 70 percent of total Japanese 
outward FDI since 1951. Besides the rapid expansion of Japanese FDI in total, there are several prominent 
characteristics in Japan’s direct investment since the 1980s. First, as Figure 2.2 shows, there was a 
remarkable shift from Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America towards North America, especially the 
United States, and Western Europe; that is, toward the developed countries and away from developing 
countries. According to one scholars’ estimation in the early 1990s, the combined share of North America 
and Europe in overall Japanese FDI increased from 54.1 percent in 1980-85 to 73.9 percent in 1986-89.141 
During the past decades, this period has unique characteristic in Japanese FDI expansion, as well as its 
presence in the United States as will discussed below. 
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Figure 2.2 Geographical Spread of Japanese Outward Direct Investment 
 
Second, there was a shift away from mining and natural resource related investment—and 
manufacturing—towards the tertiary industry. In 1986, finance and insurance (32.3%) and real estate 
(17.9%) were the two leading sectors in Japan’s outward direct investment, accounting for more than a half 
of the total between them. For the period 1951-79, the share of non-manufacturing in overall FDI was 65.8 
percent, while the corresponding share for the period 1980-88 was 75.1 percent.142 Direct investment in 
manufacturing increased generally after 1980, but its growth was far outpaced by the growth of investment 
in the tertiary industries. In 1989 the amount of direct investment in finance, insurance, and real estate 
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reached a value of 243.7 billion, while the amount for manufacturing was 159 billion. 
At the same time, even in developed countries, the sectoral distribution of Japanese FDI was different. 
As Table 2.1 shows, “finance and insurance” in Europe absorbed a large amount of Japanese funds—$64 
billion compared to $46 billion in North America in 1989. Furthermore, the Japanese investment in 
manufacturing and real estate reached values of $95.7 billion and $85.6 billion respectively in North 
America, while corresponding categories had only values of $30.9 billion and $22.8 billion in Europe. It 
is obvious Japanese manufacturers focused on the U.S. economy to expand global production, while 
European countries were largely still supplied from manufacturing enterprises within Japan. This 
outcome differs from situations that Kojima isolated in his 1978 book: “the amount of Japanese direct 
investment in manufacturing sectors in advanced countries is still very small, and the majority is spent on 
the manufacturing activities which include assembly of trucks, automobiles, motor bikes, and television 
sets or tape-recorders.”143 In fact, as observers noted, “by the early 1980s Japanese FDI already showed 
substantial consistency with mainstream theory that emphasizes the roles of intangible assets and 
oligopolistic competition.”144  
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Table 2.1 Japanese FDI Flows in North America, Europe, and Asia, by Selected Industries (millions of 
dollars) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 
Manufacturing         
  North America 79 140 398 1223 9586 4146 1010 433 
  Europe 21 40 161 323 3090 2040 300 600 
  Asia 96 367 724 464 3220 3658 898 536 
Finance, Insurance         
  North America 21 115 218 1465 4626 2521 301 56 
  Europe 52 160 118 953 6409 2079 680 554 
  Asia 1 10 29 168 1079 676 71 99 
Real estate         
  North America 3 5 66 1126 8855 4258 349 31 
  Europe 0 1 7 11 2282 808 130 10 
  Asia 3 3 12 5 1121 276 109 40 
Wholesale and retail trade         
  North America 27 501 459 776 2453 1805 236 150 
  Europe 6 66 159 409 1449 1876 126 112 
  Asia 6 31 70 137 662 705 96 51 
Mining         
  North America 54 61 110 244 242 50 14 13 
  Europe 6 - 1 1 312 236 50 7 
  Asia 42 509 207 316 211 265 127 0 
Construction         
  North America 0 23 20 38 318 194 25 - 
  Europe 0 0 1 2 25 1 1 0 
  Asia 3 3 11 31 289 41 27 7 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing         
  North America 2 3 17 28 78 22 3 3 
  Europe - - - - 12 28 0 1 
  Asia 11 18 26 12 42 43 13 2 
Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance, Zaisei Kinyu Tokei Geppo [Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly], Tokyo: 
Ministry of Finance, December 1981, pp.52-57; December 1989, pp.42-47; December 1995, pp.32-37; January 2006, 
pp.32-37. 
 
Several factors help to explain the expansion of Japanese FDI from the beginning of the 1980s, 
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especially the sea change during the late 1980s. First, from the macro-level, the appreciation of the yen 
vis-à-vis other currencies rendered the acquisition of assets abroad less expensive compared to domestic 
assets. This strong economic power created a powerful impetus for Japanese companies to shift and 
expand their operations overseas.145 Second, at the firm level, some observers emphasize that Japanese 
companies possessed firm-specific assets, such as organizational skills, technological know-how, and 
management ability. As Edward Graham and Paul Krugman noted, “When U.S. production is undertaken 
by foreign firms it is typically because the foreigners have firm-specific assets that give them an advantage 
in management and technology.”146 Third, trade barriers in the export markets, especially in the United 
States and Europe, were also important contributing factors to the outward Japanese direct investment. In 
the 1980s, “to cope with trade friction” became by far the leading reason for Japanese direct investment 
going to developed countries.147  
In the early 1990s, the growth of global FDI outflows slowed somewhat. This situation can largely be 
attributed to a slow-down in the growth of outflows from Japan, and a decline in outflows from the United 
Kingdom. The temporary decline of global FDI flows was mainly due to the economic recession of the 
“Triad” economies and cyclical fluctuations, especially the slowing down of economic activity in the 
United States. When referring to the decline of Japanese outward FDI, two important domestic factors 
must also be included: Japanese government demand stimulus for investing in domestic production 
facilities and Japanese banks’ substantial losses during the crumbling of the stock and real estate markets 
at the start of 1990.148 Besides the domestic factors that led to the decline of FDI outflows, some 
international factors also contributed to the decline, such as the Gulf crisis, world recession, and escalating 
                                                        
145 DeAnne Julius, Global Companies and Public Policy: The Growing Challenge of Foreign Direct Investment, 
London: Pinter Publisher, 1990, p.33; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1991: The Triad in Foreign Direct 
Investment, New York: United Nations, 1991, p.4. 
146 Edward M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, second edition, 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1991, p.3. 
147 Ryutaro Komiya, The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry, and Government, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 
1990, p.127. 
148 United Nations, World Investment Report 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth, New York: 
United Nations, 1992, pp.11-21. 
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economic tensions.149  
From the point of view of the United States, Japanese FDI presence was prominent in the later 1980s. 
From an insignificant level in 1950, Japan’s share of inward direct investment in the United States 
accounted for only 1.4 percent in 1974. Thereafter, Japan’s share expanded dramatically and reached 8.6 
percent in 1982.150 In 1984, Japan became the third larges source of FDI. The United Kingdom, with 38.1 
billion of dollars, or about 28 percent of all FDI in the United States, was the largest single investor in 
1984, followed by the Netherlands, with 32.6 billion; Japan, with 14.8 billion; and Canada, with 14.0 
billion.151 In 1985, the share of Japanese direct investment in the United States reached 10.5 percent. In 
1988, Japan surpassed the Netherlands and moved to the second place. According to historical-cost basis 
date, in 1992 Japan surpassed the United Kingdom and emerged as the number one foreign direct investor 
in the United States.152 Moreover, Japanese FDI had the highest average annual growth rate during the 
1980s, at more than 30 percent (Table 2.2). However, its net investment growth rate in 1993 did not keep 
pace with that of other countries, largely because of poor economic conditions in Japan and an increased 
share of Japanese direct investment outflows going to East and Southeast Asia.153  
 
                                                        
149 George C. Georgiu and Sharon Weinhold, “Japanese Direct Investment in the US,” The World Economy, Vol.15, 
No.6, 1992, p.773. 
150 J. W. Wheeler, “Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,” in H. Peter Gray, ed., Uncle Sam as 
Host, London: JAI Press, 1986, p.358. 
151 Harvey A. Poniachek, Direct Foreign Investment in the United States, Lexington Books, 1986, P.30. 
152 Japan had the largest position at yearend 1992. Preliminary data published in June 1994 indicated that Japan also 
had the largest position at yearend 1993. However, based on new information received subsequent to June 1994, the 
United Kingdom, not Japan, had the largest position at yearend 1993. See Survey of Current Business, June 1995, 
p.65. 
153 U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: An Update, 1995, p.2. 
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Table 2.2 FDI Stock in the United States, 1980-1993: Ten Largest Countries (Billions of dollars at year-end) 
Ten Largest 
Countries 
 (1993) 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
U.K. 12.2 43.6 51.4 75.5 95.7 105.5 108.1 100.4 94.7 102.4 
Japan 4.2 19.3 23.4 34.4 51.1 67.3 83.5 92.9 96.7 99.2 
Netherlands 16.9 37.1 42.9 46.6 48.1 56.3 64.3 59.4 61.3 72.2 
Canada  10.1 17.1 18.3 34.7 26.6 28.7 27.7 37.3 39 40.1 
Germany  5.4 14.8 17.4 21.9 25.3 29 27.3 28.6 29.2 34.8 
France  3.0 6.7 7.4 10.1 13.2 16.8 19.6 24.2 23.8 29.4 
Switzerland 3.9 10.6 12.1 13.8 14.4 18.8 17.5 19.2 19.6 22.2 
Australia 0.3 3.3 4.9 5.4 7.2 7.2 6.5 6.1 7.1 8.2 
Neth.Antil 7.5 10.4 8.3 8.1 8.9 9.3 13 7.9 8.4 7.5 
Sweden  1.4 2.4 3.6 4.9 4.7 5.3 5.5 5.7 6.9 6.3 
Totals: 
  Ten 
Countries 
 
64.9 
 
165.3 
 
189.7 
 
245.4 
 
295.2 
 
344.2 
 
373.0 
 
381.7 
 
386.7 
 
422.3 
All Counties 68.3 184.6 220.4 263.4 314.8 368.9 394.9 414.4 419.5 464.1 
Source: 1993 data was drawn from Survey of Current Business, June 1995, p.67, Table 4. Others were quoted in Robert Grosse and Len J. Trevino, “Foreign Direct Investment 
in the United States: An Analysis by Country of Origin,” Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.27, No.1, 1996, p.141, Table 1. 
 
 73
The inflows of FDI in the United States changed the global investment position of America. 
The United States’ share of world inflows climbed to over a quarter in the later 1970s, around 40 
percent in the first half of the 1980s, and over 45 percent in the late 1980s before declining 
somewhat.154 By 1990, inward FDI stock in the United States was as large as U.S. outward stock 
abroad. As a consequence, the dominant role of the United States as a supplier of direct investment 
to other countries ceased to exist (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3 Direct Investment Position in the United States, 1982- 1997  
 
 
 
                                                        
154 Robert E. Lipsey, “Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Changes over Three Decades,” in 
Kenneth A. Froot, ed., Foreign Direct Investment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.116. 
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2.2 Sectoral Distribution of Japanese FDI in the United States 
Japanese multinationals have deep historical roots in the United States. According to Mira 
Wilkins’s study, the earliest Japanese direct investment in the United States appears to have occurred 
in the late 1870s.155 However, it was during the 1980s that Japan became an important source of 
FDI into the United States, leading to intense debate. Next, we will provide a detailed analysis of its 
distribution and location in the United States based on the available data; this historical analysis is 
similar to what Mira Wilkins emphasized in 1990: “what is new today is neither the existence of 
Japanese multinationals nor their presence in America, but some of the specific U.S. sectors that are 
attracting the Japanese, the size of the direct investments, and their significance in the American 
economy”. 156 
Although Japanese FDI grew rapidly in the United States during this period, the sectoral 
distribution did not spread equally. As Figure 2.4 highlights, it is important when discussing inward 
Japanese FDI into the United States to distinguish between manufacturing and services or other 
non-manufacturing. During the period from 1985 to 1993, the five largest Japanese direct investment 
sectors—manufacturing, real estate, finance and insurance, service, and wholesale trade—accounted 
for more than 95 percent of total Japanese FDI in the United States. 
 
 
                                                        
155 Mira Wilkins, “Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Chase, 1879-1990,” Business 
History Review, Vol.64 (Winter 1990), pp.585-629. 
156 Ibid., p.586. 
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Figure 2.4 The Flows of Japanese FDI in the United States, by Sector, 1985-93 
 
In order to clarify and describe these issues more clearly, we borrow Kojima`s industrial 
classification.157 According to Kojima, industries are classified into three major groups. The first, 
group R (resource development), consists of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, mining, and 
construction. The second group S (services), consists of commerce, finance and insurance, real estate, 
and other industries. The third is group M (manufacturing). Here, we adopt data from Survey of 
Current Business published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Group R includes 
mining, petroleum, and other industries; and group S includes wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, 
banking, insurance, real estate, and services. As indicated in Table 2.3, the lion’s share of Japanese 
FDI in the United Sates during this period consisted of S group industries. The fluctuation in 1988 
and 1989 can be explained by the fact that FDI in finance flowed into Europe, as we mentioned 
above. The share of S group in the United States maintained a stable position of 75 percent during 
                                                        
157 Kiyoshi Kojima, “Dynamics of Japanese Direct Investment in East Asia,” Hitotsubashi Journal of 
Economics, Von.36, No.2, 1995, pp.93-124. 
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this period, while M group increased from 13.5 percent in 1986 to 25.3 percent in 1988, and then 
declined to 18.4 percent in 1993. At the same time, the United States was not the main destination of 
Japanese resource investment. This situation necessitates the revision of the traditional theory of 
international investment which mainly derived from manufacturing direct investment. By stock, this 
outcome is basically consistent with Wilkin’s observation in 1990 that “despite the sizable rise in 
investment over the years, the basic composition had not changed.”158 However, one point worth 
noting is that in Wilkin’s observation manufacturing FDI stocks accounted for 25 percent of all 
Japanese FDI stock. As shown in Table 2.3, the manufacturing FDI stocks declined after 1988 from a 
peak of 25.3 percent, due to shifting to Asia in the following years. It is obvious R group is less 
important compared to the other two groups, so we will discuss S and M groups further below.  
 
Table 2.3 Share of Japanese FDI Position in the United States, 1986-93 (Percent) 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
S: Services 81.7 78.5 73.6 75.8 78.0 79.6 80.4 81.0 
M: Manufacturing 13.5 15.3 25.3 23.2 21.0 19.5 18.9 18.4 
R: Resource  4.8 6.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 
Note: Before 1988, the statistic item of “S” does not include insurance; after 1988, “R” does not include mining; 
calculated by the author. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 
1988, p.74, Table 10; August 1989, p.52, Table 10; August 1990, p.46, Table 10; August 1992, pp.93-94, table 
10.1-10.2 ; August 1994, pp.104-106, Table 10.1-10.3. 
 
 
Services 
It is clear that S group has increased its importance over this period. As mentioned earlier, 
North America has attracted the largest share of Japanese investment in the manufacturing, whole 
sale and retail trade, and real estate sectors. As table 2.4 shows, the Unites States was also the most 
important destination for Japanese service direct investment: the value of FDI in the service sector 
rose hugely in 1989 and reached its highest level of $8.5 billion in 1990, followed by a quick decline 
                                                        
158 Mira Wilkin, “Japanese Multinationals in the United States: Continuity and Change, 1879-1990,” p.154. 
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in 1991. During the late 1980s, the pattern of global FDI gradually shifted from extractive sectors to 
the service sector.159 Japanese FDI presence in the service sector reflected and affected the trends. 
S group consists of seven subsectors. As Table 2.4 shows, in terms of historical-cost basis, the 
largest subsector in services is wholesale trade; this subsector increased from 13.7 billion dollars to 
33.9 billion in 1993. The next largest subsectors are finance, real estate, and banking. The share of 
finance, real estate, and banking as a proportion of total Japanese direct investment in the United 
States experienced the most dramatic growth from 1986 to 1993. At the same time, the share of 
wholesale trade, in contrast, declined during the same period. As historical cost may undermine the 
real value of investment, we may adopt other indicators to describe the economic influence of 
Japanese direct investment in services.  
 
Table 2.4 Japan’s Service Direct Investment Position in the United States, 1986-93 
(Millions of dollars, historical-cost basis) 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Wholesale 
Trade 
13678 15352 18390 21111 25750 30681 32841 33910 
Finance 2087 2115 2863 9191 8605 13273 13087 11151 
Real estate 2941 6098 10017 10665 15084 9487 9909 9460 
Banking 2704 3513 3895 4963 5931 8000 8809 9803 
Retail trade 290 326 346 571 639 1113 980 844 
Insurance (D) (D) (D) 368 385 520 486 686 
Service - - - 4043 7393 11582 12334 12170 
Note: Before 1989 there is no item “service”; D Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1988, p.74, Table 10; August 1989, 
p.52, Table 10; August 1990, p.46, Table 10; August 1992, pp.93-94, table 10.1-10.2 ; August 1994, pp.104-106, 
Table 10.1-10.3. 
 
Most of Japanese assets of direct investment in the United States are in finance. As shown in 
Table 2.5, however, most FDI is in wholesale trade (57.5 percent in 1992), followed by finance(49 
                                                        
159 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated International 
Production, New York: United Nations, 1993, p. 61. 
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percent in 1992). That is to say, Japanese wholesale trade has a unique position in the United States. 
Although Japanese multinationals adjusted their strategies and gradually released assets in wholesale 
trade sector, the long-established position of this sector could not challenged by other countries.   
 
Table 2.5 Assets of Japanese Service FDI Percent of Total in the United States, 1985-1992 (UBO)160 
Industry 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
All Industries 8.7 11.7 21.2 24.1 23.4 24.7 25.0 25.3 
Wholesale trade 44.5 44.4 46.2 47.7 49.7 53.9 56.8 57.5 
Finance, except banking 5.6 14.6 44.2 48.7 47.1 47.0 47.9 49.0 
Service 8.6 8.8 12.5 12.8 15.7 32.5 34.4 36.2 
Real estate 4.8 9.6 14.6 20.2 25.2 33.0 32.2 34.7 
Retail trade 3.1 1.9 2.4 1.4 2.3 4.2 12.2 14.9 
Insurance (D) (D) 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Note: The “(D)” suppressed to avoid disclosure of data on individual companies. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, May 1988, 
p.71, Table 11; July 1989, p.135, Table 18; July 1990, p.140, Table 14;July 1991, p.88, Table 14.1; July 1991, p.89, 
Table 14.2; May 1993, p.106, Table 12.1; July 1994, p.179, Table 21.1 p.180, Table 21.2. 
 
Following the wholesale trade sector in assets was finance (except banking), services, and real 
estate. The manufacturing sector only ranked fifth relative to other sectors. There was a sharp growth 
and then a steep decline in subsidiary formation in finance, insurance and real estate from the peak 
of 1986-90 to 1991-3. As Kojima noted, Japanese financial institutions and real-estate companies 
lost tens of billions of dollars in the US during the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, when the bubble 
economy burst in Japan, these companies were the hardest hit and many of them were forced to 
liquidate and repatriate their foreign investments. Kojima called these investments in the US 
“investments and divestments without much regard to economic fundamentals.”161 Some other 
scholars also pointed out that Japanese investment in these subsectors was motivated by yen 
                                                        
160Ultimate Beneficial Owner (UBO) is that person, proceeding up a U.S. affiliate’s ownership chain, beginning 
with and including the foreign parent that is not owned more than 50 percent by another person. The foreign 
parent is the first foreign person in the affiliate’s ownership chain. Unlike the foreign parent, the UBO of an 
affiliate may be located in the United States. The UBO of each U.S. affiliate is identified to ascertain the person 
that ultimately owns or controls and that, therefore, ultimately derives the benefits from owning or controlling 
the U.S. affiliate. See Survey of Current Business, July 1994, p.155. 
161 Kiyoshi Kojima, “Dynamics of Japanese Direct Investment in East Asia.”  
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appreciation. 162 Here, we do not examine the finance sector, as Europe received more of the 
Japanese outward investments than the United States in this period, but we will examine some 
important aspects of wholesale trade. 
Japan’s trading companies (Sogo Shosha) and Japanese manufacturers invest heavily in 
wholesale trade. When Japanese companies first started to expand into the American market, they 
did so largely through exports of consumer and capital goods plus intermediate products used in 
manufacturing activities. The marketing of these products was supported by sales subsidiaries as 
well as by warehouse and service facilities. As shown in Table 2.5, wholesale trade is by far the 
leading sector in which Japanese firms invest, with a share of 44.5 percent of all FDI in this category 
in 1985, and it grew steadily during this period.  
Data on assets helps present evidence that wholesale trade is quite important to Japan as well as 
America. Among the subsectors, the assets of Japanese affiliates in motor vehicles and equipment 
and electrical goods illustrated their importance, especially motor vehicles investment which reached 
41 billion dollars in 1992. Generally speaking, the investment gap among subsectors has been 
reduced to parity since 1987 (Figure 2.5). However, we need to pay attention to the uniqueness of 
wholesale trade. In contrast to machinery and primary metals’ higher position in Japanese FDI, 
wholesale trade transferred many assets into motor vehicles and equipment as well as electrical 
goods. Scholars commonly argued that Japan has a strong competitive advantage in fabricating and 
assembling manufacturing industries using mass-production technologies. These industries are 
characterized by “product differentiation,” and the products are sold to heterogeneous customers. 
Therefore, “it is essential for the success of the manufacturers in these fields to establish and 
maintain an efficient market and servicing network.”163 At the same time, in this period, as 
Raymond Vernon noted, some sophisticated products were channeled where under the direct control 
                                                        
162 R. Farrell, “Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Real Estate, 1985-1994,” Pacific Economic Papers, 
No.272, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, October, 1997. 
163 Ryutaro Komiya, The Japanese Economy: Trade, Industry, and Government, Tokyo: University of Tokyo 
Press, 1990, p. 134. 
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of the manufacturers.164 Because of the overlap between the activities of trading companies and 
manufacturers, as the former often trade in the products of the latter, we need thoroughly examine 
the manufacturing. 
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Source: Compiled by the author based on US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, May 1988, 
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Table 14.2; May 1993, p.106, Table 12.1; July 1994, p.179, Table 21.1 p.180, Table 21.2. 
Figure 2.5 Assets Distribution of Japanese FDI in Wholesale Trade, Percentage, 1985-92 
 
 
Manufacturing  
Generally speaking, Japanese manufacturing direct investment maintained higher 
competitiveness relative to other developed countries in the international market. Changes in 
Japanese domestic economic structure and the international market together led to a new pattern of 
Japanese outward direct investment worldwide, especially to developed countries. In his 1986 
Japanese Participation in British Industry, John Dunning emphasized that, 
 
Our research into Japanese manufacturing affiliates suggests quite strongly there is no 
Japanese miracle as such. What is unique is the ability of Japanese companies to supply 
the consumer with an (almost!) fault-free product and to co-ordinate their quality control 
procedures by the appropriate management philosophy and work organization. If this 
                                                        
164 Raymond Vernon, “Where Are the Multinationals Header?” in Kennth A. Froot, ed., Foreign Direct 
Investment, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, p.71. 
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philosophy and attitude cannot or will not be translated into the UK economy, this is not 
because of our ignorance of what needs to be done; but rather because of outdated 
traditions and values, institutional rigidities or a lack of motivation. It is this, rather than 
anything else, which is the real British disease!165 
 
If Dunning’s comment was correct, Japanese direct investment, especially in the manufacturing 
industries, really challenged industrialized countries, including Britain which was the first 
industrialized country. This change is very profound in international political economy. 
It is necessary to know exactly, in economic terms, which subsectors have importance to Japan 
as well as to the United States, and to examine whether Japanese multinationals shifted strategy and 
changed industrial priorities facing market competition. In Kojima’s words, “Japan’s manufacturing 
DFI in North America (or, more generally, in advanced economies), where the wage cost has until 
very recently been more expensive than in Japan, has been of the ANT-type.”166 This anti-trade 
oriented FDI does not use Japanese comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing. 
According to Kojima, it cannot produce competitively, but rather leads to bad outcomes for Japanese 
multinationals and American consumers. As a result, Japanese investors should have rethought their 
strategy. 
However, Kojima does not thoroughly examine Japanese FDI in the United States during this 
period. His focus was South East Asia countries. To shed light on the characteristics of Japanese FDI 
in the Unite States during this period, we still adopt Kojima’ manufacturing classification: M group 
can be divided into three sub-groups. The first is sub-group L (labor-intensive, light manufacturing) 
consisting of food manufacturing, textiles, and miscellaneous manufacturing. The second is 
sub-group I (intermediate good manufacturing), including timber and pulp, chemicals, and primary 
(and fabricated) metals. The third sub-group is K (machinery manufacturing) consisting of general 
                                                        
165 John H. Dunning, Japanese Participation in British Industry, Croom Helm, 1986, p. 193. 
166 Kiyoshi Kojima, “Dynamics of Japanese Direct Investment in East Asia,” p.98. 
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(non-electric) machinery, electric (and electronic) machinery, and transport machinery.  
This classification is similar to Survey of Current Business, which compiled by the Department 
of Commerce in the United States. However, the difficulty is that U.S. data lacks some detailed 
information on subsectors in manufacturing. For example, transportation equipment was included in 
the item of other manufacturing which was only documented by assets or employment. As a result, 
we could not draw more accurate classification about L and K sub-group. Thus, we classified 
manufacturing sub-groups due to Japanese Ministry of Finance’s statistics. According to Japanese 
Ministry of Finance statistics, the K sub-group includes electronic, transportation equipment and 
machinery tools; the I sub-group includes chemical, steel and iron, and lump and pulp; and the L 
sub-group includes food, textile, and others. As Table 2.6 shows, the composition of these three 
sub-groups in all manufacturing FDI stocks changed substantially during this period. Among them, L 
sub-group increased from 10.3 percent in 1985 to 28.4 percent in 1993 and I sub-group increased 
from 17.0 percent in 1985 to 21.4 percent in 1993, while K sub-group declined from 72.6 percent in 
1985 to 50.2 percent in 1993. Another important characteristic is the fluctuation of FDI in 
sub-groups. More specifically, I sub-group has more similarity to K sub-group than to L sub-group in 
terms of trend..  
 
Table 2.6 The Share of Manufacturing sub-groups’ FDI in the United States, 1985-1993 
(Percent) 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
L 10.3 14.3 15.9 48.3 20.3 16.1 44.7 38.0 28.4 
I 17.1 26.1 22.6 21.6 27.8 27.7 21.0 20.1 21.4 
K 72.6 59.6 61.5 30.1 51.9 56.2 34.3 41.9 50.2 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Japanese Ministry of Finance, Zaisei Kinyu Tokei Geppo [Ministry of 
Finance Statistics Monthly], Tokyo: Ministry of Finance, December 1989, pp.50-51; December 1995, pp.40-41. 
 
In trying to further explain this complexity in manufacturing, we will examine assets 
distribution to evaluate the uniqueness of Japanese FDI relative to others. As Figure 4 illustrates, 
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1988 marked a shift of Japanese manufacturing FDI distribution in the United States. Before 1988, 
for example, the share of Japanese investment in transportation equipment continued to grow and 
accounted for nearly 40 percent of all countries’ FDI in the United States by 1988, and then kept this 
position in the United States. Another important characteristic of their period is that Japanese 
manufacturing FDI had increased its importance in the United States, as its share of all countries’ 
FDI in the United States increased generally. However, if we look at the bottom figure in Figure 2.6, 
the assets gap between industries decreased. The bottom figure illustrates each subsectors’ 
percentage of manufacturing FDI in the United States. In terms of absolute amount, not only did 
Japanese manufacturing FDI increase during this period, but also the asset allocation changed. In 
1985, for example, the highest amount of assets was distributed in the primary metals sector, but its 
importance declined quickly in subsequent years. Since 1990, Japanese affiliates distributed assets 
rather evenly between subsectors. This may reflect the fact that Japanese firms in the United States 
adopted new strategies after somewhat faded entry in the 1990s. As one scholar pointed out, 
“Japanese manufacturing investment in the United States differs from traditional investment patterns 
in that it appears to be more strategic and concentrated than other foreign investment.”167 
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167 Simon Reich, “’Manufacturing’ Investment: National Variations in the Contribution of Foreign Direct 
Investments to the US Manufacturing Base in the 1990s,” Review of International Political Economy, Vol.3, 
No.1, 1996, p.46. 
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Note: The top figure reports Japanese FDI percent of total FDI assets in the United States in the same category 
at same year; the bottom figure reports this subsector’s FDI percent of Japanese manufacturing FDI. 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, May 1988, p.71, Table 11; July 1989, p.135, 
Table 18; July 1990, p.140, Table 14;July 1991, p.88, Table 14.1, p.89, Table 14.2; May 1993, p.106, Table 12.1; July 
1994, p.179, Table 21.1 p.180, Table 21.2 
Figure 2.6 Assets of Japanese FDI in U.S. Manufacturing, Percent Distribution, 1985-92 
 
The pattern of manufacturing and wholesale trade assets change reflected one notable fact that 
Japanese FDI in the United States changed profoundly compared to its earlier direct investment. As 
some analysts argued, the patterns of foreign direct investment by Japanese firms were converging 
toward norms recorded by their U.S. and European rivals.168 As with U.S.- and Europe-based firms, 
the object of Japanese firms in establishing a producing subsidiary in a foreign country was 
commonly to protect a market in a relatively differentiated product that originally had been 
developed through exports from Japan. As Raymond Vernon noted:  
 
At this advanced stage, however, the markets to be protected were of considerably 
different character from those that the first generation of Japan-based multinationals 
had developed. One difference was in the identity of the markets under siege, now 
located mainly in the United States and Europe. Another was the nature of the products 
involved; these were relatively sophisticated products, such as automobiles, 
camcorders, and computer-controlled machine tools. And a third was the channels of 
                                                        
168 Dennis J. Encarntion, Rivals Beyond Trade: America Versus Japan in Global Competition, Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1992, pp.9-35. 
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distribution involved; such sophisticated products were usually marketed through 
channels under the direct control of the manufacturers rather than through trading 
companies.169 
 
 
 
2.3 Geographical Distribution  
There are three main geographical factors to consider. First, the location factor in the 
determination of FDI has become increasingly important. John Dunning developed an eclectric 
paradigm that emphasized location as one of the three pillars contributing to the expansion of 
multinationals. The country that was endowed with plentiful production factors, suitable 
environments and supportive government policies certainly will be firms’ ideal location. At the same 
time, FDI may increase productivity, widen the scope of competition, and spur the economy of the 
host country. As a result, Dunning linked enterprise competitiveness to national competitiveness; in 
his words, “the international competitiveness of a particular country will depend on the ownership 
endowments of its enterprises and on its locational endowments, relative to those of other countries; 
and transfer costs in moving goods and services from one country to another.”170 
Second, in the late 1980s new trade theory and economic geography found that modern 
industrial growth expanded with higher industries cluster and geographical concentration.171 Some 
endowments in economic activities are always less immobile, such as raw materials, land, and 
specific cultural resources. A firm would like to split its value chain into separate locations, thereby 
reducing production costs and transaction costs. Similarly, expanding of multinationals also have 
strong motives to form localized geographical clusters. In fact, even within one country, FDI is not 
                                                        
169 Raymond Vernon, “Where Are the Multinationals Headed?”, in Kennth A. Froot ed., Foreign Direct 
Investment, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993, p.71. 
170 John H. Dunning, “Trade, Location of Economic Activity and the MNE: A Search for an Eclectic 
Approach,” in B. Ohlin, P.O. Hesselborn and P.M. Wijkman, eds., The International Allocation of Economic 
Activity, London: Macmillan, 1977, p.410. 
171 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: Macmillan, 1990; Paul R. Krugman, 
Geography and Trade, Leuven: Leuven University Press and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.  
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allocated evenly. As we will see below, Japanese FDI was concentrated in several regions in the 
United States, not distributed equally through the nation. 
Third, in political sense, interest distribution or redistribution is a key political motive in the 
United States political life. Traditionally, specific interest groups or rent-seeking groups attempt to 
impact legislation in order to generate policy outcomes that protect existing profits or provide new 
opportunities which could not be accomplished in competitive market conditions. 172 Even in the 
field of international economic policy, there are numerous issue areas in which domestic interest 
groups can influence foreign policies. In the field of inward FDI, the same political economy logic 
can be used to analyze the U.S. domestic groups struggle to attract or oppose Japanese FDI. FDI can 
serve to create jobs and revenues for particular local government, but on the other hand it can also 
increase market competition, harm infant industries, or threaten sensitive defense-related industries. 
Thus, it is to be expected that JFDI would be more welcome in, and more clustered around certain 
geographic areas. Those states located more Japanese FDI will pro free investment policies. 
Based on these kinds of thinking, we provide some statistical surveys of the location of 
Japanese FDI in the United States. As Table 2.7 shows, Japanese FDI in the United States mainly 
concentrated in the Far West, Mideast, Great Lakes, and Southeast; while Rocky Mountain, Plains 
and Alaska only attracted a little Japanese FDI untill 1993. Japanese investment located on the West 
Coast partly because of its geographical proximity to Japan, and partly because these states are 
located on the coast.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
172 Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” The American Economic Review, 
Vol.64, No.3, 1974, pp.291-303. 
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Table 2.7 Locations of Japanese FDI in the United States, 1990, 1993 
 1990 1993 
Far West 523 564 
Mideast 518 557 
Great Lakes 262 217 
Southeast 158 182 
New England 46 96 
Southwest 67 76 
Plains 19 8 
Rocky Mountain 14 13 
Alaska 5 8 
Hawaii 62 68 
Others  46 76 
Total 1720 1788 
Note: Here the author adjusts the geography districts according to Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business. 
Source: MITI, Kaigai Toshi Tokei Soran [Statistical Survey of Overseas Investment], Tokyo: MITI, 1991, p. 111, 
Figure 2-3; 1994, p.97, Figure 2-3. 
 
On a state level in the United States, California is the largest recipient with 306 Japanese 
manufacturing factories, followed by Ohio with 134, and Illinois with 114 (Figure 2.7). Japanese 
manufacturing FDI concentration in this relatively small number of states certainly reflects the 
firm-specific advantages of Japanese manufacturing multinationals in the United States as well as 
the traditional location advantages of these states. As mentioned earlier, a remarkable linkage existed 
between the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors; the geographical or location cluster may 
help to reduce the traffic costs, information cost, and other transaction costs between these two 
sectors.   
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 Note: Here the author adjusts the geography districts according to Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business. 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Zaibei Nikkei Seizogyo 
Keiei No Jittai [Current Situation of Business Operations of Japanese Manufacturing Enterprises in the United States], 
Tenth Survey Report, July 1994, p.9. 
Figure 2.7 Locations of Japanese Manufacturing FDI in the States of U.S., 1993 
 
Another relatively important indicator is employment distribution of Japanese direct investment 
in the states of the United States. The total employment in Japanese subsidiaries increased from 
212,800 employees in 1985 to 728,200 employees in 1992, with an annual average growth rate of 
34.6 percent over this period. Among the regions of the United States, the Far West is the most 
important location of employees in the Japanese subsidiaries, with more than 180 thousand 
employees in 1992, although its annual average growth was not much higher than the national 
average (Table 2.8). In 1992, as illustrated in Table 2.8, Japanese multinationals in California, 
Hawaii, Indiana, and Michigan employed more workers than those of western countries.  
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Table 2.8 The Employment Distribution of Japanese Direct Investment in the US by Region, 
1985-1992 (Thousands of employees) 
 1985 1987 1989 1990 1992 Annual average 
Growth (%) 
New England 3.5+(D) 12.5+(D) 21.9 21.3 22.4 76.7 
Mideast 38.6 59.9 82.6 91.1 103.9 24.1 
Great Lakes 35.7 51.2 103.9 99.0 158.9 49.3 
Plains 3.5+(D) 5.1+(∗) 12.3 16.0 20.3 68.6 
Southeast 33.0 42.0 89.6 114.2 131.4 42.3 
Southwest 9.1 11.0+(∗) 27.0 31.8 38.8+G 46.6 
Rocky 
Mountain 
1.2+(D) 1.7+(∗) 4.0+(D) 7.4+(D) 10.3+(∗) 108.3 
Far West 67.8 75.5+(D) 119.5+(D) 159.3 181.4 24.0 
Alaska 2.6 2.0 2.4 6.0 2.6 0 
Hawaii 11.7 15.8 29.6 36.0 35.7 29.3 
Puerto Rico 2.0 2.1 2.7 1.6 1.4 -4.3 
Total 212.8 284.6 504.3 629.2 728.2 34.6 
Note: 1. (D) suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies. 
2.∗ Fewer than 50 employees. 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, May 1988, p. 74, Table 14; July 1989, p.139, 
Table 22; July 1991, p. 91, Table 15.2; May 1993, p.111, Table 15.1; July 1994, p.184, Table 23.2. 
 
The data on FDI in subsectors and affiliates’ employment reflected that Japanese subsidiaries 
are spread unevenly; they tend to be concentrated in certain regions. This kind of concentration not 
only inspired the economic geographer, but also has important implications for political analysts. For 
the purpose of this study, these twelve regions are very crucial in considering Japanese FDI’s 
political and economic influence to the United States. Although individual state has its particular 
environment and cultural tradition in the United States, and could not reflect full impacts Japanese 
multinationals excised. It is safely to argue that they certainly control the important episodes of the 
story. 
Furthermore, Japanese multinationals also have unique characteristics compared to Western 
corporations in the United States. As Table 2.9 shows, Japanese-owned affiliates employed the most 
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of foreign workers in California, New York, Hawaii, Indiana, and Michigan. This situation has 
significant implications for local government policy towards Japanese FDI in the United States.  
 
Table 2.9 The Ten Largest states of employments, Japan vs Western, 1992 (Thousands of 
employees, UBO) 
 California Ohio Illinois 
New 
York 
Hawaii Texas Indiana 
New 
Jersey 
Michigan Florida 
Japan 147.9 46.7 46.2 45.1 35.7 33.6 32 31.6 30 22.1
Canada 35.9 16.6 27 41.1 0.5 42.0 13.7 19.2 19.9 20.4 
France 31.2 15.9 13.3 28.6 0.6 23.2 15.6 16.0 10.0 18.0 
Germany 48.1 15.7 26.5 39.0 0.5 26.7 12.8 29.0 23.3 16.1 
Netherlands 27.3 15.5 14.3 31.4 0.6 22.4 9.5 13.9 4.2 9.6 
Switzerland 28.9 16.7 27.2 21.0 1.6 16.5 4.9 27.7 4.5 8.3 
England 97.5 52.1 53.0 81.6 1.1 56.5 17.7 40.5 25.4 42.7 
Source: US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July 1994, p.184, Table 
23.2. 
 
 
2.4 The Second Generation? Economists’ Debate 
In the latter half of the 1980s, scholars debated one important question: whether Japanese direct 
investment was different, and, if so, in what ways it may differ from British or Dutch direct 
investment. Public opinion, some Congressmen, and even some academic scholars argued that the 
Japanese FDI was very different due to Japanese history. Although the answers to this problem were 
diverse, and depended on which firms or industries we discussed, it is necessary to review some 
economic analysis on this problem.  
As mentioned earlier, Kojima developed a new theory of Japanese-style FDI in the 1970s. In his 
view, Japanese FDI in East Asia facilitated the hosting countries’ exports, while U.S. outward FDI 
was inherently anti-trade. Kojima defined anti-trade FDI as FDI undertaken by large firms that were 
oligopolies in their home market, in new industries with differentiated products in which the home 
country had a comparative advantage. This American-style FDI is the dominant direct investment 
form in the world economy. Kojima’s observation was based on Japanese textile, chemical and food 
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industries’ FDI in East and Southeast Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s. It is obvious that the 
region and industries underpin the analytical foundation of the first generation of Japanese FDI in 
Kojima’s model. 
In its earlier days, Japanese outward FDI had three unique characteristics: the firms taking part 
in overseas investment were mainly small-and medium-sized, which differed from larger Western 
firms; the industries Japanese firms clustered in were relatively competitive industries that produced 
standardized or traditional goods such as textiles, metal products, and the relatively unsophisticated 
product lines of electrical appliances and chemicals; and the regional distribution mainly 
concentrated in Asia and Latin America. According to this style, some scholars contended that 
Japanese overseas direct investment could not be explained by mainstream theories of FDI, such as 
industrial organization theory, monopolistic competitive model, and product-cycle theory. Instead, 
they provided a macroeconomic approach to explain Japanese FDI. As Terutomo Ozawa states, 
 
Japanese firms were driven overseas by such macroeconomic factors as the emerging 
factor scarcities at home, an increasing uncertainty in the supply of imported key resources, 
and a decline in the trade competitiveness of Japan’s labor-intensive light industries rather 
than by the growth of their individual internal capacities to operate on a global scale. 
Indeed, the very weakness of their capacity to go overseas as individual units is a leading 
part of Japan’s unique pattern of government-supported and group-oriented multi-firm 
investment overseas.173 
 
In the late 1970s, Ozawa noted that some Japanese overseas direct investment began to shift 
from Asia to the West, motivated by protectionism and appreciation of the yen. From an economic 
perspective, as the Japanese economy matured, its industrial market and corporate structure tended 
                                                        
173 Terutomo Ozawa, Multinationalism, Japanese Style: The Political Economy of Outward Dependency, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979, p.70. 
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to become increasingly similar to those of advanced Western countries. To maintain competitiveness 
in the world market, Japanese firms were starting to extend their strategies globally and occupied the 
United States and Europe since the late 1970s. 
Since the mid-1980s, two critics have emerged in response to the spread of Japanese FDI 
worldwide, especially into the developed regions. One strand of research program that focused on 
Japanese FDI in East Asia, mainly discussed whether the “flying geese” model was suitable for 
explaining Japanese firms’ behavior and catch-up economic development. Some scholars argued in 
considering production networks in East Asia that people should go beyond Japanese-oriented 
outward FDI models.174 Kojima himself admitted that the Flying Geese pattern of development 
applied solely to the catching-up phase of industrialization in latecomers; however, it also can be 
used to analyze the post-catch-up phase after some theoretical elaboration. In his view, there are 
three pillars that make the Flying Geese pattern: catch-up process of industrialization, 
pro-trade-oriented FDI, and agreed specialization. And the last pillar can be used to explain 
increased intra-industry trade in an integrated region.175  
 The second, perhaps most important research program are the works focused on Japanese FDI 
in developed regions. Considering the data problem in FDI study and the complexity of 
multinationals’ activities, it is not surprising to see different conclusions reached on Japanese FDI in 
the United States during this period. Some earlier studies tended to view Japanese FDI as really 
different from other countries’ FDI in the United States, at least in some important aspects of firm 
activities. For example, Glickman and Woodward reported evidence that social and labor practices of 
some Japanese transplants appeared at odds with those of other nations’ American affiliates.176In his 
                                                        
174 Such as Bruce Cuming, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: 
Industrial Sector, Product Cycles and Political Consequences,” International Organization, Vol.38, No.1, 1984, 
pp. 1-40; Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill, “Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, 
Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia,” World Politics, Vol.47, No.2, 1995, pp.171-209. 
175 Kiyoshi Kojima, “The ‘flying geese’ model of Asian economic development: Origin, Theoretical extensions, 
and regional policy implications,” Journal of Asian Economics, Vol.11, No.4, 2000, pp.375-401. 
176 Norm J. Gllckman and Douglas P. Woodward, The New Competitors: How Foreign Investors Are Changing 
the U.S. Economy, New York: Basic Books, 1989, pp.59-62. 
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1992 influential textbook Global Shift, a British economist, Peter Dicken concluded that, “There is 
no doubt that, at present, Japanese transnational activity still differs quite substantially from that of 
the other major economic and political situation.”177 In 1993, however, Richard Caves stated, 
“Japanese foreign investment in the United States represents behavior that is fully explicable in light 
of the standard analytical treatment of foreign investment, both its transaction cost and financial 
branches. ” 178As systematic data collection and publication always have time lag, historical 
reexamination is still meaningful. 
Compared to Asia and Europe, the motivation of Japanese firms’ investments in the United 
States explicitly illustrates its characteristics. As Table 2.10 shows, Japanese FDI in these three 
periods all emphasize the local market, so it can be called market-seeking FDI. Besides the similar 
strategy, in Asia, Japanese FDI mainly invested due to labor cost considerations and local 
government incentives, while in developed regions, collection of information and dividend 
reinvestment became more prominent. Collection of information reflected Japanese multinationals’ 
technological capabilities and their research and development (R&D) concentration in the United 
States.179 Although trade linkage is one of the important characteristics of Japanese FDI compared 
with other developed countries’ investments in the United States—as two notable economists 
pointed out, “one major difference between Japanese and other foreign firms is worth noting, namely, 
a higher Japanese import propensity,”180—it is obvious that Japanese firms in East Asia are more 
likely to export back to Japan. This outcome is consistent with Shujiro Urata’s argument that 
market-seeking FDI has also responded to trade barriers in these regions, but generally production 
                                                        
177 Peter Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity, 2nd edition, London: Paul 
Chapman Publishing, 1992, p. 81.  
178 Richard E. Caves, “Japanese Investment in the United States: Lessons for the Economic Analysis of 
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has been directed toward exports of manufactures to other industrialized counties.181  
 
Table 2.10 Motivations for Japanese FDI in three regions, 1987-1993 (percent) 
 1987-88 1990-91 1993-94 
 U.S.A. Asia Europe U.S.A. Asia Europe U.S.A. Asia Europe 
Access to the local 
market 
75.0 70.4 88.1 70.7 64.3 76.4 67.2 65.6 75.7 
Collection of 
information 
38.3 15.8 32.1 41.7 18.6 34.2 38.4 18.4 34.8 
Dividends 
reinvestment 
12.2 15.2 10.9 15.9 11.2 8.3 13.4 10.4 8.6 
Access to other 
markets 
- - - 12.6 28.4 32.6 11.0 26.9 28.8 
Export to Japan - - - 8.1 15.6 7.4 8.1 16.2 4.6 
Supply of labor 4.0 37.7 3.2 7.9 45.3 9.2 7.8 45.4 10.2 
Trade Friction 4.9 1.0 5.5 7.6 1.2 7.0 6.9 1.3 5.0 
Official incentives 3.5 27.1 9.8 4.8 22.0 7.0 2.8 18.3 6.2 
Supply of raw 
material 
6.8 5.1 2.6 4.9 5.2 2.3 5.8 4.2 2.5 
Materials available for 
Local production  
2.9 3.9 1.3 4.4 5.1 1.2 4.6 5.1 1.4 
Others 9.6 5.7 5.3 23.6 13.8 16.4 23.0 11.7 16.3 
Note: In 1991, the item “access to the local market” includes “access to other markets”. 
Source: MITI, Kayigayi Towushi Towukeyi Sowuran [Basic Statistics of Outward Foreign Direct Investment] 
1989, pp.120-125; 1991, pp.129, 131, 135; 1994, pp.117, 119, 123. 
 
Some scholars emphasize Japanese investment’s movement towards similarity, which can be 
explained by traditional mainstream theories, but we should keep in mind that does not mean there 
are no differences. The trends towards convergence reflect that firms are rational actors in global 
political economy, and they must reduce various costs and increase competitiveness. With the 
maturity of the Japanese economy and industrialization, the difference between Japanese outward 
                                                        
181 Shujiro Urata, “Changing Patterns of Direct Investment and the Implications for Trade and Development,” 
in C. Fred Bergsten and M.Noland, eds., Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington in association with the Pacific Trade and Development Conference 
Secretariat, 1993, pp.273-297. 
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direct investment and other nations’ was expected to become narrow. However, it still has a long way 
to go.182 In the case of Japanese FDI in the United States during this period, Japanese investment 
may have been more complicated than we expected; as analysts noted, “it is important to caution 
again, however, that since the Japanese investments during this period were clearly in a transitional 
stage, the evidence on convergence must await data covering a longer time span.”183 
In the late 1990s, it was obvious that the nature of outward FDI of Japanese manufacturing 
firms in the 1980s and the 1990s was quite different from that of the 1970s. For example, for 
Japanese multinationals that formed subsidiaries in North America and Europe, fewer than 7 per cent 
formed minority joint ventures, and most of those were oligopolistic firms. This characteristic of the 
data would seem to support Kojima’s (1978) conclusion that one of the features of Japanese-style 
FDI, a heavy preference for minority joint ventures, was more a feature of the concentration of 
Japanese FDI in Asia in the period through the early 1970s than it was a feature of Japanese FDI per 
se. 184  Some scholars emphasize that Japanese FDI in the developed regions was similar to 
Western-style FDI. Mireya Solis-Soberon of Harvard University, in his dissertation asserted that 
“with four decades of postwar history, the profile of Japanese offshore investment is increasingly 
closer to that of other industrialized nations, notably the U.S. and UK.”185 In this point of view, the 
evolution of Japanese FDI seems to have solved the controversy on the unique nature of Japanese 
outward investment. Kojima himself admitted that Japanese FDI has increasingly come to resemble 
the Western style of FDI.186  
 
                                                        
182 Louis W. Pauly and Simon Reich, “National Structure and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring 
Differences in the Age of Globalization,” International Organization, Vol.51, No.1, 1997, pp.1-30. 
183 Ashoka Mody and Krishna Srinivasan, “Japanese and U.S. Firms as Foreign Investors: Do They March to 
the Same Tune?,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol.31, No.4, 1998, p.795. 
184 Paul W. Beamish, Andrew Delios and Donald J. Lecraw, Japanese Multinationals in the Global Economy. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997.Beamish et al. argue that minority-owned venture were far more 
common in the Japanese FDI, although Japanese Multinationals have a relatively lower preference for wholly 
owned subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector. 
185 Mireya Solis-Soberon, Exporting Losers: The Political Economy of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, 
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186 Kiyoshi Kojima, “Dynamics of Japanese Direct Investment in East Asia.”  
 96
2.5 Conclusion 
The period from 1985 to 1993 was not only unique in Japanese outward direct investment 
history, but also special in the United States investment position. This chapter used two sides’ data 
and mainly reexamined Japanese FDI industrial distribution and location in the United States 
compared to other developed countries’ direct investment in the United States. Its main findings 
support the view that the determinants of Japanese direct investment into the United States are very 
similar to Western-style FDI in the United States. That means market forces are the strongest factor 
in promoting FDI. Local market seeking, information collection, and yen appreciation significantly 
supported Japanese FDI into the United States.  
However, as mentioned above, Japanese FDI still had its own characteristics. Generally 
speaking, there were three points worth noting over this period in the United States. First, the 
Japanese were new comers in Greenfield-style FDI, and made acquisitions in the high-technology 
sectors a special priority due to financial assets’ quick and substantial appreciation; second, Japanese 
FDI attempted to concentrate in wholesale trade, transportation equipment, machinery, and primary 
metal industries; and some locations such as California and Hawaii are unique to Japan. This 
reflected that cluster factors compelled Japanese firms to identify specifically their competitive 
advantages in this transition age. Third, Japanese FDI aroused much debate in the United States in 
that time. Although this may be beyond the purely defined FDI sphere, it still added one 
characteristic of Japanese FDI due to the two preceding characteristics. 
Then, is it possible to conclude that Japanese FDI completely shifted from the Kojima model to 
the Western model during this period? If we admitted pro-trade as one of the pillars of the Kojima 
model—although its linkage in the United States is less prominent than in Asia—it is still a strong 
case comparing to other counties’ in the United States. Furthermore, Japanese multinationals in the 
United States contributed to political debate in the United States, while trade linkage in Asia created 
a mutual interest between Japan and other Asian states under larger bilateral economic gaps. 
Understanding Japanese FDI’s effects still requires more detailed work. A possible reason may be 
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due to the changed trade pattern through intra-industry and intra-firm trade in the economy and the 
fact that Japan was seen as an emerging competitor in both the economic and political field.  
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Chapter 3 Relative Gains and National Competitiveness: The Federal 
Government Policy 
 
 
In this chapter, I focus on the United States as a unitary actor in world political economy, and 
examine why and how to directly deal with the inward Japanese FDI at the federal government level. 
Moreover, this chapter attempts to explore the U.S. capacity and willingness to alter the behavior of 
multinationals. The topic of relations between multinationals and host countries is not new to 
international political economy. However, the United States as a host country and Japan as a home 
country along with the world economy transition through the late 1980s give us new implication on 
this topic.  
The subsequent parts are organized as follows. First, I investigate the national interest of the 
United States in the FDI area and its relative liberal policy. After that, I discuss the actual or 
perceptional interest change which resulted from changed international investment position, 
especially the entry of Japanese FDI during the later 1980s. Second, I examine the evolution of 
inward investment policy at the federal level during this period. In particular, I explore the origins 
and development of the Exon-Florio Amendment of 1988, and attribute it to Japanese FDI and U.S. 
concern about national competitiveness. In the third part, I pay attention to non-M&A types of FDI 
policy, and analyze U.S. sectoral policy on FDI.   
 
 
 
3.1 U.S. National Interest in FDI and Investment Policy Debate 
As a student of IPE, we should ground our work on the broad international economic setting in 
which the United States acted. The economic affairs in all states are constrained by the outside 
environments, especially by the rise of the economic interdependence. The difference lies in the 
degree of this influence, and the degree itself partly depends on the capability as well as conception 
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of state. The United States has historically maintained an open door policy to investment, but, this 
policy has changed as a result of specific challenges, as well as larger shifts in the international 
political economic system. In the later 1980s, the Japanese direct investment came to symbolizes 
decline of America’s relative economic power and necessitated a policy response. The national 
interest of the United States must be redefined in terms of direct investment. 
 
 
3.1.1 Liberal World Economy Order and Multinationals 
Foreign direct investment is considered as an instrument to serve national economic 
development. As a result, the United States welcomed inward investment in its earlier days. In his 
Report on Manufactures, Alexander Hamilton once characterized foreign capital “instead of being 
viewed as a rival, ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put into motion a 
greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater portion of useful enterprise than could exist 
without it.”187 In that time, the United States was a country with more raw materials and shorting of 
capital and technology. Many of us may wonder whether Hamilton would really welcome free 
investment, as his famous “Report on Manufacturers” strongly supports protecting infant industries 
in the United States. Writing in the late 1990s, Peter Drucker argued, “What makes these old ideas 
attractive is that Hamilton, Clay, and List did not focus on trade. They were neither free traders nor 
protectionists. They focused on investment.”188 To the United States, economic growth is the most 
important national interest before it became the largest industrialized county in the late 19th century. 
The hegemonic power of the United States has been associated with the growth of American 
multinationals, and has been used to exert different regional strategies to its outward direct 
investment. In fact, since the late 19th century, the United States’ principal economic concerns in 
regard to underdeveloped areas were access to markets, and obtaining opportunities to exploit 
                                                        
187 Quoted in Robert H. Mundheim and David W. Heleniak, “American Attitudes Toward Foreign Direct 
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natural resources. To protect their interests, sellers of uncompetitive merchandise and investors in 
primary production would be for export will be more prone to support imperial intervention and 
direct colonialism. Imperialism was a result of the search for raw materials, agricultural products, 
and markets in less developed nations. With the rise of the United States, from an industrializing 
nation to the world’s leading foreign investor, as well as structural economic and political changes in 
the developing world, the United States gradually abandoned the explicit imperialism policy after the 
First World War. Specifically, American economic interest had moved way from investment in 
primary production for export and toward investments in production for local markets.189  
The United States shared mutual interests with its multinationals after the Second World War. 
As Robert Gilpin stated in the 1970s, “in the middle 1960s, the importance of the multinational 
corporation to America’s place in the world began to be more fully appreciated by American political 
leaders”, and moreover, “corporate and political elites have shared the American vision of a liberal 
world economic order.”190 Specifically, the overseas expansion of U.S. multinationals contributed to 
three kinds of U.S. national interest at that time. First, international operations of American 
multinational corporations were perceived as pillar of the liberal international economic and political 
order. Second, multinationals helped the United States maintained the crucial raw materials supply, 
especially oil. Third, although in the shot term, multinationals expanding overseas meant capital 
outflow, in the long-run, the profit transfer would bring back more capital to the United States. As a 
result, multinationals plays a critical role on America’s balance of payments.191  
Outward FDI was regarded as important parts of U.S. national interest. More than ten years 
later, Gilpin stated again, “although the rate of growth of foreign investment declined by the 1980s, 
the United States remained heavily dependent on its multinationals for access to foreign markets and 
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for the earnings they produce.”192 Economist C. Fred Bergsten also hold similar views, and he stated 
that “multinational enterprises appear, on the basis of current evidence, to contribute significantly to 
the effectiveness of international monetary arrangements, to the maintenance of liberal U.S. trade 
policies, and thus to these important national interests of the United States.”193 
The linkage between U.S. economic power and multinationals is predicated on product cycle 
theory. As discussed in chapter 1, the product cycle assumes that domestic competition leads to 
production for export and then invests overseas. This kind of foreign investment will evolve with the 
stages of product upgrade in the domestic market. The more sophisticated industry integrated into, 
the more competition produced. Thus, the industrial characteristic is the main dynamics of U.S. 
multinationals. We can conclude that the detailed industries multinationals invested in are important 
to help explain the change in U.S. interest. As Theodore Moran pointed out, “by the mid 1960s the 
petrochemical industry was second in total value of United States foreign investments and first 
among U.S. manufacturing groups in net capital outflows to affiliates abroad.”194 Until the 1970s, 
the product cycle model is used to explain the expansion of American multinationals. As Gilpin 
recommended, “In fact, one could describe American commercial policy since the end of the war as 
one of following the product cycle.”195  
However, with increasing foreign competition, imitation and duplication, the technological gap 
between the leading country and the followers gradually narrowed. In the 1970s, the conflict 
between multinational corporations and the interests of nation-states was still “an American 
problem.”196 By and large, this perception of the American essence of the multinational enterprise 
problem was also shared by government officials throughout the world. It was America that 
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identified the problems surrounding multinational corporation’s relationships with political entities. 
Although FDI has grown considerably in scope and significance over the past several decades, its 
distribution has been and continues to be a very uneven, asymmetrical, and inherently conflictual 
process. Given the consensus in the United States elites, the leadership of the United States is 
necessary to a stable international economy.  
Regardless of whether this conclusion is suitable to judge policy in the 1980s, or whether U.S. 
multinationals elites have the same vision about the liberal economic order with political elites, the 
story below will illustrate that American’s reaction to her allies’ rising multinationals is very 
complex. 
 
 
3.1.2 A Brief History of Inward Investment Policy  
The U.S. hegemony in the aftermath of the Second World War maintained the greater belief 
that a liberal international economy order would benefit the U.S. and improve the liberal world. In 
that time, foreign investment policy consideration are not included in U.S. international economic 
problems. To those foreign investors in the United States, the U.S. adopted simplified policies based 
on sources of investments: U.S. allies, non-enemy nations, and enemy nations. In general, Professor 
Mira Wilkins’ statement exactly illustrated, “soon after 1945 there tended to be a relaxation, a 
dissipation, of many of U.S. policy makers’ fears over inward foreign investors (except those related 
to the defense sector, which fears heightened after the advent of the Cold War); some of the 
apprehensions and debates that arose during the interwar years would resurface, but not for decades 
and then in a greatly modified manner.”197 
Before the 1970s, the most striking feature of American inward FDI policy has been in absence. 
In fact, until the early 1970s inward FDI policy was “something other countries had.”198 There was 
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little sense of national policy toward, and little consciousness of incoming foreign direct investment. 
Robert Pastor argued that, “like many foreign policy-related issues, foreign investment becomes 
important only when it has an immediate impact at home—either in buying out American producers 
or in displacing American workers. Since the U.S. has been much more of a source than a recipient 
of foreign investment, the U.S. had much less need to formulate a host investment policy.”199 The 
open door policy harmonized well with the United State’s position as the world’s largest exporter of 
FDI. 
The first important investment policies shift in the United State emerged in the earlier 1970s. As 
Robert Pastor acknowledged, “if 1971 was the watershed year for U.S. monetary policy, then 1973 
played a similar role for U.S. host government investment policy.”200 First in response to a 
substantial increase in investment from Western Europe and Japan, and later in response to the influx 
of capital from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), U.S. Representatives John 
Dent and Joseph Gaydos introduced H.R. 8951 on June 25 1973, which became the Foreign 
Investors Limitation Act on November 6 of the same year. In Pastor’s words, it “was the first of 
many restrictionist bills designed to respond to the increased unease and to the increased 
vulnerability to outside pressures which Americans felt, perhaps as a result of the devaluations, 
perhaps due to a sluggish economy.”201 For gathering necessary information on foreign investment 
in the United States, Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 and the 
International Investment Survey Act of 1976. The Act imposes strict reporting requirements on 
foreign-owned enterprises in the United States.  
Partly in order to get Congress off a potentially dangerous protectionist track, the 
Administration produced its own report. It set out to show that Arab direct investment was already 
very much under control through a vast array of existing restrictions. The report was issued by the 
Commerce Department in 1976 with nine volumes and more than 3,000 pages. This report helped 
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the administration win the day against Congress. However, the report cast doubt on U.S. claims 
about operating an open economy for FDI. The scope of the U.S. restrictions was so vast that it took 
almost three whole volumes of this report to set them out. As the Department of Commerce noted, 
“there are a number of U.S. restrictions, which prohibit direct investment by non-resident aliens in 
enterprises engaged in shipping, radio, television, telegraph, fishing, air transportation, mining, 
hydro-electric power and atomic energy.”202 
In addition to these measures, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS) was established in 1975 by the Ford Administration. CFIUS is an interagency committee 
that serves the President in overseeing the national security implications of foreign investment in the 
economy. The Committee is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International 
Affairs, and its members include senior officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, 
the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, and the Executive Director of the Council on 
International Economic Policy. Its main duty was to “review investments in the United States which, 
in the judgment of the Committee, might have major implications for United States national 
interests.”203  
On January 2, 1980, the United States Trade Representative and the Chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisors replaced the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs and the 
Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, respectively.204 In President 
Carter’s statements, the USTR is the primary representative of the United States for “negotiations 
concerning direct investment incentives and disincentives and bilateral investment issues concerning 
barriers to investment.” 205  Carter adjusted the membership of CFIUS to conform to their 
administrations’ objectives. However, the committee’s objectives are limited in accordance with the 
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general American policy of avoiding government involvement in particular transactions. Moreover, 
it has no authority itself to block any foreign investment in the United States. Another shortcoming 
of CFIUS as a screening mechanism is that it cannot compel a foreign investor to delay an 
investment while it reviews the case.  
Due to the fact that FDI entry into the United States was less significant than American 
outward FDI until the 1970s, the United States maintained an open investment policy in generally. 
Robert Pastor wrote in 1980, “Prior to 1973, U.S. inward investment policy was little more than an 
afterthought of a policy whose principal objective was to mitigate the effects of our balance of 
payments deficit. But after more than a decade of unprecedented economic growth by Japan and 
Europe….Many [Congress] members responded reflexively and introduced bills which mandated 
strict prohibitions on foreign investment.”206  
However, the small sizable inward FDI to American economy did not arouse enough 
attentions. According to a report organized by the Government Operations Committee in August 
1980, “Federal efforts to monitor foreign direct investment in the United States and its impact on 
America’s national interests are so inadequate, disjointed and poorly implemented that Federal 
estimates of the total amount of foreign direct investment constitute little more than 
guesswork…Notwithstanding repeated assurances by administration officials, the U.S. Government 
does not have a sound, sensible or rational policy on foreign direct investment.”207  
The leading position of U.S. investment required a liberal international economy order. U.S. 
companies’ expansion needed foreign countries open their doors. On September 9, 1983, President 
Ronald Reagan characterized the U.S. policy toward inward FDI as follows, 
 
The United States has consistently welcomed foreign direct investment in this country. 
Such investment provides substantial benefits to the United States. Therefore, the 
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United States fosters a domestic economic climate which is conducive to investment. 
We provide foreign investors fair, equitable, and non-discriminatory treatment under 
our laws and regulations. We maintain exceptions to such treatment only as are 
necessary to protect our security and related interests and which are consistent with our 
international legal obligations.208 
 
This policy essentially describes the general open door policy approach of the federal 
government toward foreign investment. Two points in this statement need to be emphasized: first, 
the United States did not adopt reciprocity as a general policy rule applicable to foreign investment 
issues. Second, the United States government restricts foreign ownership in areas where the national 
security may be affected.  
The brief historical evolution of the United States investment position illustrates that it 
maintained open and neutral policy toward inward FDI, as well as exceptions to this general attitudes. 
Federal restrictions on the inflow of direct investment are of relatively long standing and focused on 
sectors with strong implications concerning national security or national autonomy:209 Primarily this 
meant aviation, ship-building, and nuclear matters the first; while banking and communications were 
of the secondary importance. Ownership in these areas is barred, or limited to non-controlling 
positions. 
As a result of its open door policy, FDI in the United States increased significantly. The 
growing public anxiety increased pressure on the government to restrict foreign acquisitions. 
Policy-makers in the United States began to thoroughly consider both the positive and negative 
effects of the inflow of FDI, and increasingly emphasized the importance of reciprocity as well as 
national security consideration.  
The general policy which rejected investment reciprocity changed somewhat in 1984 with 
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substantial FDI increasing in the United States. Section 304 of the International Trade and 
Investment Act of 1984 states that the President may take actions to restrict or deny the authorization 
of foreign investment in the service sector, if the home country of the foreign investor places undue 
restrictions on United States services investment. Thus, if a foreign country restricts United States 
banking activities, then the President may take action similarly to limit banking investments by 
residents of that country.210  
Another change involved increasing the consideration given to national security 
considerations. Since the mid-1980s, some members of Congress and the Department of Defense, 
actively sought authority to monitor, regulate and restrict foreign investment to safeguard national 
security. In 1984, Pentagon officials expressed fears about the continued existence of a ball-bearing 
company that was likely to be acquired by a Japanese-owned firm. A Pentagon spokesman stated that 
the concern was that a “viable industrial base” be maintained for ball-bearing products.211 The 
acquisition was also reviewed under antitrust statutes by the Justice Department in February 1985. 
As the company’s manufacturing facilities still remained under the direct control of the U.S. 
subsidiary and available to handle military contracts, they approved the takeover.212 
The United States’ inward investment policy is considered open to other countries under 
specific conditions. As one observer noted, it included three special conditions, “the fundamental 
market orientation of the United States economy and the absence of pervasive national governmental 
controls over the economy; the historical experience of the United States in developing its economy 
through the early part of this century on the basis of foreign capital and immigration; and the vast 
size of the United States economy in which foreign ownership of United States assets, albeit growing, 
is relatively small.”213 If any of these conditions changed, or policy makers’ perceptions of them 
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changed, the United States would have to re-examine its investment policy. 
 
 
3.1.3 Investment Position Change and Inward Investment Policy Debate 
During the period of this study, Japanese outward direct investment aroused critical debate in 
the United States. Scholars, politicians, and journalists expressed their concerns about the effects of 
Japanese FDI. Policy debates sometimes are not strictly bounded by facts, but rather about which 
facts are considered important to American national interests. In a society like the United States, it is 
not surprising to hear all sorts of voices. The preceded discussion helps us understand the position of 
the U.S. in the world economy and its policy stance. Furthermore, it identified economic interest 
change along with the rise of Japanese multinationals. In this section we will examine the evolving 
views of elites in the United States on Japanese FDI and much broader related issues.  
With the increasing importance of the world economy and the positional decline of the United 
States in economic affairs, the United States emerged as an “ordinary country” during the late 
1960s.214 Domestic problems began to arise on the policy agenda in regards to international 
competition. This change obviously led to fundamentally new thinking in the United States; 
specifically, that the United States should put its own national interest over its allies’ interests.  
The key policy makers in the United States began to notice the political nature of foreign 
economic policy. Henry Kissinger, while the Secretary of State under the Nixon Administration, 
acknowledged in his memoirs that, before the fall of 1971 he had paid little attention to such issues,  
 
From the start I had not expected to play a major role in international economics, 
which—to put it mildly—had not been a central field of study for me. Only later did 
I learn that the key economic policy decisions are not technical but political. At first I 
thought that I had enough on my hands keeping watch on the State and Defense 
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Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency without also taking on Treasury, 
Commerce, and Agriculture…On the whole I confined myself to a watching brief.215  
 
Since the 1970s, the structural changes in international trade began to sharply challenge 
America’s traditional free trade doctrine, which was based on comparative advantage and factor 
endowments. Scholars can argue that free trade is nevertheless the right policy, and government 
should favor industries under conditions which lead to external economies. However, as Paul 
Krugman concluded, “the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 
1817 publication of Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy.”216 Policy makers in the United 
States quickly realized the importance of new trade theory in favor of government intervention in 
trade negotiation. In a broader sense, some industry sectors such as semiconductor, aviation industry, 
came to be seen as strategic economically as well as militarily. As a result, protecting and promoting 
these industries was necessary.217 
Economic competition between developed countries not only spurred economists to develop 
new trade theories, but also aroused heated debates on how to improve competitiveness. The first 
wave of policy debate was on industry policy. Debate on industry policy became a symbol of 
American industry decline, especially relative to Japan. Moreover, industry policy was considered of 
“primarily political programs, designed to appeal to political constituencies rather than professional 
economists.”218 To some business specialists, industry policy was poorly conceived and misleading. 
Short term distribution of resources to some industries may become a welfare program, while 
international competition is shaped by two competing national strategies—Japan’s 
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productivity-oriented developmental strategies and U.S.’s distribution-oriented strategies. The 
central premise of a developmental strategy is that a country, like a company, can accelerate its 
growth by long term strategies. A national strategy needs focus of long term development in order to 
effectively address the American competitiveness.219 
Followed by industry policy debates, competitiveness issues became the heated topic in the 
United States in the latter part of the 1980s. Economist Paul Samuelson stated that “in chapter 31 
Ricardo discovers what he has elsewhere gratuitously denied: that an improvement abroad can hurt 
Britain under free trade (or, as needs to be said today, that an improvement in Japan can hurt the 
American living standard),” As a result, “discussions of international competitiveness are incomplete 
without referring to the Japanese success story.”220 Although what competitiveness is and how it can 
be to measured is still an ongoing debate, people used it everywhere.  
This consideration also absorbed American intellectuals. On July 28 1985, Theodore H. White, 
U.S. journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winning author, published an article entitled “The Danger from 
Japan” and warned that “if a ripple of depression forces Congress to act, a lockup of the open 
American market would wound Japan more than it would wound us. The superlative execution of 
their trade tactics may provoke an incalculable reaction-as the Japanese might well remember the 
course that ran from Pearl Harbor to the deck of the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay just 40 years 
ago.”221 White’s piece came at a time when Congress was at a fever pitch to “do something” about 
Japan’s growing trade surplus with the United States.  
Fear of the Japanese economy spread with time. In 1987, an influential senator’s aide said, “We 
are no longer talking about the Japanese threat to our industry; we are talking about the Japanese 
threat to this country.”222 Akio Morita, then Chairman of Sony Corporation, in his lecture at New 
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York University in 1991 described that, “This sudden rise of Japanese corporate involvement in the 
US, however, has caused fears among certain sectors of the American public about Japanese 
business activities and their effects on the local community and has led to an emotional backlash. 
The increase in foreign investments is regarded as a threat to America’s ability to control its 
economy, to the political process, and even to national security.”223  
Nearly twenty years later, a report on U.S. national security and foreign investment goes further 
and illustrates that:   
 
By the late 1980s, it was not Japan’s trade surplus that produced the most angst among 
legislators in Washington. Rather, it was the growing perception that Japan was on the 
verge of gaining unprecedented control over the U.S. economy. The upshot was a 
xenophobic backlash against Japanese investment in the United States over the second half 
of the 1980s, and a deepening ambivalence in the United States about the role of foreign 
direct investment.224  
 
The American fear of Japanese FDI not only comes from its quick rise, but also the dramatic 
linkage between FDI and other issue areas. Earlier trade disputes involved motor vehicles and the 
steel and textile industries, but in the late 1980s, Japanese economic success began to challenge U.S. 
supremacy in core industries, such as supercomputers, semiconductors and high-technology. As 
mentioned earlier, Japanese FDI symbolized the success of Japan and its power.   
Japanese outward direct investment reflected Japan’s stronger competitiveness in the world 
market and the role of the Japanese government in facilitate it. This led some American economists 
and industry policy makers to reassess their views on competitiveness and the state. Most analysts 
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have accepted the definition of competitiveness offered in the 1985 Report of the President’s 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness as: “the degree to which a nation can, under free and fair 
market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets while 
simultaneously maintaining or expanding the real incomes of its citizens.”225 This definition has 
three main elements that deserve attention. First, its unit of analysis is a nation, not a firm or industry. 
Second, the market circumstances under which nation struggle should be free and fair. Third, 
citizen’s real income is the ultimate measurement of competitiveness. Beyond this conceptually 
sound definition, disagreements quickly arise, particularly over how to determine the precise means 
to measure the degree to which the United States is passing or failing the competitiveness test. As a 
consequence, conflicting technical definitions, ambiguous statistics, and multiple interpretations of 
data plague the measurement of the competitiveness concept.  
Generally speaking, throughout the 1980s and 1990s commentators and scholars used the 
competitiveness at the firm, industry, and national levels.226 Among these three levels, the firm level 
is the most specific level for measurement. As a firm is a profit-maximizing actor in a free market, 
cost-benefits analysis is simple for a firm; it succeeds if it reduces costs and increases its profits. As 
a result, a firm is competitive if it can hold or expand its market share against rival firms at home or 
abroad in the long term. In this sense, measurement is simple. However, how to improve its 
competitiveness is still problematic. For specific industries useful indicators include growth in 
national shares of global production, growth in employment, growth in revenues and profits of firms 
in the industry, and the frequency of industrial crises. At the national economy level, international 
competitiveness can be measured by such indicators: trade balance, world market shares, 
productivity growth, research and development, and the cost of capital. These indicators are always 
linked to the Japan economic challenge, as scholars considered that, “absent Japan as economic 
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powerhouse, and with the relative position of the United States in the world economy unchallenged, 
we think it a reasonable conjecture that the competitiveness debate would not have emerged.”227 
The problem following this logic is how the US elites can distinguish U.S.-based multinationals 
and U.S.-owned multinationals. One scholar stated that,  
 
The increase of foreign corporations in the US has political as well as economic 
consequences for trade policy making. Government efforts to promote competitiveness seek 
to distinguish between US and non-US firms in terms of eligibility requirements. 
Discriminatory definitions risk violating international commitments to the ‘national 
treatment’ principles, with potential adverse effects on relations with trading partners and 
their treatment of US investment abroad. More directly, domestic political forces will 
increasingly resist nationality criteria that exclude local affiliates of foreign corporations as 
the realization hits home that program benefits are also thereby being denied to suppliers, 
retailers, customers, employees, and other constituencies in the affiliates’ host states and 
localities.228 
 
In case of Japanese FDI in the United States, this penetration is obviously more serious than 
American FDI in the Japan. In this situation, economic gains plus political and psychological 
considerations together influence people’s perceptions of Japanese FDI. Ryokichi Hirono, then 
professor of economics at Seikei University, stated “consumers welcome us because competition 
from Japan brings better and cheaper products. But American and European multinationals see us 
only as a threat.”229 U.S. perception of Japanese economic threat are not limited to the economic 
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sphere alone; as Charles Kindleberger noted, “the rise in protectionism in the United States in the 
last few years is connected less to recession, in my judgment, than to feelings of losing out to 
Japanese competition and a longing for geriatric, as contrasted with infant-industry, tariffs.”230  
In 1990, Harvard Professor Robert Reich published his seminal article “Who is Us?” in 
Harvard Business Review.231 Reich argued that American ownership of corporation is less relevant 
to America’s economic future than the American workers, and the competitiveness of 
American-owned corporations is no longer the same as American competitiveness. Moreover, the 
competitiveness of American workers is a more important definition of “American competitiveness” 
than the competitiveness of American companies. As a result, the United States should invest in 
people, not in nationally defined corporations. According to this logic, Japanese multinationals in the 
United States should be encouraged.  
In fact, Reich’s idea is not new in the economic logic of labor and capital. As mentioned earlier, 
the basic assumption of international trade theory is on the degree of mobility of production factors. 
In classic international trade world, labor and capital were assumed to be immobile between states, 
so mercantilist focused on distribution of gains always established in some industries under the 
conditions which market scale existed. Reich assumed that labor could not flow between states, 
while capital could flow between states. In Reich’s world, states must compete for investment. The 
inflow of direct investment will bring at least two potential gains: employment and a transfer of 
technology or other assets such as management skills. 
However, the question is whether multinationals will invest globally or whether they mainly 
invested in some particular regions, or countries? Another important question becomes where they 
put their R&D? In historian Paul Kennedy’s words, “If products are no longer ‘American,’ what is 
the point of trying to measure the balance of merchandise trade, or the gap in U.S.-Japan commerce 
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in high-technology goods?”232 In fact, what Reich described is not the fact but the future of 
multinationals. Laura Tyson argued that although Reich posed a correct question, his answer only 
described the future of the world economy. Nationality continues to matter, due to jurisdiction 
regulations and the home country effect. The United States still needs American-based companies to 
keep America’s lead in high technology and national defense.233  
MIT professor Lester Thurow specifically challenges Reich’s argument that when Japanese 
companies open plants in America, they became “us.” Thurow argued that no matter where a 
Japanese company invests, virtually all the senior management jobs remain in Japan, and are held by 
Japanese citizens. So are the jobs in the advanced research centers and factories that pay the highest 
wages. In Thurow’s words, “If the top management jobs are back in Japan and the highest-wage jobs 
are back in Japan, they are not us. If the best technology is kept back in Japan, they are not us. In fact, 
Japanese transplant factories in the United States almost never make the most sophisticated, highest 
value-added products that the company makes.”234 As a result, in the real world corporations still 
have distinct national identities.  
The 1980s was a decade when globalization of production increasingly influenced the complex 
strategies of multinational corporations. Companies attempted to improve their competitiveness in 
the world market through strategic alliances. In this way, firms sometimes cooperated with their 
rivals in other settings. Under this cross-cutting corporate interest, as Miles Kahler noted, “Should 
the United States encourage Japanese investment in smaller, American, high-technology firms, for 
example? Are American corporations in Japan part of the U.S. economy situated abroad, or are they 
essentially Japanese firms? Such a web of private connections at first appears to create important 
pressures for liberalization in government policies.”235  
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In theory, firms that have various transnational linkages may pursue liberal policy as to their 
economic interests are strongly influenced by protectionism. As a result, multinational corporations 
usually exert pressures on governments to seek open door policies.236 In practice, this policy 
preference was not always reflected in policy outcomes. It depends on domestic political institutions 
as well as protectionism power. How to balance a firm’s pursuit with the national interest under 
changing international economic conditions has became an important policy question in the United 
States. 
In a partly globalized world, only some countries attract most of the FDI. The distribution of 
FDI is very uneven. In the case of this study, what is Japanese multinationals or American 
multinationals is clear, because of the “special nature of the links between the corporation and its 
home nation and because of the citizenship of the majority of its owners, managers, and workers, a 
‘national’ company with international operations is ‘one of us.’”237 Two notable economists in the 
earlier 1990s categorized the political implications of domestic and foreign firms as followed: 
 
Beyond its immediate financial role, foreign direct investment implies a rising share of 
foreign ownership in those economies that have been its main recipients. To the extent 
that foreign-owned firms behave differently from those with domestic owners, this may 
have important long-term economic implications. Equally important, concern over how 
foreign firm might behave has inevitably become an important political issue.238 
 
Thus, the policy debate on FDI issues evolved along with other related topics in international 
political economy. The United States has understood the power of multinationals’ outward direct 
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investment since the aftermath of the Second World War. The role of multinationals in building 
national competitiveness is also growing in importance to other countries. In particular, Japanese 
FDI posed great a challenge to the United States, not only in academic thinking about the 
international economy, but also in policymaking circles.     
 
 
 
3.2 Exon-Florio Amendment and U.S. National Economic Security 
This study does not comprehensively evaluate the United States’ policies related to FDI, but 
rather focuses on the most important policy changes which were directly caused by the entry of 
Japanese FDI during this period. I argue that the major reason which compelled U.S. inward 
investment policy during this period is the Japanese FDI, especially the national security as well as 
national economic security considerations of  M&A types of FDI.  
The United States administrations insist that open door policy on FDI is a positive sum game 
for the world economy, and traditionally among the most open economies in the world with respect 
to inward FDI. However, U.S. FDI policy significantly changed with the passage of the Exon-Florio 
amendment in September 1988. This gave the President power to bar the acquisition of a U.S. firm 
by foreign persons on national security around, to specify the conditions under which the transaction 
would be allowed, or even to require the divestment of such firms after acquisition has already 
occurred.  
The passage of the Exon-Florio amendment was a response to the replacement of the United 
States’ domination in FDI area with that of the Triad economies. As discussed in Chapter 2, Japan 
emerged as the quickest FDI sourcing country and accounted for much the inflows of FDI into the 
United States. As a result, the story of the Exon-Florio Amendment is directly relevant to Japanese 
FDI. Given the complex political and economic interaction in the pass of the Exon-Florio Act, “its 
direct impetus was a single event: the highly-publicized threatened foreign takeover in 1987 of a U.S. 
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semiconductor firm, Fairchild by Fujitsu of Japan.”239  
 
 
3.2.1 The Fujitsu Case and the Origins of the Exon-Florio Amendment 
On October 23 1986, the Fujitsu Corporation of Japan announced plans to purchase U.S. 
based Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, a pioneering Silicon Valley computer chip manufacturer 
owned by Schlumberger Ltd.240 Semiconductors are the key components in the design, development 
and production of computer and telecommunications systems. They are often described as “the crude 
oil of the information age.” At that time, Fujitsu was Japan's fourth largest chip maker after NEC, 
Hitachi and Toshiba, and the largest computer maker in Japan in terms of sales. According to the 
agreement, Fujitsu would obtain an 80 percent stake in Fairchild. The transaction marked one of the 
most significant commercial transfers of leading-edge American technology, research and expertise 
to Japan, and it positioned Fujitsu to become a much more powerful player in the computer and 
semiconductor market (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Top Integrated Circuit Makers in 1986 
Multinationals  Home country Sales (billions of dollar) 
IBM U.S.A 3.2 
NEC Japan 2.2 
Texas Instruments U.S.A 1.9 
Fujitsu Japan 1.5 
Motorola U.S.A. 1.4 
Toshiba Japan 1.3 
Philips Netherlands 1.0 
Intel U.S.A 1.0 
National Semiconductor U.S.A 0.9 
Advanced Micro Devices U.S.A 0.7 
Matsushita Japan 0.6 
Mitsubishi Japan 0.5 
Source: Louise Kehoe, “Long Shadows in Silicon Valley: The Fujitsu-Fairchild Deal,” Financial 
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Times, October 29, 1986. The column “home country” is added by author. 
 
At the time of the announcement, the Japan-U.S. trade relationship was under fire. Japan and 
the United States signed a semiconductor trade agreement on September 2 1986. According to this 
agreement, U.S. companies would reach their goal of a 20 percent share of the Japanese chip market 
within five years. Although this agreement was considered by the U.S. government as a “major step 
forward” to open Japan market and increase U.S. share in Japan, it did not make such sense in “the 
press, economists, and many companies dependent on Japanese chips.”241 At the same time, 
Japanese firms, such as Toshiba, Hitachi and NEC, had grown to dominate the world’s 
semiconductor market, and provoked calls for trade protection by the U.S. semiconductor industry. 
Some congressmen considered that Japanese direct investment in the United States would create 
obstacles to coordinate with Japan on unfair trade problems. As Congressman Charlie Wilson stated, 
“if the Fairchild-Fujitsu deal had been allowed to go through, among the many bad effects would 
have been the ability of Fujitsu to expand its predatory pricing practices—free from the threat of 
penalties under of U.S. antidumping trade laws, because our trade laws apply only to foreign-made 
goods.”242  
On the other hand, investing directly in the United States had emerged as the dominant 
strategy for Japan’s electronic companies. The increased purchasing power of the yen and declining 
export profit margins provided stronger impetus for Japanese multinationals to invest in the United 
States. If Fujitsu could succeed in its acquisition strategy, many others in the Japan quickly follow 
suit. In fact, NEC and Toshiba already had major production plants in the United States, other giants 
such as Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, and Matsushita Electric had each stated their intention to follow 
in Fujitsu’s footsteps with an overseas purchase.243  
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Under these conditions, the announcement aroused opposition especially in Silicon Valley. 
Some argued, for example, “it’s very dangerous… another major American semiconductor company 
is in the hands of an overseas company, and it’s particularly disturbing that it’s the Japanese.”244 
Although Fairchild occupied a relatively minor place in the U.S. semiconductor market, Fujitsu’s 
announced intentions coincided with a flurry of investigations into allegations that Japanese 
manufacturers were dumping several types of semiconductors into the U.S. market. Many observers 
felt that, “Fujitsu, signals a radical restructuring of the US semiconductor industry.”245  
The U.S. government set up an interagency working party in November 1986, including the 
Pentagon, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department and the Treasury, to look into the trade 
and military implications of the proposed deal. According to Bruce Smart, Undersecretary for 
International Trade at the U.S. Commerce Department, U.S. concerns centered on three main areas: 
Fairchild is a leading supplier of chips to US military contractors; Fairchild's advanced 
semiconductor technology would come under Japanese control; whether other US companies would 
be purchased by Japanese company.246 The proposed transaction alarmed a number of U.S. officials 
who viewed it as yet another step in Japan’s efforts to dominate the global semiconductor trade at the 
expense of U.S. firms.  
A group of government officials, headed by an unusual alliance between the Secretary 
Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, opposed the 
acquisition. Although there is no legal authority under which the Regan administration could enjoin 
a foreigner from investing in an American firm, it can set conditions that discourage them. At that 
time, the Defense Department was a major consumer of microchips and therefore opposed the sale of 
Fairchild to Fujitsu. Opponents also argued that the transaction would jeopardize national security 
because no U.S. manufacturers produced the advanced microchips made by Fairchild. The Defense 
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Department feared the loss of an American-owned source of supply, while the Commerce 
Department worried about America losing its position in a major world industry. Fujitsu’s purchase 
of the Fairchild symbolized Japan’s economic challenge and the erosion of U.S. high-technology 
independence. As one official said, “this is a test case. If Japan can come in and buy this company, it 
can come in and buy them all over the place. We don't want to see the semiconductor industry under 
Japanese control.”247 
However, not all government officials opposed the Fairchild acquisition. Some executive 
branch officials, such as the Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary R. A. Cornell and the 
administration’s economist, opposed government intervention. They saw the “national security” 
issue as a “smokescreen” for “Japan-bashing” at a time of trade friction. 248  The Treasury 
Department welcomed Japanese FDI due to its capital contribution to the American economy. 
However, given the opposition from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, as one official 
stated, “It’s unlikely for the Japanese to do something like that in the United States when the 
Secretary of Commerce doesn’t want it done.”249 In the Fairchild case, the different attitudes 
reflected the relations between specific departments in the world economy and national security (see 
Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 The Attitudes towards Fujitsu’s Purchase of Fairchild, 1987 
Oppose Waiting Support 
Commerce Department Justice Department  Treasury Department 
Defense Department Economic Policy Council  
Central Intelligence Agency   
Note: “Waiting” means that the agency’s determination of whether to support or oppose was 
depended on the outcome of an investigation that had not concluded.  
 
Under the pressure and negative efforts against the plan, the acquisition attempt ultimately 
                                                        
247 Peter T. Kilborn, “U.S. Asked to Block Japan Deal: Two in Cabinet Fight Sale to Japanese,” New York 
Times, March 12, 1987. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
 122
failed. On March 16 1987, in Tokyo, Fujitsu announced that it had abandoned its proposed takeover. 
The New York office of Schlumberger in its statement noted that U.S. officials were not as 
concerned over French ownership of Fairchild because France was not as much of a threat in the 
semiconductor and computer markets. As a result, “rising political controversy in the United States 
made it unlikely that the sale of Fairchild could be completed in a reasonable time.”250 In Senator 
John D. Rockefeller’s words, “I think they stopped it because there was clearly massive public 
pressure. American pressure was building up against it. I think it was in Japan’s interest at that 
particular time and would be now, not to have proceeded with the particular arrangement, and I think 
that is why it happened.” 251 Yoshiji Nogami, the Japanese Embassy’s economic counselor, in his 
interview with the New York Times, noted that “we regret that there have been a number of 
unwarranted criticisms raised by some Administration officials.”252  
Fujitsu’s announcement obviously reflected Japan’s competitiveness in the semiconductor 
industry, as well as America’s losing edge. This industry is a core national interest of the United 
States. The semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley, “created not only a new industry but a new 
culture”, and “the culture of Silicon Valley seemed to many observers to symbolize America’s 
future.”253 This view was broadly shared by U.S. policy makers. As Representative Don Ritter 
stated, “both national security and America’s position in the vital world information economy—the 
two are linked—demand that we take some deliberate steps now to ensure a viable United States 
semiconductor industry for the long run.”254  
The concern about Japanese economic power was the major reason to link this case to national 
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security, especially the economic competitiveness. As David C. Mulford, Assistant Treasury 
Secretary for International Affairs, stated in October 1987, “in the case of Fairchild-Fujitsu, we had 
serious concerns. The acquisition proposal ultimately was called off before the CFIUS had to 
conclude its process but the Commerce Department, for example, brought to that process some 
serious concerns as to whether or not it would in the long run have national security implications. It 
wasn’t our judgment that we were imposing a militaristic view of what constitutes national 
security.”255 In fact, the Defense Department consumed less than 10 percent of U.S. semiconductor 
output in the 1980s, while it had been the leading buyer of semiconductors in the 1960s. In another 
words, semiconductors had become the critical industry not only for defense, but also for the 
commerial competitiveness. 256   
The Fujitsu case also illustrates that the major issue of US policy toward inward direct 
investment in strategically sensitive industries remains unresolved. On the one hand, the question of 
where the Administration stands was being asked.257 On the other hand, the question of how to keep 
the U.S. leadership in high-technology industries became more cautious.258 “As a result of the 
Fujitsu affair, many congressmen became aware that the President had no express authority to block 
foreign acquisitions of the U.S. companies.” 259  Sensing the proper atmosphere, members of 
Congress began to draft alternative tools to confront the similar situations in the future. Although the 
Regan Administration opposed such legislation for fear that it might make a change in the United 
States’ liberal foreign international investment policies, the controversy surrounding the attempted 
takeover of Fairchild led to proposals to tighten controls on foreign takeovers. The Fujitsu case 
created a wave of fear in the United States and marked a turning point in U.S. FDI policy. 
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3.2.2 The Creation of Exon-Florio Amendment 
The Fujitsu-Fairchild case largely opened the door of investment protectionism in Congress. 
After news of acquisition was announced, Senator J. James Exon260 met with President Regan to 
protest the proposed acquisition; however, the White House responded that the President Regan had 
no authority to prohibit the takeover.261 On June 4, 1987, Exon introduced the Foreign Investment, 
National Security and Essential Commerce Amendment to the Technology Competitiveness Act in 
the Senate Committee on Commerce Science and Transportation.262 In Exon’s declaration, this 
legislation was trying to authorize the President to block the acquisition of U.S. companies by 
foreign persons where he determined that such as acquisition could threaten the national security of 
the United States.  
The Administration initially opposed the bill, although Senator Exon stated that his proposal 
was not intended to chill foreign investment. By the time the hearing was held on June 10, 1987, 
opposing voices came from business, Treasury Secretary James Baker, U.S. Trade Representative 
Clayton Yeutter, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, and the Federal Reserve’s Paul Volcker.263 
Their concerns were similar: the proposal would chill foreign investment to the detriment of the U.S. 
economy, was unnecessary given existing laws, would increase uncertainty for foreign investors, 
undermine U.S. efforts to eliminate investment barriers, and invite retaliation against U.S. investors 
abroad. Secretary Baker’s letter was blunt: if this provision were in the final trade bill, Baker “would 
find it particularly difficult to recommend that the President sign the bill.”264 At the hearing, 
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Richard Darmen, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, had little difficulty in interpreting Baker’s letter as a 
threat of a Presidential veto.265  
At the June 10 hearing, neither Secretary Baldrige nor Darman supported the proposal. They 
criticized the Exon proposal as overly broad, and contrary to the established United States policy of 
encouraging foreign investment. Baldrige stated that “we are opposed to the Exon proposal because 
we think it will mean a diversion away from the principles that we have been trying to espouse 
around the world, which is national treatment for investment, open investment policy, and everything 
that goes with it.”266 Furthermore, they contended that the statute was not narrowly targeted to 
hostile takeovers but “unnecessarily” extended to friendly mergers, “synergistic” joint ventures, and 
licensing agreements which contribute to the transfer of technology to the United States and enhance 
U.S. competitiveness.267  
Moreover, the statute contained amorphous undefined criteria for review, particularly “essential 
commerce” and “economic welfare.” Secretary Baldrige criticized the “essential commerce” 
criterion and the listed review criteria as “bad economics, bad policy…fraught with political risk” 
since it would undercut U.S. investment policy, and the U.S. negotiating stance in the GATT and the 
then ongoing Canada-United States FTA talks.268 Treasury Deputy Secretary Darmen called it a 
“radical reversal of U.S. policy favoring increasingly open investment regimes.”269 As illustrated 
above, these two departments were constrained by their own department of interest in considering 
Japanese FDI. Treasury welcomes Japanese FDI because of its view on the budget deficit. 
Probably the dialogue between Senator Exon and Secretary Baldrige at this hearing illustrates 
the perceived challenge of Japanese FDI well: 
 
Senator Exon: You did intervene, did you not, in the Fujitsu case? 
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Secretary Baldrige: I expressed some concerns. 
Senator Exon: You voluntarily expressed some concerns? 
Secretary Baldrige; Well, I felt there was a national security aspect there. 
Senator Exon: Did you think that there was any national security involved in the Goodyear 
takeover by, in this case, a British subject? 
Secretary Baldrige: No. 
Senator Exon: And you did not act? 
Secretary Baldrige: I did not act.270 
 
Despite broader questions raised, among the testimony of even the harshest critics of Exon, no 
one disputed the need to protect the “national security.” By the end of the hearing a consensus was 
forming on the Committee that the Exon amendment needed only to be “tightened.” On July 19, the 
Senate Commerce Committee unanimously adopted it out as part of the Technology Competitiveness 
Act of 1987.271 The new vision of Senator Exon’s proposal “tightened up” a number of issues raised 
at the hearing: 1) the criterion for review of foreign takeovers was recast as “national security and 
essential commerce which affects national security”. This scope is narrower than CFIUS’ brief which 
included those cases with major implications for the United States’ national interest; 2) the Secretary 
of Commerce was not required to undertake an investigation; 3) the number of agencies which could 
initiate an investigation as reduced; 4) coverage of joint ventures and licensing arrangements as 
omitted. As a result, the coverage was limited to mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.  
Representative James Florio introduced a House version that was almost identified the Senator 
Exon’s original proposal during the hearings on October 20 and 21 1987. These hearings echoed 
many of the criticisms heard in the Senate hearing on June 10th. Representative Florio stated that “I 
want to make this very clear. This is not, at least from my perspective, a protectionism initiative. It is 
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not designed to keep out investments; certainly under certain circumstances, they work in our 
interests. What it really is, is to say we ought to have at least the authority to gain some degree of 
control over what goes on in our own borders, at least to the point of systematizing the method of 
knowing and evaluating.”272 The view on “control” benefits into America “borders” was also 
echoed in policy debates on FDI examined previously. 
In the following months, the need to control FDI began to be discussed broadly. In the January 
25, 1988 edition of Forbes Magazine, Malcolm Forbes argued that, “before Japan buys too much of 
the USA. We must instantly legislate a presidentially appointed Board of Knowledgeable [experts] 
whose approval would be required before ANY foreign purchases of any significance would be 
allowed of ANY consequential U.S. company—regardless of size.” 273 On February 22, 1988, 
Senator James Florio stated before Congress that he agreed with that opinion. The United States 
should take action to ensure acquisition does not destroy the wealth of the U.S. economy, especially 
empower president authority to review.274 
On March 24, 1988, Reagan Administration officials reluctantly approved in talks with 
Congress negotiators on this bill. The success of this bill partly attributed to the extremely radical 
opinion of Representative John Bryant. If President did not take anti-takeover amendment, there 
would be greater pressure to pass the Bryant amendment, which required foreign firms in the United 
States to publish more information. Senator Florio stated that, “the President or his designee now 
will clearly have the authority to investigate and act in a situation in which a potential foreign 
takeover will adversely impact upon national security, including critical commercial aspects of 
national security.” Senator James Exon argued strongly in his interview with the New York Times, 
that “in this day and age, a strong economic base is as essential to national security as are 
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weapons.”275 The Financial Times emphasized that, this bill “is the first big legislative response to 
the wave of foreign takeovers.”276 On April 29, one Congressman quoted the New York Times 
articles again to argue that “Japanese have conspired with their government and with many of their 
large industries to destroy a number of our industries.”277 
The Exon-Florio Amendment was adopted on August 23, 1988, as Section 5021—Authority to 
Review Certain Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers— of the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act.278 The 
1988 trade act, in I.M. Destler’s words, “was the first major trade bill initiated by Congress since the 
days before Smoot-Hawley. And it was by far the longest trade bill passed by postwar Congress.”279 
On August 23, 1988, President Ronald Reagan, in his opening remarks on signing this bill stated 
that, “the United States Government now speaks with one voice in calling for a free and open 
trading system, one committed to fairplay for all participants.”280 Generally, as a procedural matter, 
the Exon-Florio Amendment was codified into the Defense Product Act (DPA) of 1950. The Act 
provides the President or a presidential designee with the authority to investigate “mergers, 
acquisitions, or takeovers” which could result in foreign control.  
Senator John Heinz wrote in his “Manufacturing a Trade Policy in An Era of Change” in 
autumn 1988, that America should exert a clear foreign economic policy based on its own 
interests.281 In this article, Heinz emphasized that the trade and commercial considerations must be 
given a prominent place in the U.S. policymaking process. Heinz argued that “our obligation is to 
pursue policies that are in our interest, not theirs. We have not done that for some years, and it is 
long past time to make the switch. Nearly 150 years ago, Benjamin Disraeli said, ‘Free trade is not a 
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principle. It is an expedient.’ Free trade served the British well, and it served us well, but over the 
years we have forgotten Disraeli’s advice and turned it into the eleventh commandment. It is past 
time to put it back in its rightful place—a sound policy to be pursued when circumstances and 
interest dictate—which may not be right now.”282 Senator John Danforth recommended this article 
to Congress in mid 1989, and argued that “this article certainly represents a worthwhile contribution 
to the ongoing debate about U.S. trade policy.”283 
The policy justification behind Exon-Florio Provision manifested the national security fear in 
the United States under the new international circumstances. Furthermore, as discussed above, this 
provision mainly focused on Japanese FDI because of Japan’s economic challenge to the United 
States’ position in world political economy. As analysts pointed out, “The post-World War II 
suspicion in the United States of foreign direct investment in key American national security 
industries by Japanese investors was exacerbated by Toshiba’s 1987 sale of defense secrets to the 
Soviets. In contrast to its position regarding the Japanese, the Pentagon has undertaken no efforts to 
stop British and French firms from investing in defense-related companies.”284 Clearly, it was 
Japanese FDI that caused Congress’s initiatives on regulating acquisitions by foreigners. The 
Department of Defense focused on their own institutional interest in protecting defense technology.  
The compromise between Congress, the administration, and individual departments in the 
administration, showed that the beliefs of the Reagan and Bush administrations were strongly 
constrained by Cold War ideology as well as negative conception of American decline in some 
specific industries. America maintained that economy interests should be given priority as a security 
consideration. However, the paradox is that the United States could not adopt a radical economic 
policy towards its allies because of the need to maintain security cooperation. Moreover, the goals 
of adequate domestic production and domestic ownership of technology so not always coincide with 
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the Department of Defense’s requirement. Under these conditions, Department of State declared in 
mid-1989 that “the United States welcomes foreign investment and seeks to accord foreign investors 
the same fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory treatment given to American investors.”285 This 
reciprocity principle in investment policy has gradually closed to trade policy in the late 1980s. 
However, the Bush administration could not formulate an explicit economic strategy. Only when the 
Japanese economy stumbled in the 1990s and the Cold War ended, could the Clinton administration 
begin to shift its strategy from security to economy.   
 
 
3.2.3 The Operation of Exon-Florio and Definition of National Security 
Exon-Florio establishes time limits for a CFIUS review. Once CFIUS receives notification, it 
has 30 days to review that particular acquisition. This information is circulated to all member 
agencies, who may in turn request that an investigation be conducted. If CFIUS decides that no 
further investigation is necessary, then its review authority ends. However, if an agency requests an 
investigation, CFIUS has an additional 45 days to complete it. As the investigation draws to a close, 
the member agencies are expected to reach a consensus on whether there is “credible evidence” of a 
threat to national security and whether existing laws to safeguard the national security are lacking. 
The advisory findings of CFIUS are sent to the President. The President then has 15 days to make a 
determination on whether or not to take action against the transaction under the authority of 
Exon-Florio. If the President finds that intervention is required, then he must report this to Congress. 
The whole investigation process must be completed within 90 days (see Figure 3. 1). 
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Source: United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Trade: National Security 
Reviews of Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Companies Could be Improved, Washington, D.C., March 
23, 2007. 
Figure 3.1 The CFIUS Review Process 
 
One noticeable thing is that even a concluded transaction remains subject to Presidential action. 
It is therefore in the interests of the parties to a transaction to provide notice at an early stage.  
In reviewing a notice, CFIUS will consider (1) whether the acquisition is by or for a foreign 
entity, and could result in foreign control of a U.S. entiry; (2) whether there is “credible evidence to 
support a belief that a foreign interest exercising control of the U.S. person to be acquired might 
take action that threatens to impair the national security”; and (3) whether other provisions of the 
law provide adequate authority to protect the national security.286 Essentially, CFIUS’ initial review 
determines whether the transaction raises national security concerns.  
In its investigation, CFIUS must answer three questions: (1) is a foreign entity involved in the 
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transaction; (2) will the transaction result in foreign control of the U.S. entity; and (3) what will be 
the effects of the transaction on the national security of the United States? The final issue is the most 
complexity and represents the area in which CFIUS has the most discretion in making its 
recommendations to the President. 
During the period of 1988 and 1994, 918 voluntary filings were submitted, out of which only 
fifteen resulted in investigations by CFIUS; and only nine were transmitted to the President for 
decision (see Table 3.3). The decrease in CFIUS notifications somewhat parallels the decline in 
overall FDI in the United States (see Figure 3.2). In early 1990, the President ordered China 
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation to divest from MAMCO, which involved 
a U.S. aircraft parts manufacturer. After President Bush’s decision, the White House stressed that the 
United States was still committed to maintaining an open policy to foreign investors.287  
 
Table 3.3 Disposition of CFIUS Notifications, October 1988 through December 1994 
Year CFIUS 
Notifications 
Notifications  
investigated 
Notifications  
Withdrawn 
President 
Blocked 
1988 14 1 0 0 
1989 200 5 2 1  
1990 295 6 2 0 
1991 152 1 0 0 
1992 106 2 1 0 
1993 82 0 0 0 
1994 69 0 0 0 
Total 918 15 5 1 
Source: United States General Accounting Office, Foreign Investment: Implementation of 
Exon-Florio and Related Amendments, Washington, D.C.: GAO, December 1995, p.4. 
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Figure 3.2 U.S. Business Enterprises Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Investors, 
1979-2006 (Millions of dollars) 
 
The unique feature of Japanese firm’s takeover operations in the United States attracted much 
concern. In their study of Japanese companies in the United States during the period through 1979 to 
1989, Hennart and Reddy found that 57 percent of companies selected acquisitions, while 43 
percent selected Greenfield equity joint ventures.288 The big difference between Japanese and other 
Western countries on takeovers are most clearly shown in a report concluded by the Economic 
Strategy Institute quoted by the Wall Street Journal in May 1991. This report calculated that 
Japanese included investments in 66 companies in computers, 41 in semiconductors, 27 in advanced 
materials, 25 in semiconductor equipment, 23 in telecommunication, 12 in chemicals and 11 in 
aerospace. Although this report did not detail the size of the stakes, the amount of Japanese 
takeovers was much higher than British, French, and Canadian buyers, with comparable investments 
in all categories combined of only 40, 17 and 10, respectively.289  
Furthermore, as Table 3.4 shows, in contrast to all countries’ acquisition activities which 
peaked in 1989, Japanese acquisitions reached their peak in 1991. What aroused more concern was 
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that Japanese M&A took place more in high-technology field. For example, in semiconductors and 
computers, Japanese multinationals significantly exceeded other western countries’ activities in the 
United States. These industries are highly related to U.S. defense industries. Since 1991, the speed 
of takeover fell quickly. One of the reasons, as Peter Peterson, former Secretary of the Department 
of Commerce under the Nixon Administration analyzed, was politics. Peterson noted that many 
Japanese companies began to realize the political desirability of Greenfield investment, which was 
considered by many U.S. governors to contribute to new jobs and tax revenue.290  
 
Table 3.4 Japanese Acquisitions of U.S. Companies 1986 to 1993 
Year No. of Deals Value ($ billions) 
1988 50 8.5 
1989 108 12.7 
1990 130 14.4 
1991 63 2.3 
Source: Lenz Neuhauser and Nick Cowley, “Why Japanese Firms Have Pulled Back on Overseas 
Buying,” Mergers & Acquisitions, November, 1994, p.15. 
 
In the meantime, the Department of Defense began an initiative to improve the 
competitiveness of U.S. industries critical to the defense industrial base. On July 15, 1988, they 
released the final report entitled Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness. On August 15, they 
provided a summary to Congress. 291  They identified 215 defense-critical industries, which 
accounted for about 95 percent of Department of Defense purchases from the manufacturing sectors. 
Measured by six indicators, the performance of the semiconductor industry ranked 114th.292   
The Exon-Florio provision did not define “national security,” but the accompanying 
conference report noted that the phrase was to be interpreted broadly and without limitation to 
particular industries. Narrow definition includes firms that do the majority of their business with the 
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Department of Defense or as subcontractors to Department of Defense prime contractors. A broader 
definition includes industries and firms whose business is driven by the civilian commercial sector 
but, because of their leading edge technologies, are important to overall defense technology 
leadership.  
In practice, the definition of “national security” does not impact on the operation of CFIUS. 
Stephen J. Canner, the chairman of CFIUS explained that the criteria were “case by case, from the 
various perspectives of the interests of the agencies, and within the context of Exon-Florio, which 
says that we should define it broadly.”293 As two economists reviewed, “There is no significant 
national security threat: foreigners have not taken over strategic industries and cannot do so under 
existing laws. The important issue relating to foreigners is the future of the American economy—its 
performance and the policies that guide it. This means active policies, not a passive laissez-faire 
approach. It means strategic choices, not drift and indecision.”294 In fact, in their earlier 1990 report 
to Congress, the United State General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that the lack of a specific 
definition did not affect CFIUS’ ability to investigate investments.295 Even in the final form of 
implementing regulations in November 1991, it also did not define national security. This allowed 
maximum flexibility and discretion to safeguard the country’s interests. 
Since Exon-Florio functioned effectively, the question of how to balance between national 
sovereignty and economic welfare increasingly occupied policy makers’ agenda. It is difficult for 
policy maker to draw the line between foreign companies and domestic companies under the 
conditions which foreign companies provided crucial contributions. Professor Theodore Moran 
argued, the true threat to national security was that there were few substitutes for those crucial goods. 
For industrial countries, the main threat comes from the potential concentration of reliance on a few 
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foreign-owned companies. Thus, even if the last domestic owned firm is acquired by a foreigner, it is 
not a threat if global markets in this industry are diffuse. The measurement of concentration is that 
the largest four firms (or four countries) control more than 50 percent of the market. Under Moran’s 
proposal, a friendly take-over would generally be allowed if R&D and production remained in the 
United States.296 Moran’s view caused broader concern in Congress. On June 12, 1991, in his 
testimony before the Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness Subcommittee of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Moran argued that any strengthening of the Exon-Florio 
should be focused narrowly on those cases “where foreign suppliers pose a credible threat to U.S. 
interests because of their monopolistic structure, and not be allowed to interrupt foreign investment 
more broadly.”297 Moran’ argument required policy makers to think again the economic theoretical 
foundation of Exon-Florio.  
His concern may be captured by Mendelowitz’s testimony before Congress. As director of 
International Trade, Energy, and Finance Issues at the GAO, Allan Mendelowitz in his statement 
argued, “CFIUS does not perform analyses of foreign investment by industry sector, nor does it 
examine other larger questions which have arisen in public debate. These questions include: (1) how 
much of the defense industrial base has been acquired by foreign-owned firms, (2) which industry 
sectors, technologies, or types of firms, if any, should be preserved for U.S. ownership, (3) why 
some U.S. companies have found it desirable to discontinue operations in certain high technology 
sectors, and (4) how to assess the direction and effects of technology transfers accompanying foreign 
acquisitions.”298 These questions need to be addressed at a higher policy making level and in a 
broader context than the case-by-case approach afforded by CFIUS. 
In fact, the definition of “national security” was increasingly being elaborated in economic 
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terms rather than in military ones as U.S. grand strategy shifted from military to economic concerns. 
As a result, Exon-Florio still has the potential to be implemented as a “protectionist weapon”.299 In 
retrospect, as one notable lawyer stated,  
 
U.S. congressional activity toward stricter monitoring of foreign investment nonetheless 
proliferated in the wake of the Japanese investment swell of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The concerns aroused during this period engendered a stronger bill (Levine/Wolf), 
introduced in 1991, with a view to extending ‘national security’ to ‘economic security’. 
Such a provision was not passed into law, but signaled a disturbing trend in U.S. 
investment policy toward the extension of national security criteria to potentially 
unbridled economic protectionism.300 
 
 
3.2.4 The Evolution of Exon-Florio and Economic Security 
The Exon-Florio Amendment to the DPA would lapse as of October 20, 1990, with the 
expiration of the DPA. Without statutory authority to act, the CFIUS was forced late to consider a 
proposal of the Japanese firm Fanuc Machine Tool to buy the United States’ leading manufacturer of 
advanced grinding equipment, Moore Special Tool Corporation. The congress announced that it 
would consider a hearing on the takeover of Moore Special Tool due to this company’s importance 
to nuclear weapons in the United States. After that, Fanuc Machine Tool announced that it had 
withdrawn its offer to buy Moore. During this process, President Bush did not take any measures on 
this purchase.  
These events put the Exon-Florio amendment on the table in the House. Representative Cardiss 
Collins, chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and 
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Competitiveness, emphasized improving Exon-Florio. She stated in her remarks on support of bill 
H.R. 991—Defense Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, as follows,   
 
       If an American solution to problems like Moore's cannot be found, should the 
President be authorized to require that foreign purchasers provide assurances that 
firms they buy will continue to supply our defense program and other U.S. 
customers with important technology and equipment? Does CFIUS interpret national 
security too narrowly, and exclude the consideration of technology and products that 
are not of critical and direct importance to the military? Does the Treasury's 
chairmanship of CFIUS conflict with the Department's primary responsibility for 
promoting foreign investment, and if so should CFIUS be chaired by Commerce or 
some other agency?301 
 
    The serious security consideration at that time reflected the Persian Gulf War’s influence on 
Congress. The DPA gave the President authority to order priority defense contracts when needed. 
Moreover, it gave the President the authority to allocate materials under emergency circumstances. 
The strong economic power to support military security was obvious. Thus, any foreign takeovers of 
U.S. firms may reduce the domestic industrial base and threaten to impair national security. At last, 
the bill H.R. 991 was passed in House by a vote of 416 to zero with 17 abstentions. 
    In early March 1991, Senator Philip Sharp suggested that the United States should restore the 
Exon-Florio Amendment.302 He argued that “although the administration and members of Congress 
may disagree on how Exon-Florio is being interpreted, there is no real debate on its necessity.” 
According to his statement, aside from protecting the national security, there are two another 
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reasons to make Exon-Florio permanent law: first, Exon-Florio reflected checks and balance 
between the Executive and Congress; second, making Exon-Florio permanent would obtain credits 
for foreign investors who are important to America’s economic interests. Thus, “Exon-Florio is too 
important a law to be allowed to lapse ever again.”303 In the subsequent debate in Congress, 
consensus was reached to renew this bill. 
In August 1991, Congress agreed to make the Exon-Florio Amendment an “anti-sunset” 
provision of the DPA to which it was appended.304 James Exon supported making it and stated that, 
“at a time when the defense budget is declining and American weapons production will likely be 
reduced, it is absolutely critical that America maintains an industrial and technological base which 
can be mobilized in the time of national need.”305 A number of bills aimed at revising Exon-Florio 
have been introduced since it became permanent federal law in 1991. However, attempts to broaden 
the interpretation of “national security” to include “economic security” have failed. 306  The 
executive branch was fearful of the possible “essential commerce” factor because it viewed this 
additional focus on economic security as a method of restricting free trade. However, the 
Conference Committee’s elimination of the “essential commerce” standard from the Exon-Florio 
Amendment leaves room for broad interpretation of the circumstances allowing Presidential 
action.307  
On November 15, 1991, the Treasury Department issued the final regulations for the U.S. 
government review of foreign acquisition of U.S. companies under the Exon-Florio amendment. 
Even in this report, the chairman of CFIUS does not give a definite definition of “national 
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security”.308 In fact, the content of “national security” has changed significantly with the end of the 
Cold War. C. Fred Bergsten stated at a Senate hearing in November 1991 that “there is virtually no 
concrete evidence that foreign direct investment has hurt the national security of the United States. 
Numerous allegations have surfaced but none has been buttressed by any substantial evidence, let 
alone a persuasive overall case.”309 Bergsten continued to suggest that “national security is often 
the last refuge of scoundrels looking for protection on trade or investment or anything else so one 
has to be very clear this suggestion release, pure and simple, to cases of legitimate national security 
concern.”310 
At this Senate hearing, Professor Theodore Moran’s suggested “4-4-50” principle was 
seriously discussed and eventually accepted. This principle means that four firms or four countries 
controls more than fifty percent global market share is dangerous. As Tyrus Cobb, former member 
of National Security Council in the Reagan administration, explained that  
 
The 4-4-50 rule could be applied to strength the Exon-Florio amendment in a relatively 
simple manner. If a foreign acquisition is proposed in an industry when concentration is 
higher than four companies, or four countries [more than 50 %] of the global market, 
Government action is necessary. Outright rejection of the acquisition is probably not going 
to be necessarily, but the U.S. Government—again, I am echoing Dr. Bergsten’s 
words—should impose some form of performance standards on the acquiring firm, and one 
possibility would be a requirement that the firm maintain R&D and production facilities 
within the United States. In this manner, we reap the benefits with of foreign investment 
while retaining some form of onshore production capability.311  
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 This consideration reflects the American policy makers’ new thinking on balancing the 
security threat and economic interests. In fact, the United States still dominated the world economy 
except in relatively small industries. And these smaller industries were mainly controlled by the 
Japanese. Furthermore, this “4-4-50” rule is a basic principle in dealing with domestic antitrust 
affairs. As the United States domestic market was the largest market in that time, the operation and 
expansion of foreign multinationals in the United States was in an uncompetitive position compared 
to U.S.-owned multinationals. On December 6, 1991, President Bush permanently reauthorized the 
Exon-Florio Amendment of the Defense Production Act of 1950.312 Earlier in this year, Bush stated 
that, “foreign investment in the United States is a sign of America’s strength and a vote of 
confidence in its economic future.”313  
The challenge to U.S. policy makers is to control the benefits within the United States borders. 
On the one hand, some acquisitions threatened U.S. core national interests, including national 
security and commercial competitiveness. On the other hand, FDI is important to U.S. political and 
economic interest. Bush’s attitude to FDI tries to follow his predecessors’ liberal policy. However, it 
is impossible to gain all the benefits without incurring any costs. The problem is, as Bergsten 
suggested “we need a much more sophisticated understanding of the relatively small number of 
cases where there is a direct relationship to national security, and much greater sophistication in the 
availability and use of policy instruments to make sure that we can deal with such cases in the 
future.”314  
The unique characteristic of Japanese FDI created opportunity for U.S. policy makers to test 
and distinguish these two kinds of FDI. The government’s support and trade effect of Japanese FDI 
specifically attributes to the “4-4-50” rule. Moreover, the United States continues to improve its data 
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works on FDI and relative domestic policy to cope with this unfamiliar FDI.   
In the following several months, the debate on the Exon-Florio provision centered on the new 
amendments to this law. One view is that the Exon-Florio provision worked well and did not need 
any more amendment. Edward M. Graham, a well-known economist on FDI, asked during House 
hearings that, “Is a strengthened Exon-Florio something that would make a positive contribution to 
U.S. competitiveness? The central theme that I wish to convey is that the answer is no, absolutely 
not. This is true for one simple reason: Nothing breeds competitiveness like competition, and 
foreign direct investment in the United States, if nothing else, brings competition to the United 
States.”315 According to Olin Wethington, Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs, 
“we do not believe that the Exon-Florio provision requires amendment. We believe that its 
implementation is working well.”316  
The second view is that the Exon-Florio Provision needed to be extended further. Laura D. 
Tyson, then economic professor at the University of Berkeley, California, testified that “I think we 
should assume in principle that whenever foreign direct investment involves a substantial stake by a 
foreign government, investment should be reviewed, regardless of whether it involves national 
security, narrowly defined, or not. And since there is no presumption that market forces prevail, we 
must consider our economic security.”317 Tyson also supports Professor Moran’s 4-4-50 rule, in her 
words this rule “gained a lot of support in the economics’ profession.”318 In this sense, the new 
thinking on the scope and threat of M&A types of FDI has much broader than Exon-Florio 
Provision. And the United States expanded screening scope much broader. 
Petitions for a coherent national economic strategy began to emerge at this hearing. Senator 
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Donald W. Riegle, chairman of Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
criticized that “the administration has no overall policy to evaluate foreign takeovers of American 
companies. This is part of our larger failures to have a national economic strategy for our country. It 
is my conviction that such a strategy must be developed and implemented if America is to remain a 
leading economic and political power in the 21st century.”319 Although his view partly reflected his 
party’s ideology and their opposition to the Bush administration, it was widely regarded as 
important and necessary to formulate a new economic strategy to responed to the FDI problem. As 
discussed below, the Clinton administration continued to adjust its views on FDI, not only on M&A 
types, but also on Greenfield types. 
In October, 1992, the “Byrd Amendment,” Section 837 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1993, amended the Exon-Florio Provision. This Amendment listed five revisions 
to the Exon-Florio Provision: (1) acquisitions made by an entity “controlled by or acting on behalf 
of a foreign government” and could “result in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in 
the United States that could affect the national security of the United States” must be investigated; 
(2) the amendment emphasized “the potential effects of the proposed or pending transaction on 
United States international technological leadership in areas affecting United States national 
security”; (3) the President was required to immediately transmit a written report to the Secretary of 
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives after receiving report from CFIUS; (4) 
Congress suggested that the members of CFIUS should include the Director of the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy and the Assistant to the President for National Security; (5) technology risk 
assessments.320 The Byrd Amendment demonstrated the importance of technology in regulating 
foreign investors’ acquisition. 
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3.3 Institutional Change of CFIUS and Information Promotion 
    The most direct outcome of the Exon-Florio Amendment was to expand the power and 
permanence of CFIUS. Before this amendment, CFIUS only had the power to investigate and review 
investments, but lacked any power to block them. In response to the perceived threat of Japanese 
FDI and the need to increase the governments’ power to regulate investment flows, CFIUS was 
granted significant new powers. At the same time, Congress passed the law to integrate the various 
government agencies responsible for data collection. For government agencies, accurate, immediate 
and effective alternative data is very important to evaluate the consequences of transnational 
economic activities. Access to such data was also seen as being important for allaying public anxiety 
about an “invasion” of foreign investments. 
 
 
3.3.1 Power Expansion of CFIUS 
As mentioned earlier CFIUS was an inter-agency committee, chaired by the Department of 
Treasury. The members of CFIUC covered important U.S. agencies in international economic affairs, 
such as the Department of Commerce, USTR, and the Department of Defense. According to 
bureaucracy theory and practical experience, these agencies put their own affairs first. Thus, the 
function of CFIUS is the sum of different institutional beliefs. Their different views on foreign 
acquisition can be observed in the Fujitsu case.  
Following the passage of Exon-Florio, President Reagan gave CFIUS authority to implement 
the amendment on December 27, 1988 and added another two agencies as members of CFIUS.321 
Reagan administration added two sections to “Foreign Investment in the United States” executive 
order signed by President Ford. After revision, Section 7 of this executive order includes two 
clauses: one set for time limited investigation; the other mandated a “Report to the President”. In 
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Section 8, the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget were 
added as members of CFIUS. Introducing these two additional members, the Reagan administration 
emphasized institutional change in CFIUS, especially the “consultation” between chairman of the 
Committee and other members.  
The Business Week stated that CFIUS had changed from “toothless and obscure” to active 
since the passage of 1988 trade bill. CFIUS extended its scope to negotiate with foreign companies, 
encouraging R&D in the United States, maintaining domestic production, and forbidding exports to 
the Soviet Union etc. Although Treasury officials stated that CFIUS did not discourage foreign 
investors, “CFIUS [had begun] putting the world on notice that even in America, some things are 
not for sale.”322 As a sub-cabinet level official, it was expected to play an increasing role in 
regulating takeovers. Stephen J. Canner, the chairman of CFIUS, told the New York Times “prior to 
Exon-Florio, we were a coordinating agency, now we’re a mechanism.”323 
The debate on who should take the lead in CFIUS also illustrates the policy considerations. 
The Treasury took responsibility for international monetary policy in the United States and favors 
free flows of investment capital. Defense may fear or distrust foreign parties, while Commerce may 
consider both the protection of U.S. business from foreign competitors as well as the danger of 
cutting off foreign capital. For this reason, the designation of the Treasury Department rather than 
the Department of Commerce as the agency with primary power over implementation of 
Exon-Florio “was widely viewed as an indication that the act would not be vigorously applied.”324 
President Reagan in his sing of Exon-Florio decentralized power further, forcing it to make 
decisions in a consultative, rather than top-down manner. However, this system also aroused 
criticism. In early 1989, one report finished by Johns Hopkins University on the question of foreign 
ownership of U.S. defense companies argued that the Secretary of Defense should take the lead 
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within the government in determining which defense properties should be protected from 
ownership.325 Moreover, the question of who is chair of CFIUS also affected what the body 
considered to constitute FDI. It is well-known that FDI includes capital, technology, and 
management. To the Treasury, FDI is primarily a source of capital. To the Commerce, FDI’s 
meaning is much broader.  
On September 3, 1993, President Clinton designated additional three members to CFIUS: the 
National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Economic 
Council.326 Thus, at the end of 1993, 11 agencies had seats on CFIUS. The participant of the 
National Security Council is mainly used to solve the problem of inadequate and poorly defined 
“national security”. As mentioned above, the Exon-Florio amendment did not define “national 
security,” but in practice the phrase was to be interpreted broadly without limitation to particular 
industries. The implementing regulations, which were issued in final form in November 1991 by the 
Treasury, also did not define “national security”. CFIUS had tended to focus on identifying the 
nature of the U.S. firm’s relationship with defense-related works; for example, those firms involved 
in industries classified by the Department of Defense and contracts with Department of Defense. 
Also, CFIUS tried to identify what percentage of its production is defense related, and what portion 
of its R&D is defense related. 
The inclusion of the Office of Science and Technology Policy illustrated the importance of 
high-technology industries. For high-technology industries, information on the availability of 
alternate suppliers of the product, both domestic and foreign, and their market shares are not always 
readily available. For these items, even minute differences in quality can be very important, and 
technological advances are constantly being made. Furthermore, in high-technology industries, 
government intervention is of obvious importance to improve its performance. The United States 
realized that some industrialized countries, such as France, Japan, play a more active role than the 
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United States in encouraging their high-technology sectors. In high-technology, economic 
competitiveness is far more important than political allies. In one businessman’s view, “we need to 
own and control our high-technology industry, given its importance to our economy and our future, 
both commercial and military and strive to continuously expand its global market share. We cannot 
and should not believe that the world order will remain unchanged and our allies of today will be 
our allies tomorrow.”327  
In contrast to relatively transparent legally defined government role, the difficulty is how to 
identify private firms and state-owned foreign firms. To the U.S. government, foreign government 
ownership of U.S. defense contractors should clearly be prohibited. Even in some commercial 
industries, this problem also posed a challenge to some U.S. owned firms. With the support of their 
own government, some foreign firms with leading edge technologies may monopolize the 
international market. Thus, U.S. firms’ commercial prospects can be damaged, and their defense 
contribution would also be endangered. Under this condition, CFIUS’ role in assessing this kind of 
investment was greatly complicated? A more proactive approach was needed to preserve U.S. 
leadership in defense-related technologies and in commercially strategic technologies. As mentioned 
earlier, the Departments of Defense and Commerce had already identified strategically critical and 
emerging technologies. The Clinton administration certainly realized this point and continued to 
improve U.S. leadership in critical industries.  
The Clinton administration added the Office of Science and Technology Policy into CFIUS to 
balance foreign economic affairs and domestic economic affairs. In the 1990s, it was obvious that 
the operation of multinationals was influencing domestic economic development through 
technology spillover, job creation, financial resources, and trade linkage. Thus, it was necessary to 
maintain that national security was not limited to national defense-related industries, but also 
including high-technologies. In a bipartisan commission report on “Policymaking for a New Era” 
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published in Foreign Affairs, commission members argued that the decline of America’s global 
competitiveness and end of the Cold War had transformed the policy agenda. The bipartisan 
commission suggested the new administration “placing all policy coordination in three coequal 
councils; the National Security Council, the Economic Council and the Domestic Council.”328   
The new National Economic Council (NEC) undoubtedly was endowed with a specific role in 
policy making on foreign investment. The NEC was established by President Clinton on January 25, 
1993, “to coordinate the economic policy-making process with respect to domestic and international 
economic issues.”329 The director was Robert E. Rubin, an investment banker from Goldman Sachs. 
The NEC was designed to put together information and policy recommendations from different 
departments involved in economic issues and prepare advice for Bill Clinton. In some previous 
Administrations, there was no formal process for channeling economic ideas to the president. The 
establishment of the NEC shows that in the new era, economic policy would be at least as high a 
priority as national security, and more importantly, it moved the center of gravity on economic 
policy away from the Treasury and into the White House. In its first year, the NEC focused on 
Japanese-U.S. economic relations.330 Later, President Clinton described the NEC in the following 
light, “I think when the history of this administration is written, one of the most significant 
organizational changes we will have made, and one that I predict all future administration will 
follow, is the creation of the NEC and the development of a coordinated, disciplined national 
economic policy for the global economy.”331  
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3.3.2 The International Data Improvement Act 1990 
The International Data Improvement Act, 1990 is an important institutional changes in U.S. FDI 
policy. In Senator James Exon’s word, “the President and his administration merit congratulations 
for their recognition of the need to improve foreign investment data collection. This change from the 
policy of the previous administration represents a dramatic victory for those of us in the Congress 
who have worked for so long on the foreign investment issues.”332 
The history of systematic data collection on FDI does not begin at the 1980s. In 1974, the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation enacted Public Law 93-479 to 
authorize the Secretary of Commerce to conduct surveys on foreign direct and portfolio investment 
in the United States. In 1976, the Commerce Committee passed the International Investment Survey 
Act (Survey Act) to supplement this authority. In subsequent years, the Commerce Committee 
continued to emphasize and impose several public laws on this topic. In 1981, the committee passed 
legislation reauthorizing the Survey Act and directed the Secretary of Commerce to do benchmark 
surveys on FDI in 1980, 1987 and every 5 years thereafter. 
Since 1987, the Commerce Committee began to reexamine the U.S. government’s collection 
and analysis of information on foreign direct and portfolio investment under the International 
Investment and Trade in Service Survey Act. This examination began with the committee’s 
deliberations on the Omnibus Trade Bill in the 100th Congress. The House Energy and Commerce 
Committee had passed, in 1987, an amendment offered by Representative John Bryant to improve 
collection and disclosure of date on FDI into the U.S. In his statement at the hearing, Representative 
Bryant emphasized that “we need to have data to show us what the effects of our economic policies 
are and have been, so we can understand those effects and know how to change those policies. It is 
not available to Members of Congress. It is not available to scholars or economic analysts.”333 
                                                        
332 “International Data Improvement Act,” Congressional Record, Senate, Vol.136, No. 141, October 18, 1990, 
p.16080. 
333 U.S. House of Representative, Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs, Mergers and Acquisitions: Foreign Investments in the United States, October 21, 
1987, p.5.  
 150
Some contents of this bill were included in the Exon –Florio amendment, but most of its contents 
were dropped from the trade bill. The most significant changes related to the limits on disclosure of 
individual investor information. Instead of being publicly available, the information was limited to 
several specific groups of people. 
In January 1988, Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, 
and Investigations Committee on Energy and Commerce, asked GAO to report all the collection of 
FDI data by all federal agencies. In July 1989, Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, requested a similar report. Senator 
Murkowski introduced legislation to permit the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to share 
information with the Committee on CFIUS and to require BEA to collect and disseminate 
information on foreign government FDI in the United States. In October 1989, the GAO reported to 
Congress.334 The division of data collection in the federal agencies was found to be divided mainly 
between the Department of Commerce and the Treasury. The former focused on inward FDI, while 
the latter is primarily responsible for portfolio foreign investment. The GAO concluded that the 
federal government has no central agencies to track and store all information, and recommended 
that one be established.  
On February 1990, Representative Philip R. Sharp, introduced bill H.R. 4060 entitled “Foreign 
Investment Policy Improvement Act.” Sharp pointed out that the data was not organized coherently 
and was unavailable to the right officials. Thus, “this bill, by putting together the essential pieces of 
the foreign investment puzzle, would yield both an exact overall view of foreign investment and 
provide a very localized level of detail. This is a complete picture which is vital to our national 
security and an informed debate on foreign investment.”335 For adequate information on inward 
FDI, according to Sharp, federal agencies should break down the legal and bureaucratic walls. 
Lastly, Sharp also proposed that the GAO should be authorized to access the shared data. 
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In April 1990, Senator James Exon introduced legislation to require BEA to share data with the 
Census Bureau. This data exchange would allow BEA to report data at a more detailed level. On 
July 19, Senator Exon testified that “the American economic policy must be concerned about the 
creation of American wealth and international economic leadership, as well as the creation of 
American jobs…. A better understanding of the level of foreign ownership will help the Congress 
and the president better craft economic policy. Among the policies encouraged by the public concern 
about the increasing level of foreign investment could be a better use of Exon/Florio law, a stronger 
effort to reduce the Federal budget deficit, and move aggressive U.S. technology policy and an 
active effort to increase U.S. competitiveness.”336 
 On July 31, 1990, the Senate Commerce Committee approved Exon’s bill by voice vote. This 
bill was intended to allow the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis to shared 
detailed data gathered by the department’s Census Bureau. Both agencies developed information on 
foreign investment, but the Census Bureau’s data was much more detailed and collected on a plant 
by plant basis, while BEA’s data was collected at a broader industry level. According to this bill, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget should be responsible for the implementation of 
the exchange of information between the BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This action was 
expected to “enhance the government’s ability to stop foreign acquisitions seen as threatening U.S. 
international competitiveness.”337  
On September 18, 1990, the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce 
approved a similar bill (H.R. 4520). This bill, mainly crafted by Philip R. Sharp, would require 
annual reports by the Commerce Department to Congress detailing the extent and effects of foreign 
investment in the United States, broken down by industry and region. And it allowed broader date 
sharing with CFIUS than the Senate bill promised. The Reagan administration did not support either 
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measure, however, and “opposed any effort to increase such data collection and dissemination.”338 
On October 2, 1990, the full House Energy and Commerce Committee approved bill H.R. 4520. 
Thereafter, it was approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 3. However, due to 
the Bush administration’s strong opposition, the amendment could not give the General Accounting 
Office access to the BEA and Census Bureau data. This bill “represent[ed] a compromise with the 
administration on an issue that has divided Congress and the White House for five years: the 
growing concern that foreign capital is gaining control of key sectors of the U.S. economy.”339  
On October 2, 1990, the Senate Commerce Committee passed bill S. 2516, the International 
Data Improvement Act of 1990. Authorized by this bill, BEA should provide any data requested by 
CFIUS within 14 days. The Secretary of Commerce was required to annually report to the Congress 
on the role and significance of FDI in the United States. The GAO was authorized to review the 
information provided by Secretary and submit a report to Congress. 
On October 23, 1990, the House Energy and Commerce Committee passed the bill (S. 
2516).340 This bill included employment data from the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The Secretary of Commerce should submit FDI report to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the 
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. In this regard, the policy advice on FDI became broader 
than merely trade and financial issues. Furthermore, the report covers data including employment, 
market share, value added, productivity, R&D, exports, imports, profitability and taxes paid. Also, it 
requires State and local governments to provide data investment incentives and services. The 
Secretary of Commerce was required to make recommendation for possible additional policy 
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coordination affecting FDI within the executive branch in the United States. In this regard, the voice 
of the Department of Commerce was beyond other members of CFIUS. As noted earlier, the 
Department of Commerce opposed the Fujitsu-Fairchild acquisition. 
The bill demonstrated the consensus in Congress on the knowledge of FDI in that time. 
Representative Pitter’s remarks tell us more about Congress’ concerns what regarding the potential 
impact of FDI. He noted “What do those investment dollars mean for the United States? What kind 
of jobs are created? What is the impact of those dollars in areas of high technology? How is trade 
affected? This bill we will pass today will provide data that will answer these questions.”341 In the 
subsequent remarks, Philip Sharp, the author of the original bill, noted that “this investment is of 
critical national security interest, or critical economic security interest, and we have to make a tough 
call and a tough judgment.”342 Thus, the common goal of both the S. 2516 and H.R. 4529, as Sharp 
concluded, was “to enact a bill to greatly improve information on foreign direct investment so that 
we could in turn benefit from our improved knowledge in our public policy debates. Regardless of 
our political affiliation or philosophical disposition toward foreign ownership in America, few of us 
would deny that federal data are presently inadequate to answer important questions relating to FDI, 
or that we should remedy those inadequacies as soon as possible.”343 
Although Japanese FDI was not the only reason for this accomplishment, it played a vital role 
in compelling Congressmen to conclude this bill. For example, Representative Douglas Walgren, in 
his remarks on bill S.2516, noted that, “almost half the foreign direct investment in 1988 was in the 
manufacturing sector…foreign investors now own 13 percent of the U.S. manufacturing base, and 
they own 50 percent of the vital consumer electronics industry. Between 1980 and 1988, foreign 
direct investment in the U.S. electronics industry alone, tripled to over $ 12 billion…foreign 
dependence puts the Defense Department’s access to leading edge technology at real risk.”344 
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Although Representative Walgren did not mention any particular nation in his remarks, it is obvious 
that given the data presented in Chapter 2, Japanese FDI contributed much to increasing FDI in the 
electronics industry.  
Critics of BEA also manifested the role of Japanese FDI. In his illustrating example of 
inadequate data collected by BEA, Representative Sharp described that “when a foreign-owned 
company operates in several industries in the United States, the BEA ascribes all of that enterprise’s 
activity to the industry of greatest economic value. Because foreign automakers who have set up 
manufacturing operations in the United States still import more finished cars than their production 
here, all of their data are placed in the wholesale trade category. That misplacement wrongly inflates 
the wholesale trade numbers, and just as wrongly fails to accurately capture the numbers from their 
manufacturing, design and research facilities here.”345 Douglas Woodward, the author of The New 
Competitors, in his testimony at a Senate hearing in 1989 noted that “Right now, if you wanted to 
know simply how much Japanese investment is in the U.S. auto industry, how much employment, do 
you think you could get [the] answer to that question? No, you cannot. Most of that investment right 
now is classified by the BEA under wholesale trade, not manufacturing. And you cannot separate out 
the two.”346 
Domestic groups that supported this bill included the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Auto 
Parts and Accessories Association, and the United Auto Workers.347 Nancy Johnson, in her remarks 
on this bill, also provided an example on the importance of data and its relation to reevaluate the 
policy on manufacturing. In a meeting held by the House Auto Parts Task Force and the Department 
of Commerce in 1988, Johnson recalled that “Commerce gave us a report, in glowing terms, of how 
foreign auto parts makers were establishing facilities in the United States and how part exports were 
on the rise. But, we asked them, are the new plants creating net new jobs or simply displacing jobs in 
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other regions of the United States? The answer was, we don’t know. We asked them what portion of 
parts exports were coming from the new foreign-owned parts transplants. Again, the answer was, we 
do not know.”348 Many of the key players in bringing about this bill came from the North East of the 
United States. As will be examined in Chapter 4, it may help us understand more on the relationship 
between geographical distribution of Japanese FDI and the Congress people who supported the 
International Data Improvement Act 1990.  
The need for data collection stemmed national concerns of foreign investment in the United 
States since the late 1980s. Nancy L. Johnson summarized “This is a tough bill that will give us 
exactly what members of Congress and their constituents have been seeking for years: accurate, 
timely and useful information.”349 On November 7, President Bush signed this bill. However, he 
stressed that it imposed no additional reporting requirements on businesses and contained 
“significant safeguards to protect the confidentiality of sensitive business information.”350 In a 
broader sense, in James Exon’s words, U.S. active policy in foreign direct investment reflected the 
essential importance of FDI ownership; “it matters a great deal who owns business, assets and 
technologies. American economic policy must be concerned about the creation of American wealth 
and international economic leadership, as well as the creation of American jobs.”351 
  
 
 
3.4 Sectoral Policies Related to Inward FDI 
FDI is defined as a form of long-term international capital movement and is usually composed 
into two types—Greenfield investment and M&A. While the former mainly involves establishing 
new plants in the host country, the latter involves to buying or merging with existing assets in a 
foreign country. Japanese multinationals initially entered into the United States by adopting 
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Greenfield investment. Compared to the traditional Greenfield investment’ type, multinational 
M&As were relatively new in the 1980s. Under the conditions of quick acquisition and merger 
waves of Japanese FDI in the United States, the federal government of the United States developed 
relatively restrictive screen policies on the M&A type of FDI. 
Although the Exon-Florio amendment grants more authority to the President to block foreign 
takeovers of US domestic enterprises, it is more symbolic than practical operation. Furthermore, it 
only has the authority to deal with the M&A type of FDI without relevance to other kinds of FDI. In 
his testimony before the Senate, Allan Mendelowitz, Director of International Trade and Finance 
Issues of the GAO, criticized the limited role of Exon-Florio in defending U.S. investment interest. 
In his words, “The Exon-Florio review process does not addressed public concerns about the broader 
issues of U.S. competitiveness in industry sectors essential to leadership in defense technology. Nor 
does it cover the range of international business relationships that raise technology transfer issues 
similar to those raise[d] by direct equity investments.”352 Moreover, as observer stated, “One of 
Exon-Florio’s many ironies is that, for a statute which responds essentially to the Japanese 
investment threat, it is poorly designed to challenge most Japanese direct investment in the United 
States. The Japanese, after all, have generally dominated markets in the United States and elsewhere, 
not through takeovers or acquisitions, but through ‘Greenfield’ investments not covered by 
Exon-Florio.”353 
 
 
3.4.1 Anti-Trust and R&D Policy  
The OECD noticed that “the desire to strengthen US firm’s competitiveness have led to 
stronger emphasis on opening foreign markets and to the US government’s willingness to consider 
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withholding access to foreign investment in certain sectors to achieve this goal.”354 The OECD 
listed some sector-specific conditional treatment proposals supported by the US administration, such 
as banking and financial services, air transport, minerals mining, submarine cable, maritime 
transport, etc.355 The larger and more complex policies purported to regulate FDI is sectoral policies. 
The defense industry has remained an area of strict control. Other sectors of the economy which are 
centered on “essential service industries” also have specific restrictions placed on them.356 
The sectoral policies on inward FDI were part of broader industrial policies in the United 
States during this period. To some extent, the United States Congress and the Executive imitated 
Japan’s industry policy. Although most U.S. industrial policies did not work in the 1990s, it really 
aroused debates as demonstrated in Chapter 1 and had begun to take place in the 1980s. As one CEO 
in his speech delivered at Tokyo said, “Japan’s most controversial export to the United States 
probably isn’t the compact car; it’s MITI.”357 The United States implemented a three-pronged 
strategy designed to: (1) weaken enforcement of and create exceptions to the Sherman Antitrust Act 
and Clayton Antitrust Act; (2) establish executive agencies charged with channeling investment 
toward critical sectors; and (3) encourage the privatization of public R&D.358  
Under the influence of Congress, the Executive played an important role in constructing U.S. 
industry policy. In 1986, Congress established the Technology Administration within the Department 
of Commerce. In 1992, legislation passed to require the Department of Commerce to develop the 
capacity to target important industries like MITI. Specifically, Congress asked Commerce to identify 
critical industries in the United States “necessary to support a robust manufacturing infrastructure 
and critical to the economic security of the United States.”359 Congress stated that “the national 
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interest demands that the Federal laboratories collaborate with universities and industry to ensure 
continued advances in scientific knowledge and its translation into useful technology.”360 In 1986, 
Congress passed the Federal Technology Transfer Act, and required federal laboratories to enter into 
formal Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with industry. CRADAs has 
became the cornerstone of federal technology transfer policy. The Department of Defense also 
played a role in promoting U.S. industry policy (see Table 3.5). We will discuss more on this point 
below.   
 
Table 3.5 Agencies and Programs of U.S. Industrial Policy 
U.S. Technology Bureaucracy Date Created  
Department of Commerce 
   Technology Administration 
       National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
       National Technology Information Services (NTIS) 
       Office of Technology Policy (OPT) 
 
1986 
Department of Energy 
   Federal Laboratories 
   Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) 
 
 
1986 
Department of Defense 
   Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) 
      Sematech 
      Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) 
 
 
1987 
1993 
Source; Nathan A. Adams, “Monkey See, Monkey Do: Imitating Japan’s Industrial Policy in the 
United States,” Texas International Law Journal, Vol.31, 1996, p.546. The item “initial time” is 
added by the author. 
 
As Mark Warner and Alan Rugman pointed out, in the 1980s competitiveness concern in the 
United States compelled the federal government to adopt more sectoral policies to distinguish 
foreign-owned and U.S.-based multinationals, especially by antitrust and R&D policy.361 Antitrust 
laws are intended to prohibit anticompetitive mergers, monopolization, price fixing, and restrictive 
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agreements between manufacturers and dealers. Aspects of antitrust rules and fair business practices 
have also been used time and time again in federal and state courts in an attempt to frustrate foreign 
acquisitions of American firms.  
On May 19, 1993, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 820, the National 
Competitiveness Act of 1993 by a vote of 243 to 168. This bill expressed the sentiment that the 
creation, development, and adoption of advanced technologies are significant determinants to 
sustainable economic growth, productivity improvement, and competitive standing. Further, the bill 
notes that over the last decade the rate of advanced technology adoption in the United States had 
been about half that of some prominent foreign nations, thereby contributing to a decline in U.S. 
industrial competitiveness. H.R. 802 further aims to promote the development and rapid application 
of advanced manufacturing technologies and processes by U.S. manufacturers. 
The most known case of this kind of technology policy is the Semiconductor Technology 
Research Corporation (Sematech), which was designed to improve the competitiveness of the 
seminconductor industry under the support of the federal government. After the U.S.-Japan 
Semiconductor Trade Agreement was signed in September 1986, the relatively closed domestic 
market in Japan and Japan’s strategy for monopolizing a segment of the American market drew the 
attention of the U.S. government. Under the influence of industry policies debate and domestic 
interest groups’ voices, the Reagan government determined to improve the U.S. position in the 
semiconductor market. 
Since early 1987, Sematech was established with federal support from the Department of 
Defense. Sematech is an organization composed of 138 American companies engaged in supplying 
equipment and materials to the semiconductor industry. Membership in Sematech was restricted to 
US companies.362 In Laura Tyson’s words, Sematech “provides a new U.S. model of partnership in 
the R&D area.”363 Its goal was to provide US-owned semiconductor companies with the capability 
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to achieve world leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology by 1993.  
Sematech realized that Japanese domination in the market would reduce the policy 
effectiveness of sanctions adopted by US government. Besides recommending imposing an objective 
tariff on Japanese competitors, Sematech strongly advised that the U.S. should restrict Japanese FDI. 
Robert Noyce, Chief Executive Officer of Sematech, in his speeches to the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, on May 24, 1989, urged them to “initiate regulations that would prohibit avoidance of 
the tariffs by Japanese efforts to shift assembly or manufacture of affected products to other 
countries, including the United States, and require a duty on all Japanese content regardless of end 
use.”364 As one observer later noted, “between 1978 and 1988, the share of the world semiconductor 
market held by U.S. producers declined from almost 60 percent to less than 40 percent, with the 
Japanese taking over the number one position in 1986. Sematech was explicitly formed to reverse 
these trends.”365 While Sematech firstly was to respond to Japanese investors in Austin, Texas, it 
quickly became the market leader under the support of US government. Sematech signaled a clear 
shift in the way US officials defined the defense industrial base.366 By 1993, the United States 
accounted for over 40 percent of the world market for semiconductors and Japanese firms’ shares 
have fallen from about 50 percent to about 43 percent. According to Thomas Pugel, professor at New 
York University, “government policies did not seem to hurt things, and in many ways seem to have 
contributed to what now looks to be really a quite good performance by U.S. industry.”367 
In the foreign economic policy area, American political elites struggled to balance the liberal 
ideology originating from its hegemonic position and the demand for occasional intervention. The 
support of government for semiconductor is crucial. As George M. Scalise, Chairman of Public 
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Policy for the Semiconductor Industry Association testified to the House in early 1994: “I am also 
pleased and proud to be able to state that we have regained the No.1 position worldwide market 
share. We regained that position having lost it to Japan about 10 years ago, and through the 
aggressive efforts of the industry, and I would also say the enlightened support of government as it 
deals with market access and dumping issues.” 368 With the increasing number and scope of 
multinationals, the boundaries between foreign and domestic economic policies have waned. On 
Sematch, as Peter Cowhey writes,  
 
Despite Sematech’s success, conservatives made each program innovation into a major 
battle, thus delaying timely action. President George Bush showed no personal interest in 
resolving the policy deadlocks. This created an opening for Clinton to pitch himself as an 
heir to the ‘”Rockefeller Republican” tradition of championing cooperation with business 
to expand jobs.369 
 
 
3.4.2 A Compromise on “Who is Us” in Clintonomics 
The linkage between FDI and trade issues lead policymakers to consider the correlated policy 
influence. As one study suggested “U.S. trade and investment policies are integrally related. In both 
issue areas, the declining international hegemony of the United States is a key factor in the growth of 
nationalist, protectionist policies.”370 This judgment is specifically relevant to our research on the 
federal government policy to FDI. As demonstrated in chapter 2, one of the significant changes in 
the world economy is the reversed relations between trade and FDI. Thus, we can expect that 
investment issues would gradually attract policymakers’ interest and concern. Moreover, there is a 
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reasonable time lag effect compared to the long policy history in trade issue area.  
The trade policy toward Japan in the United States shifted from “process-oriented” to 
“results-oriented”. Although the United States continued to pursuit a liberal international economic 
order, its international economic position restricts its ambitions. Beginning in the mid-1980s, both 
Ronald Reagan and George Bush pursued quantitative requirements of market access gains with 
Japan. This policy went still further in the first Clinton administration.371 
In investment issues, the Clinton administration had begun to change the institutional design of 
CFIUS and other aspects of investment policy. In late 1992, Foreign Policy published an important 
article proposed an active U.S. investment policy.372 The author argues that the United States should 
extract the maximum possible benefits from foreign investors. Thus, investment policy could not be 
too extreme—neither wholly liberal nor completely protectionist. The author acknowledged that, 
“the creation of a workable coalition will depend on the skills of leaders and on their willingness to 
make much-needed adjustments in the face of continued U.S. economic decline.”373 Some of these 
agendas had been finished in the first year of Clinton administration. However, it still leaves us more 
questions on U.S. investment policy. 
In 1992, Clinton won the election that marked the economic shift in U.S. foreign policy. From 
the beginning of his campaign, Clinton emphasized U.S. economic reconstruction. As James Fallows 
wrote in March 1992, “Clinton’s economic scheme is not at far-reaching as Thruow’s, but of the 
proposals offered by the remaining candidates, only Clinton’s meet the test that Thurow says is the 
standard for political seriousness; they take account of the country’s economic problems and 
recognize that they are not solving themselves.”374 The economic issue was the most central part to 
Clinton’s wining the election, and it dominated the administration’s early agenda. Clinton’s emphasis 
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was on building productive capacity rather than stimulating demand, and he took an activist stance 
toward investments in public infrastructure, research, and training activities.375 
The economic agenda became the first prominent issue in Clinton foreign policy. This point 
was illustrated clearly and strongly by Mickey Kantor, US Trade Representative (USTR), on his 
statement before the Senate Finance Committee on March 9, 1993. Kantor stated that “past 
administrations have often neglected US economic and trading interest because of foreign policy and 
defense concerns. The days when we could afford to do so are long past. In the post-Cold War world, 
our national security depends on our economic strength.”376  
President Clinton organized a new economic policy term for achieving this purpose. According 
to Business Week, “like Harvard University during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and the 
University of Chicago in the Reagan years, it’s MIT economics that will help shape policy in 
Washington under President Clinton.”377 In contrast to his Republican predecessors’ belief on 
laissez-faire policy, the Clinton administration sharply adopted a sharply new foreign economic 
policy paradigm. He tapped economist Laura D’Andrea Tyson to head the Council of Economic 
Advisers, Robert E. Rubin as Director of the NECl, Robert B. Reich as Secretary of the Department 
of Labor, Lloyd M. Bentsen as Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Lawrence H. Summers as 
the Under Secretary of the Department of Treasury.  
Although the economics profession were shocked on Tyson’s appointment and predicted her 
limited influence to Clinton’s economic policy, Tyson won respect from Clinton. As Business Week 
noted “Tyson’s influence on the President remains high”, especially on “Clinton’s tough critiques of 
Japan’s sheltered markets, his support for ‘results-oriented trade policy,’ or talk of a U.S. ‘investment 
deficit’.”378 Three years later, Clinton appointed Tyson as successor to Robert Rubin, the director of 
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NEC. In his remarks, Clinton praised Tyson, pointing that Tyson “had an exceptional analytic mind 
and an understanding of the underlying global economic and political realities affecting our ability to 
compete and our economic future.” Moreover, according to Clinton, Tyson was “a consensus builder 
and an honest broker without in any way compromising her own views in the inner councils.”379  
The promise of Tyson’s influence on Clinton’s new economic policy is especially clear on the 
debate of multinationals. As discussed earlier, Tyson’s view on the importance of nationality is 
dramatically different from Reich’s argument on this issue. After the election, both Tyson and Reich 
became members of the Clinton administration. When asked how to deal with these two different 
views in a same administration, journalist Bob Woodward described Clinton’s view on “Who is Us” 
in a dialogue as follows,  
  
“What do you mean, they have different views?” Clinton asked. “They have similar views, 
don’t they?” Tyson said that she and Reich once had an academic debate in The American 
Prospect on whether the nationality of a firm was important. “Yeah, Laura was wrong,” 
Reich said. Clinton looked as if a light had switched on in his head. “I did’t know that you 
wrote that,” he said to Tyson. “I forgot that. You know what? You were right, and Bob was 
wrong.”380 
 
This dialogue teaches us that an academic view is very different from government’s policy, 
especially for the central policy makers. Policy is an interaction between multilevel variables under 
the specific conditions. Fifteen year later, Reich recalled the debate between him and Tyson, stated 
that “fourteen years ago I failed to understand the political logic of my argument. Big 
American-based corporations, becoming less dependent on the productivity of Americans, would use 
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their muscle to reduce taxes, thereby preventing the needed public investment.”381 To a politician, 
the short-term objective is the most frequent issue confronting them, while scholars have enough 
time to argue the long-term outcome. The gap between academic economic logic and practical 
political logic is even larger in American Congress, as demonstrated by Nobel laureate Paul 
Samuelson is observation that “the economic theory of the seminar room and the learned treaties 
seems to be in another world from discussions in Congress and the newspapers.”382  
This kind of conflict between academic and political argument was also taking place in the 
debate on competitiveness. Due to the importance of competitiveness and President Clinton’s 
popular claim that each nation was “like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace,” we 
may obtain implication from this issue. Paul Krugman in his article published on Foreign Affairs 
indicated that “competitiveness is a meaningless concept when applied to national 
economies.”383One the one hand, Krugman realized that usefulness of competitive rhetoric as a 
motivation for tough policies in Clinton’s economic program, but wondered whether “unjustified 
fears about foreign competition similarly be turned to good, used to justify serious efforts to reduce 
the budget deficit, rebuild infrastructure, and so on?”384  
On the other hand, Krugman’s narrow definition and discussion of competitiveness aroused 
broader criticism in academia.385 In fact, as discussed above, competitiveness was a metaphor for 
America’s position in the world and not merely a piece of economic jargon. Although Krugman once 
did a great job for Clinton’s campaign strategy, he was “droped from the Clinton team before the 
election.”386 Late, Krugman realized that “the debate over competitiveness is simply a matter of 
time-honoured fallacies about international trade being dressed up in new and pretentious 
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rhetoric.” 387  More than that, the competitiveness debate provide the opportunity for a new 
administration controlling national policy direction.  
The Clinton economy team took a very serious view on the investment issue. One notable U.S. 
government report pointed in 1993, “throughout the business and academic literature on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and U.S. international competitiveness, one theme is constant: the 
competitive challenge of Japanese corporations.”388 One of this report’s basic conclusions on 
Japanese FDI in the United States is that Japanese producers had not reached the levels of domestic 
content of U.S, although it was gradually increasing it. In mid 1993, the Clinton administration 
reached a consensus that American-owned companies and American workers should be put first.389 
The broader acceptable principle of national treatment was challenged again. This policy shift 
reflected the reality of global production that foreign-owned companies may contribute more to local 
job creation than those U.S.-based companies, and the reality that the domestic economy still 
dominated the global political economy. The Clinton administration’s policy represented a 
compromise between the debate that took place between Robert Reich and Laure Tyson. 
Following the results-oriented trade policy with Japan, Clinton also increased the reciprocity 
requirement. In his lecture at American University in earlier 1993, Clinton expressed that “we 
welcome that investment, [but] we insist that our investors should be equally welcome in other 
countries.”390 This point, which will be discussed more in chapter 5, mainly resulted from the 
dramatically asymmetric investment positions between Japan and the United States. The reciprocity 
condition was introduced into the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993. As an 
OECD report pointed out, “the 1993 act contains reciprocity conditions and the 1984 act does 
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not.”391 Similarly, the 1993 Defense Appropriations Act also required firms who are US citizens get 
funding from government.  
In the 1990s, Japanese FDI eroded quickly with its fading economic power. As a consequence, 
the Clinton administration had the room to adjust its investment policy. The shift in investment 
policy resulted from U.S. strategic considerations of linkage between relative gains and economic 
competitiveness. With the rising fear of a Japanese economic challenge and the domestic debate on 
the costs and benefits of FDI, it was safe to reduce international obligations and focus more on 
national level interest seeking. As Theodore Moran stated, it was “a retreat from the principle of 
national treatment for foreign-owned firms.”392 The federal government increased its power to block 
FDI. At the same time, the United States central policy makers were constrained by the state’s long 
standing liberal ideology, and by the lobbying of domestic groups who benefited from FDI.  
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Chapter 4 Firm Strategy, Interests Distribution, and Domestic 
Politics 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we will discuss what domestic changes were sparked by the entry of Japanese 
FDI into the United States and how they influenced the federal government’s consideration of FDI 
policy. In the first section, we try to describe the strategies that Japanese multinationals employed to 
adapt to their new markets in the United States. For Multinationals to act as economic agents in the 
world market, they must operate rationally in a competitive environment. Industry has different 
strategic weight in different companies’ FDI behavior. Japanese FDI was distributed unevenly 
throughout industries and states in the United States. The distribution of FDI not only affected 
Japanese multinationals’ competitiveness, but also shaped many local political economies across the 
United States.  
In the second section, worker’s attitudes or individual preferences to FDI entry at state level 
will be examined through a simple econometric model. Constituencies’ policy preferences are 
expected to influence both Congress and the President’s consideration of FDI policy. Here, we 
disaggregate this process into two stages. Firstly, FDI will change an individual’s interest, and then 
we assume that interest change will directly influence their policy preference. Secondly, elected 
institutions in the United States will aggregate this policy preference and transfer it to policy makers’ 
thinking.  
In the third section, local state policies towards Japanese FDI will be discussed. Contrary to 
trade, where Congress has the sole right to regulate commerce, the American Constitution did not 
deny states’ rights to attract FDI. On the one hand, multinationals have bargaining power in 
negotiating with states. Economic integration specifically affects state’s economic development. On 
the other hand, constrained by the federal government’s dual deficit, local governments would 
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consider very seriously the welfare benefits posed by the entry of Japanese FDI. As a result, the 
federal government had to coordinate its policies by adjusting the local government’s policy 
preference and individuals’ policy preference.  
  
 
 
4.1 Japanese Multinational Strategies: Interest Creation 
In this section, we mainly deal with the strategies that Japanese multinationals operated in the 
United States. As an economic agent in a market, a firm must not only create profits for its survival, 
but also provide value to society. In the sense of asset creation, firm logic is very similar to nation 
state behavior in international system; states also provide valuable goods for their communities 
through a combination of traditional factors and new created factors. Through the creation of mutual 
interest, firm and nation state will find ways to cooperate. Under new conditions, which factor can 
be contributed to assets creation is important to help us understand interaction of these agents. The 
approaches that Japanese multinationals used were diverse and provided different interests to 
different groups in the United States. 
  
 
4.1.1 Firm Logic vs. State Logic  
Scholars in International Relations borrowed concepts from economics to develop new political 
theories about international political economy. For example, microeconomic theory strongly 
influenced Kenneth Waltz’s theory construction in his Theory of International Politics, where states 
in the international system behave similarly to firms in a market system. Firms are 
profit-maximizing actors in a market system. Likewise, states are assumed to put security interest 
prior on any other interests in an anarchic setting. Thus, international politics study can take state as 
a “black box”, just like firm in economic study.393  
In discussing why cooperation can be maintained after hegemony declined in international 
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political economy, Robert Keohane uses concepts from new institutional economics to develop an 
institutional theory in his After Hegemony. In this study, states are still treated as unitary actor. Over 
twenty years later, Koehane recognized that “the theoretical discussion of After Hegemony treats 
states as units, without taking into account variations in domestic politics or in the ideas prevailing 
within them.”394 The reason why he abstracted domestic consideration out of his institutional theory 
is that “I did not know how to incorporate a sophisticated domestic politic theory into my analysis in 
a cogent and parsimonious way.”395 Definitely, the two giants in International Relations try to 
construct new theories of international politics. The paradox they faced with theoretical simplicity 
and reality complex is a possible motivation to new academic works. 
Identifying the state as a firm-style organization has analytical advantages in discussing 
interactions of political and economy forces. Robert Gilpin in his classical War and Change in World 
Politics gave us a historical evolution of international political change.396 In this book, Gilpin 
borrowed more concepts from economics, such as indifference curve, law of uneven development, 
and technological efficiency, etc. For Gilpin, states, like firms in a purely competitive industry or 
Cournor’s myopic oligopolies, define their costs and benefits without considering the likely 
reactions of others to their actions.  
A much broader landscape, an analogy between states and firms was presented by Frederic 
Lane in his Profits from Power.397 In his analysis, Lane distinguished two kinds of enterprises: (1) 
those that produce protection and are called governments and (2) those that produce goods or other 
services and pay government for protection. From the early 18th century, Lane argued that 
“protection rent” provided by government is important to human beings. One of the most distinctive 
characteristics of governments is their attempt to create law and order by using and controlling force. 
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Accordingly, the production of protection is a natural monopoly based on territorial scope. When 
transnational economic activities dramatically exceeded territorial control, it lead to the creation of 
new types of credit formations, such as deposits, bonds, capital markets, which attempt to service for 
industrial innovator. As a result,  
 
Treating governments as enterprises which seek to maximize profits creates a model which, 
it must be admitted, is more appropriate for the seventeenth century than for the nineteenth. 
The democratic revolutions at the end of the eighteen century and the subsequent growth 
of representative government have given popularity to model building on the assumption 
that governmental expenditures reflect the demands of those governed.398  
 
The motivation for regarding states as firms is attempt to explain state behavior and international 
system dynamics over a relatively long period. Some of researchers examine states at the domestic 
level; some of them focus on the international level. Certainly, these intellectual accumulations 
profoundly influence subsequent academic and media thinking. As discussed in chapter 3, 
international competitiveness and “who is us” were heated topic of debate during the 1980s in the 
United States. Many scholars considered states like firms in a market, and national competitiveness 
was a meaningful thing in international political economy. Thus, the logic of firm strategy can be 
applied to formulate state grand strategy. Others denied rational of this analogy. The question of 
whether state in world political economy can be analyzed parallel to firm in market system is 
contentious. Both sides have a point.  
To a pure economist, the firm’s logic is remarkably different from the state’s one. The former is 
organized based on profits, and operates in an open environment. Thus, its reaction to market signs is 
quicker than a government’s. The latter is constrained by many factors. As a national economy, states 
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are more complex than firms and policy makers always fall into an asymmetric information dilemma. 
In Krugman’s words, “the fundamental difference between business strategy and economic analysis 
is this; even the largest business is a very open system; despite growing world trade, the U.S. is a 
largely closed system.”399 According to Krugman, the feedback effects in an open system are often 
weak and uncertain. Too many firms exist at market; a firm’s strategy failure does not mean another 
firm’s success. To national economy, foreign economic relations have much stronger effects on its 
domestic operation. 
 Moreover, the national level based economic models have been challenged during the past two 
decades. On the one hand, strategic thinkers realize that not all national economies are constrained 
by territorial context. Kenichi Ohmae, a leading business strategist in Japan, argues that local 
governments and regional integrations play important roles in organizing resources under new 
globalizing economy. In economic sense, it is region level rather nation level governments that 
strongly influenced economic development.400 In recent years, Richard Rosecrance developed the 
concept “virtual states” to describe transnational economic activities. He argues that traditionally 
identified resources’ contribute less to economic development, and many states use services other 
than manufacturing production to increase competitiveness.401 On the other hand, some technical 
problems, such as trade statistics, origins of production, and data on service trade deficits, aroused 
new thinking on national level analysis. The complexity of economic activities poses challenges to 
immediate measurement and evaluation of a national economy. As discussed previously, 
distinguishing how firms of different nationalities contribute to a national economy is difficult.  
However, the analogy between firm and state has its rationale for study purposes if we realize 
that both of them must organize resources efficiently and create new assets to succeed. The basic 
resources now available are not limited to land, capital and labor which are used widely in traditional 
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economic theory. Rather, new forms of resources are gradually being added. Thus, opening the 
“black box” of state and internal structure of firm leads to new units of analysis. In John Zysman’s 
words, “the national economy is more than a giant input-output table.”402 As a basic actor in 
economic transaction, firm’s strategy definitely reflects the customer or individual’s interests. During 
the process of interaction between firm strategy and state behavior, we probably understand which 
assets can be created and maintained. At domestic level, we are concerned with the political actions 
of social actors and states centering on interest distribution.   
 
 
4.1.2 Market Share Strategy 
The primary explanation of why firms invest directly abroad is that firms own enterprise 
advantage. John Dunning’s eclectic theory on FDI argues that firms accumulat three kinds of 
advantage. Besides enterprise specific advantage, firms must obtain another two advantages: internal 
advantage and location advantage. A foreign investor’s advantage can take many forms. Technology 
is the most basic advantage; while access to large amounts of capital, superior management and 
products differentiated by successful advertising are also important. To business strategists, 
individual firms’ management and marketing are the core of analysis. To political economists, we are 
concerned more about the collective effects. 
Alfred Chandler once argued “the ability to gain and maintain market share and profits tests the 
efficiency of a capitalist enterprise, particularly in foreign markets where different laws, customs, 
working habits, and availability of supplies tend to favor domestic producers.”403 To measure 
multinationals’ competitiveness, Chandler uses both market share and profits as indicators. However, 
in discussing Japanese multinationals in the United States, a notable characteristic of their strategies 
is to seek market share without putting as much weight on profits. One possible reason is that 
Japanese companies earned higher profits in domestic market, which can offset weak earnings in the 
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United States. Another explanation was focused on Japanese companies’ strategies, especially their 
“transfer price” through networks in South East Asia.404 For example, before the 1986 tax law 
passed in the United States, the U.S. had among the highest corporate tax rate in the industrial world. 
If Japanese companies had factories in South East Asia, which has relative low corporate tax, the 
subsidiaries in the United States imported parts from these factories through its inter-company 
charge, the outcome is that parent company would make more money by showing the profit in the 
South East Asia states.  
Constrained by domestic financial criteria in investment decisions, American corporations are 
concerned more about profits rather than long term market share. Richard Rosecrance criticized that 
“the short term strategy that dominates American business often dictates manipulating assets rather 
than investing in new plant and equipment. Companies on the prowl for new capacity will buy assets, 
rather than add to their own production capacity.”405 Similarly, Akio Morita, chairman of the Sony 
Corporation, also said American business managers “can only see 10 minutes ahead.”406 Because 
the strategic style is rooted deeply in the domestic business environment, it is not necessary for 
American firms to adapt Japanese way.407  
Through learning by doing in South East Asia, the Japanese FDI entered into the United States 
strategically through acquisition, as well as Greenfield investments. The strategies for market share 
reflected the position of Japanese multinationals as late comers in the world market. The Japanese 
FDI in the United States was starkly different from its first generation in the South East Asia; most 
of the first generation Japanese FDI lost their competitiveness in Japan domestic market. In the 
1980s, the Japanese multinationals in the United States increased competitiveness in the world 
market.  
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The competition for market share helped them to accumulate organizational learning capability. 
As Chandler argued, “such capabilities accounted for the long-term persistence of profits by the 
same players over the decades. Such capabilities and the resulting retained earnings became the basis 
for their continued growth.”408 Those industrial enterprises owned by Americans had already 
utilized their scale and scope to establish the organizational capabilities in earlier days, while 
Japanese firms only began their scale process after the interwar period. After nearly fifty years’ of 
accumulating expertise, Japanese multinationals began to challenge teacher in the 1980s. 
Under the long term strategic consideration, Japanese multinationals selected investment 
locations and industries very carefully. As Japanese business strategist Kenichi Ohmae argued, “The 
Japanese companies with which I have worked for years have never devised strategies or built 
organizations to enter the U.S. market as a whole, as if it were a single unified area. It isn’t, and they 
knew better. Instead, they would pick and choose their spots: California, perhaps, and maybe New 
England, the Great Lakes area, and, at least initially, very little else.”409 As will be illustrated in the 
subsequent sections, Japanese investors mainly concentrated in California, the Great Lakes area, 
New York and Hawaii. At the same time, as discussed in the preceding chapters, Japanese new 
overseas plants in the United States tended to create conduits for increasing trade flows, specifically 
imports from Japan and affiliated networks. This pattern differs remarkably from Europe 
multinationals in the United States, which primarily took the form of acquisition.410 
A substantial amount of Japanese investors entered in the form of partnerships, mostly adapted 
joint ventures to mobilize location advantage in the United States. Some scholars argued the 
American partner gained more from the partnerships at least in the short term. 411  In the 
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manufacturing sector, Japanese companies attempted to use joint ventures to enter into politically 
sensitive industries, while used partial equity positions more often in high-technology industries.412 
When American companies gained from this cooperation, they sometimes shared interest risk with 
Japanese firms. Once Japanese investors had sunk capital into the United States, they also came to 
share many of the same preferences as domestic producers. Thus, if democratic systems take the 
interests of these domestic producers into account, the government will provide legislation favorable 
to the domestic producers and foreign investors. On the other hand, the presence of Japanese 
companies may change the effectiveness of domestic policies and may create incentives for new 
policy measures. For example, multinationals may be able to circumvent tax policy by relocating 
their activities to lower tax countries.413 
Japanese investment also posed a fundamental challenge to traditional American ways of 
conducting business. To some Americans, Japan’s FDI model does not accord with profits 
maximization assumption. Moreover, business-government relations in the United States are very 
different from Japan’s.414 In the United States, the government is relatively weak, while business 
groups have their strong interests. Although stronger business forces in the United States sometimes 
affected government policy, it is a double-edged sword. Thus, Japanese corporation behavior has 
been accused in some cases. Some argued that, Japanese subsidiaries in the United States had paid 
very little income tax, and were under investigation for possible using improper transfer pricing to 
evade payment of American taxes. Furthermore, many Japanese management practices also 
discriminate against American employees, especially women and members of minority groups.415  
To business strategists, Japan’s way of organizing companies is more effective. In the case of 
automobiles, for example, the famous “Toyota Production System”, which is also called “Lean 
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Production” by American scholars, produces a new production model. For Americans, learning the 
Japanese approach is crucial to regaining international competitiveness, but it will be an 
uncomfortable and threatening experience. In Gregory Noble’s view, “the real reason the American 
public is so resistant to Japanese investment is a profound sense not of superiority but of 
vulnerability.” Furthermore, the economic deregulation in the Reagan Era also led to public concern 
about their destiny and fear disintegrated national interest calculations.416   
Under pressure from critics, Japanese multinationals gradually shifted their strategies into 
localization of some parts of its production. For example, Honda Motor Company has been 
identified as “in some ways [becoming] as American an auto maker as Ford or General Motors.” The 
reason is that Honda began to share skills and ideas with its American workers, and use its America 
engineers in Ohio and California to design cars. Several years before, this situation was completely 
different. Just like many Japanese-owned factories in the United States, Honda’s U.S. factories were 
mainly used to assemble parts imported from Japan, and build cars designed by Japanese engineers. 
A notable location strategy is that Honda’s executive vice president for United States manufacturing 
was a former lawyer from Columbus, Ohio.417 
As late-comers in the world market, Japanese investors had to emphasize long term strategy. At 
the same time, Japanese investors effectively used location advantage with knowledge accumulation 
and learning from experience. In the first stage of Japanese FDI entry, a combination of protectionist 
threats and commercial logic meant that it had no choice but to locate inside the U.S. Also the 
mobile firm has little bargaining power; all the cards are in the hands of the host country or region. 
After a relatively long term, the firm will find that the number of site possibilities is very large. As 
will be seen in the subsequent section, the possible number of sites will increase due to state 
competition. Thus the federal government needs to offer no incentives for a firm to enter the US 
market, while states and its various competitors feel they have no choice but to engage in an 
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escalating incentives war.418 In this meaning, long term market share strategy is very suitable for a 
later comer. 
 
 
4.1.3 Political Strategies 
While the decision of a typical multinationals to invest in a potential host country is primarily 
motivated by a higher expected future profitability, this strategic consideration also depends on both 
economic and political factors. Even if current economic conditions seem satisfactory and suggest 
good prospects for the future, it is entirely possible that such prospects will not materialize due to 
unfavorable political conditions, such as political instability, which may disrupt the economic 
process. 
Foreign investors can directly lobby government officials for their preferred legislative 
outcomes in democracies that aren’t possible in autocracies. Hansen and Mitchell find that foreign 
firms in the U.S. are just as likely to engage in lobbying activity as domestic firms.419 As Arye 
Hillman and Heinrich Ursprung stated, “under representative democracy, foreign participation in 
domestic politics can take the form of campaign contributions, or other transfers directly at 
influencing the trade-policy position taken by a political candidate”.420 The decentralization of 
America foreign economic policy created many opportunity for Japanese lobbyists. For example, in 
1986, 106 groups registered with the Justice Department as agents for the Japanese Government or 
Japanese businesses. These agencies reported receiving $30 million for work related to Japan. A 
report finished by a Federal advisory committee noted, “The Japanese have been very successful in 
taking advantage of differences that exist among U.S. government agencies.”421 
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As Neil Mitchell argued, political activity will follow corporations’ economic activity, and 
foreign affiliates adapt to the host country’s political economy.422 In their book, Buying into 
America, the Tolchins give several examples of representatives of foreign firms exerting pressure on 
local, state, and national political leaders, and argue that “the country is functioning as fifty separate 
countries.”423 It is well documented, for example, that Toshiba urged local and state leaders, in areas 
where it had American facilities, to contact their members of Congress and persuade them to water 
down the proposed trade sanctions against the Japanese firm. Toshiba’s employees in the United 
States also embarked on a letter writing campaign in an effort to sway Congressional opinion. 
Toshiba’s message to lawmakers was simple: A ban on sales would cost jobs of thousands of 
constituents.424 Akio Morita was also instrumental in convincing Indiana’s political leaders to scrap 
unitary taxation.425 
Without a doubt, representatives of subnational governments are sensitive to the demands made 
by business leaders. The opinions of these local leaders are also given strong currency in the 
corridors of Congress. It is natural that local and state political leaders would respond to the needs of 
their business community, whether the businesses are locally owned, nationally owned, or foreign 
owned. As an illustration, the Daily Oklahoman may have lodged a similar complaint against the 
member of Congress if he had acted against Oklahoma’s economic interests by voting in opposition 
to placing a duty on imported oil. In certain cases, responding to a complaint made by a foreign 
owned company might actually bring down protectionist barriers, such as Indiana’s former unitary 
taxation policy.  
Frequent trade negotiations between Japan and the United States also led some media to 
criticize the Japanese experiences of officials in the United States. Many government officials were 
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once lawyers or business people. Since the early 1970s, it was estimated that one-third of the roughly 
60 former top officials at the USTR had close relationship with Japanese interests. For example, 
Carla Hills, USTR of the first Bush administration, once briefly advised Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Corporation in an anti-dumping complaint before her appointment as official negotiator 
with trade issues. Some Japanese lobbyists skillfully utilized this relationship to serve their own 
interest. The first hint that President Bush would name Carla Hills USTR appeared in Japan’s Nihon 
Keizai Shinbun, rather any U.S. newspapers. Personal or professional relationships with Japanese 
business community were believed to influence policy. This point can be deduced from the fact that 
officials would seek their benefits under the condition which private interest and public interest 
conflicted in specific situation. As Clyde Prestowitz once pointed out, “if you are a government trade 
negotiator, you know sooner or later you’ll leave government. Clearly it’s not advantageous to make 
enemies.”426 
In his 1990 book, Agents of Influence, Pat Choate argued that the rising power of Japanese 
lobbies in Washington was dangerous for American.427 His argument aroused broader discussion in 
academia and the media. People admitted in buying influence, Japanese companies were behaving 
just like Americans and other foreigners. Due to the asymmetry of openness of the political system 
between the United States and Japan, the most suitable way to increase U.S. influence was to 
persuade Japan to make its own political system more open.428 On June 28, 1990, the Federal 
Election Commission voted four to one to initiate a rule-making procedure to ban U.S. companies 
with 50 percent or more foreign ownership from organizing and maintaining Political Action 
Committees. This bill mainly attempted to stop them making financial contributions to political 
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campaigns. This would be against the principle of equal national treatment and would be challenged 
on constitutional grounds.429 In June 1991, this bill was denied by a four-to-two vote.430 
The implications of Japanese multinationals’ market share strategy and political strategy are 
that opening the “black box” is necessary, not only in theory but also in practice. In Chapter 1, we 
argued that national interest assumption and unitary actor model is not necessary in policy analysis. 
Moving from the national level to he subnational level, the firm’s different location and their 
different economic importance to local government already provides very diverse economic 
incentives. In the following section, we will see more about the power of economic incentives in 
influencing policy in a democratic regime.    
 
 
 
4.2 Individual Policy Preference and Local State Interests 
In the political economy of policy making, policy makers are concerned about individuals’ 
policy preferences, due to the fact that their reelections are determined by voters. As Dani Rodrik 
claimed, “in principle a political economy model of trade policy must have four elements. First, it 
must contain a description of individual preferences over the domain of policy choices available to 
policy makers.”431 This logic is also relevant in investment issues. 
The rational choice model assumes that the individual would like to act to maximize their 
interests. As discussed in Chapter 1, this assumption is increasing accepted by students of IPE. In 
contrast to the difficult collective identification and interest formulation at national level, students of 
IPE identify economic interest as the most important motivation of individual action in policy 
preference formulation and expression.432  
In this section, we will construct a model to illustrate how the individual’s policy preferences 
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are aggregated into policy makers’ considerations. Furthermore, it attempts to compare Japanese FDI 
with other countries’ FDI and examines its influence on U.S. investment policy. Moreover, it will 
illustrate that substate politics influence U.S. foreign economic policy at the Federal level.  
 
 
4.2.1 Income Distribution and Investment Policy Preference  
During the past several decades, international trade theory has helped explain how and why 
individuals have different views on economic factor mobility between countries. Those whose 
income is damaged caused by trade will favor protection, while those who gained from trade will 
favor liberal policy. It is widely accepted that trade effects are positive to skilled workers, while 
negative to unskilled workers. Basically, there are two models to discuss which groups may lose out 
and the corresponding policy implications.  
The first model is the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis. In the contemporary world, individual’s 
income mainly depends on factor income. According to Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in international 
trade theory, trade pattern between countries are determined by factor endowments. Countries 
usually export products intensively utilizing nationally abundant productive factors, and import 
where factors are scarce. After trade, the market mechanism helps realize optimal resources 
allocation. Owners of plentiful factors get much higher returns compared to non-trade. Thus, 
political coalitions may formulate into class conflict due to factor typs; labor would organize into 
groups to compete with capital group in political games.433  
The second view on individual’s policy preference is the Richard-Viner model. In Heckscher’s 
world, production factors are mobile between sectors. In the long run, costless movement of factors 
will adjust automatically between rich and poor. With economic activities becoming more 
specialized, however, factors could not move easily between different sectors or industries. Trade 
theorists began to probe for new models to explain this reality. In the Richard-Viner model of trade 
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theory, some or all factors move very costly across sectors. Thus, it is not factors that determine 
policy preferences. In Richard-Viner’s world, labor and management in the same industry or sector 
will act unitarily to influence policy. As a result, the political conflict will be demonstrated between 
different industries. 
The history of trade patterns and corresponding political coalitions in the United States required 
more careful classification of productive factors. The United States is considered to have abundant 
capital and skilled labor. However, it is not enough to predict U.S. trade politics based on capital vs 
labor. Scholars argued that labor in the United States can be further divided into sub-categories in 
productive factors.  
The various productive factors in the United States, especially the distinction between skilled 
and semi-skilled labor is useful to explain the coalition change between capital and labor. According 
to Paul Midford, a three-factor model: land, labor, and capital, is not enough to explain “Why many 
American labor unions supported free trade for the first thirty years of the postwar period.” Also it 
failed to “account for the growing protectionism of many, but not all, American capitalists—a trend 
that became particularly evident in the 1970s.”434  
Midford’s research clearly illustrates that the winners and losers of industries vary at different 
stages, as do their trade policy preference. Midford argues that labor unions in the textile and 
clothing industries began to endorse protectionism as early as the late 1950s, while labor unions in 
the steel industries and auto industries stuck to their support for free trade until the late 1960s and 
1970s, respectively. There is no solid evidence that those workers in the instrument making, 
chemical, or pharmaceutical industries favored protectionism. At the same time, capitalists in light 
industries such as textiles, apparel, and shoe manufacturing began to favor protectionism in the mid 
1950s.The electrical appliance, machine tool, and automobile manufacturers did not jump on the 
protectionism bandwagon until the beginning of the 1980s. The semiconductor industry continued to 
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support free trade through the mid-1980s and even went to the trouble of lobbying against the highly 
protectionist automobile domestic-content law of 1982-83. 435  
The difference of these two ideal-type models in trade theory mainly focused on the degree of 
intersectoral factor mobility.436 If factors could not mobilize between industries, then we could use 
the Richard-Viner model. Otherwise, the Heckscher-Ohlin model is better to grasp the influence of 
international economic activities on political action. It is clear that the real world is actually located 
between these two extreme points. We live in a world where some factors may mover freely, while 
others are more difficult to move in different sectors. As a result, individuals’ income changed with 
their industries as well as the location.  
On the period this study covers, the Heckscher-Ohlin model is the most suitable to analyze 
trade policy demand in the United States. Jeffrey Ladewig argued that factor mobility was relatively 
low in the 1960s and higher in the 1980s. His study illustrates that sectoral constituent interests in 
the 1960s are significant, while factorial constituent interests in the 1980s and 1990s are much 
stronger. 437 In the United States, capital is abundant and labor is relatively scarce. Thus, the 
predicted coalitions on trade policy during this period were capital vs. labor. Capital and capital 
intensive firms obtained greater long-term benefits from free trade. At the same time, labor 
experienced greater competition and falling wages, and therefore favored policies that decrease the 
exposure of the domestic economy to the international economy. 
In a world in which national economies are becoming increasingly integrated, the vicissitudes 
of trade and capital flows have had dramatic impacts on domestic welfare in every advanced 
country.438 By now there are various models in international political economy offering specific 
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predictions about the distributional consequences. Although attitudes to migration are more complex 
due to negative effects on hosting countries, winner’s gains will still outweigh the loser’s losses 
under free trade. Thus, Ronald Rogowski suggests, “factor’s preferences on trade will correlate 
almost perfectly with their preferences on migration and foreign investment.” 439   
By the same token, Japanese FDI entry into the United States will influence factor owners’ 
income in different industries and probably lead to political coalition formation. According to the 
Heckscher-Olhin theorem, FDI will decrease the total returns to capital and increase the returns to 
labor. As a result, labor would likely to favor liberal policies on FDI. However, FDI not only 
includes capital mobility between home country and host country, but also endows technology, 
management and marketing skills. Thus, labor’s attitude to FDI may experience complexity 
compared to trade effects.  
Furthermore, the trade creation effect of Japanese FDI contributes to negative reactions. In the 
1980s, Japanese multinationals began their FDI strategies to utilize location advantages as well as 
avoid of trade barriers. As a result, FDI led to trade between the U.S. and Japan. Under this condition, 
labor’s attitudes toward FDI can be predicted by two ways: on the one hand, Japanese FDI created 
trade between U.S. and Japan so that unskilled labor would favor protectionism; on the other hand, 
Greenfield FDI bring capitals into U.S. markets and somewhat affected the stock of capital in the 
U.S, so that labor in this predication is in accordance with the study of the United States labor’ 
attitudes to Japanese FDI. Based on a survey of union members in California, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Tennessee, Rajshekhar Javalgi et al. found mixed effects of Japanese FDI on labor’s attitudes.440 
According to this study, the potential negative aspects of Japanese FDI were attributed to technology 
transfer, the building of economic dependency, and adverse competitive effects of Japanese FDI. 
Partly due to the cases selected in this study—the four states had been particularly active and 
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successful in seeking Japanese FDI—an overwhelming percentage of the respondents agreed that 
Japanese-owned companies had caused U.S. manufacturers to become more competitive.  
Several early national level surveys had illustrated much different views on FDI.441 A February 
1989 joint New York Times/CBS News/Tokyo Broad casting poll asked: “Japanese companies now 
own manufacturing plants in the United States. Do you think this is a threat to American economic 
independence, or will it strengthen the American economy, or doesn’t it make much difference?” 
Fifty-seven percent of American said Japanese ownership was an economic threat, twenty-one 
percent said it did not make much difference and only fifteen percent said it would strength the 
American economy. A poll finished in November 1988 asked the question that “Japanese investment 
in U.S. gives them too much influences over U.S. government policy?”, and seventy-five percentage 
of the respondents agreed.  
A further comparison on mass and elites’ attitudes may help us understand the limits of this 
kind of poll to predict policy. For example, a poll conducted in January 1988 asked if voters would 
“support a candidate who discourages FDI in the United States”, and about forty-three percent of the 
mass public said it would more likely, while only seven percent of elites agreed. On the question “Is 
it right for state and local governments to give tax breaks to foreign investment,” about twenty-one 
percent of mass said it was right, while fifty-two percent of the elites agreed.442 In this sense, the 
mass and elites have somewhat different views on the impacts of FDI.   
Putting this into a broader context, the linage between income disparity and integrated 
international economy became increasing important in the United Sates. From 1950 to 1980, there 
was little change in the overall distribution of income in the United States. However, two significant 
changes have occurred since the 1980s, the lowest one-fifth of families have seen their share of 
measured income fall from 5.3 to 4.3 percent of all incomes, and the top one-fifth of families have 
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seen their share of measured income rise from 41.1 to 47.4 percent of all income.443 Although FDI 
was definitely not the main reason to defer this situation, it has been considered by some people as a 
factor. With the rising of sensitivity of income gap in the United States, any factors contributed to 
this change may lead to think.  
 
. 
4.2.2 State Interest and Congressional Voting 
To some extent, politics must deal with the collective action problem. That consideration can 
explain why sometimes we do not hear the complaints of losers. According to Mansur Olson’s 
collective action theory, only those well-organized and larger groups have political influence on the 
policymaking process. Moreover, institutional cost is also an important factor in determining 
whether the losers or winners manage to protect their interests. If political institutions give less direct 
channels to individuals to express their policy preferences, then the action of individuals may be 
reduced.  
In a democratic regime, elections give individuals’ the opportunity to influence policy. In the 
United States, the constituent interests are important determinants of a legislator’s vote. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, individual’s policy preferences are aggregated into collective willingness through 
elections, which helps to bind congressional voting on policy. Under this condition, the judgment 
that “the attitudes of the American public as a whole, as well as those of affected groups, will be a 
primary determinant of whether it will be possible to maintain a relatively open investment 
environment in the United States” attracts attention and is worth testing.444 
In contrast to President’s responsibility to national level constituents, Congress is tied to the 
relatively narrow interests of districts and states. In this sense, checks and balance between 
Executive and Congress provide opportunity for legislators to appeal to special interest groups. 
Furthermore, the federalism in the United States also gives power to the states. 
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Generally speaking, the more legislators that represent a state, the more influence it could 
exercise on policy. In the United States, the House Representatives increased to its current level of 
435 members in 1910. Among them, the thirteen largest states accounted for 61% of Representatives, 
and the largest nine states account for 51.3%. California has 45 Representatives, accounting for 
10.3%, and New York accounts for 7.8%. Thus, in American political system, these two states are 
especially important (see Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 The Thirteen largest States of Representatives in the United States 
States Representatives 
California 45 
New York 34 
Texas 27 
Pennsylvania 23 
Illinois 22 
Ohio 21 
Florida 19 
Michigan 18 
New Jersey 14 
Massachusetts; North Carolina 11 
Indiana; Virginia 10 
Total  265 
Source: Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGillivary eds, America Votes 18: A Handbook of 
Contemporary American Election Statistics, Washington: Elections Research Center, Congressional 
Quarterly, 1989. 
 
This kind of political system requires politicians to treat states differently. The great difference 
in mass public and elites’ attitudes to trade or FDI also gives politicians the opportunity to sell their 
opinions. Politicians generally overlook labors benign attitude toward foreign capital, sometimes at 
their peril. In the 1988 presidential campaign the Democratic candidate, Michael Dukakis, told a 
group of workers at a St. Louis automotive parts plant: “Maybe the Republican ticket wants our 
children to work for foreign owners... but that's not the kind of a future Lloyd Bentsen and I and 
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Dick Gephardt and you want for America.”445 In the 1988 Presidential Election, about fifty-two 
percent of voters in Missouri suported George Bush, while forty-eight percent supported Dukakis.446 
Although there were many factors influence the outcome of the 1988 Presidential Election, and FDI 
was not among the significant factors, it is a way to make a linkage between economic consideration 
and political outcomes.    
The economic interest created by Japanese FDI was distributed unevenly in American States. 
According to FDI data published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and Bureau of the Census in 1992, Japanese FDI was mainly concentrated in less than a 
dozen states. Measured by employees and size of new establishment plant in the United States, 
California is the most important location for Japanese FDI, followed by New York (Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 The Largest Ten States Attracting Japanese FDI on Employment, 1987 
States Number of 
 employees 
Employment size class 
255-999 
Employment size class 
1000 and over 
California 85804 61 6 
New York 39268 24 5 
Illinois 18390 9 1 
Hawaii 18281 16 2 
New Jersey 17328 10 1 
Michigan 12172 10 1 
Ohio 11041 4 2 
Texas 9754 5 1 
Tennessee 7328 3 1 
Washington 6139 4 0 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the 
Census, Foreign Direct investment In the United States: Establishment Data for 1987, Washington, 
D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992, pp. 643-665. 
 
Among these states, California, New York and Hawaii can be called unique in their industries 
                                                        
445 Robin Toner, “Ownership of a Speech Site Catches Dukakis Unawares,” The New York Times, October 8, 
1988. 
446 United States Congress, Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. Elections, Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1994, p.467. 
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location of Japanese FDI. As shown in Table 4.3, California attracted various industries, such as 
electronic, semiconductors, motor vehicles, etc., Hawaii mainly attracted hotels industry, and New 
York located most of the FDI from large Japanese financial institutions. The automobile and steel 
industries mainly concentrated on the Great Lakes region, such as Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and 
Wisconsin. Generally speaking, high-technology industries were in California, traditional 
manufacturing industries were in Great Lake region, and the service industries were located in New 
York and Hawaii (Table 4.3).  
 
Table 4.3 Japanese Firms Employing more than 1,000 Industries in the United States, 1987 
State Industry Number 
Tires and inner tubes 1 
Alabama 
Magnetic and optical recording media 1 
Arkansas Household audio and video equipment 1 
Electronic computers 1 
Household audio and video equipment 1 
Semiconductors and related devices 2 
Motor vehicles and car bodies 1 
California 
Automobiles and other motor vehicles 1 
Georgia Prerecorded records and tapes 1 
Residential construction, nec 1 
Hawaii 
Hotels and motels 1 
Illinois Blast furnace and steel mills 1 
Indiana Blast furnace and steel mills 1 
Motor vehicles and car bodies 1 
Michigan 
Blast furnace and steel mills 1 
New Jersey Electronic appliances, televisions and radios 1 
Tires and inner tubes 1 
Commercial and stock savings banks 1 New York 
Security brokers and dealers 3 
Installing building equipment, nec 1 
Ohio 
Motor vehicles and car bodies 1 
Tennessee Motor vehicles and car bodies 1 
Wisconsin Paper industries machinery 1 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the 
Census, Foreign Direct investment In the United States: Establishment Data for 1987, Washington, 
D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992, pp. 643-665. 
 
We expect that the states attracting more Japanese FDI would prefer a liberal investment policy. 
This point is particularly important to understand the different actions or reactions of local 
government’s in the United States. For example, when an Oklahoma representative voted in favor of 
the Omnibus Trade Bill, an editorial in the Daily Oklahoman criticized his vote, warning “don’t be 
surprised if Oklahoma doesn’t land another Hitachi plant right away.”447 Another fact is that Senator 
James Exon who proposed the Exon-Florio amendment comes from State of Nebraska where only 
employed 385 workers were employed by Japanese firms in 1987, while Japanese firms in California 
employed 85,804.448 Then, was it economic interest consideration that led California to first refuse 
to propose the regulation FDI bill, although the Fujitsu-Fairchild case took place in California? 
An econometric examination of the relationship between FDI and individual’s policy preference 
may help us distinguish various opinions on the benefits or cost of Japanese FDI in different 
states.449 In the late 1980s, we has examined many polls of individual’s viewpoints on foreigners, 
especially the threat of Japanese firms by state. Based on interest maximization assumption, 
individuals in different industries or owning different factors will not hold the same views.  
 
Model, Data and Measurement 
To test whether Japanese FDI has different influence to House Representative’s voting on 
investment policy and whether different states have different influence on policy, we estimated an 
                                                        
447 Todd Mason, “Hitachi: Winning Friends and Influencing People in Oklahoma,” Business Week, July 11, 
1988. 
448 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census, Foreign Direct 
investment In the United States: Establishment Data for 1987, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, June 1992, pp. 643-665. 
449 There are some works on estimation of FDI and trade’s influence on legislative’s  voting. For example, 
Bruce A. Blonigen and David N. Figlio, “Voting for Protectionism: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence 
Legislator Behavior?” American Economic Review, Vol.88, No.4, 1998, pp.1001-1014; Hugh M. Aree, Robert 
B. Koopman, and Marinos Tsigas, “Using State-Level Simulations in A Political Economy Model of US Trade 
Policy,” Public Choice, Vol.135, 2008, pp.91-107. 
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econometric model as below: 
 
V i =ß 0 +ß 1UER i+ ß 2 AFLCIO i + ß 3 CCUS i + ß 4 psEUA i + ß 5  psEUJ i  
 
Where V i  indicates the House representative’s votes for the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, and 
is calculated by percentage of one state representative’s vote for yeas to total national votes for 
yeas.450 UER i indicates the unemployment rate in state i in 1987, as reported in the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistic’s Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment.451 Variables AFLCIO i and 
CCUS i are the measurement of representatives’ ideology. The American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) ratings measures how closely each politician 
is aligned with labor interests, while the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS) ratings 
indicates how closely each politician is tied to business interests. The information on these two 
variables is drawn from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1988. psEUA i in this equation means 
percentage of affiliate employees in state i to all U.S. affiliates owned by foreigners. psEUJ i  tries to 
single out Japanese FDI, measured as the ratio of employment by affiliates of Japanese firms in state 
i to all Japanese firms.  
Thus, we model the Representative voting in Omnibus Trade Act as a function of the level of 
Japanese FDI, unemployment rate at state level, and Representative’s ideology on free investment. 
Strictly speaking, this model over weighted the role of Japanese FDI, as trade issues account for 
much more weight in the Omnibus Trade Act. Investment issues are only a relative small part of this 
Act. For the purpose of this study, however, this model may help us grasp the extent to which state 
economic situation and Japanese FDI impacts on policy outcomes. In econometric models, the more 
variables included, the more accurately outcomes may predicted. Due to the available data in 1987, 
this model is a very preliminary test. We provide summary statistics for all our variables in Table 4.4. 
                                                        
450 U.S. Congress, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly News 
Features, 1988, pp.76H-77H. 
451 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Geographical Profile of Employment and 
Unemployment, 1987, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988, pp.41-54.  
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Table 4.4 Summary of Variables 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AFLCIO 0.556 0.192 0.130 1.000 
CCUS 0.522 0.184 0.100 0.970 
UER 6.624 2.166 2.50 12.00 
psEUA 0.020 0.025 0.00 0.12 
psEUJ 0.002 0.004 0.00 0.03 
PVOTB 0.020 0.020 0.00 0.08 
     
  
Empirical Results 
Table 4.5 presents the results of calculating the empirical model. Two out of the five regression 
coefficients are positive; three coefficients are negative. It can be observed that unemployment rate 
at state level has a slight positive effect on representatives’ votes on the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988. 
This outcome differs somewhat from conventional wisdom. The problem may lie in the linkage 
between trade, investment, and unemployment rates, on the one hand, and the complexity of the 
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, on the other hand. As discussed heavily in preceding chapters, the 
policy preferences of individuals on FDI issues sometimes is contradiction with trade issues. Thus, if 
trade impacts are larger than investment impacts, then this model overemphasizes the investment’s 
positive impacts on employment creation. Furthermore, the Omnibus Trade Act of 1998 includes 
much broader issues and goes beyond trade or investment.452 Due to the fact that there is no record 
on voting of the Exon-Flori Amendment, this approach only poses a very preliminary estimation. 
The estimated coefficients of the degree of unionization and business contribution have 
somewhat same negative signs, especially the business coefficient. The business groups’ reaction is 
consistent with political economy literature, which emphasizes the internationalism of 
                                                        
452 In many works related on U.S. trade politics, scholars would like to delete this Act. See, for example, 
Michael J. Hiscox, “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization,” pp. 
691-92.  
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globally-oriented firms. Although the positive coefficient of unemployment rate and negative 
ideology on pro-labor is difficult to explain, the estimated coefficient of the variable AFLCIO is 
insignificant. Another possible shortcoming of this research is that the FDI data is not calculated at 
congressional district level due to a lack of information.  
The level of all FDI and Japanese FDI has dramatically different impacts on representative’s 
voting on 1988 Act. In particular, Japanese FDI has a significant negative impact on representatives’ 
voting. This point may further prove the judgment that Japanese FDI has its own unique 
characteristic compared to other western countries’ FDI in the United States.  
 
Table 4.5 Coefficient Estimates of Empirical Model 
Variables UER AFLCIO CCUS psEUA psEUJ Adjusted 
R 2  
F-test 
Coefficients 0.001 **  
(2.109) 
-0.021 
(-1.569) 
-0.027 *  
(-1.966) 
0.888 ***  
(14.569) 
-1.011 ***
(-2.823) 
0.904 93.618 
*  Significant at the 10 percent level 
**  Significant at the 5 percent level  
***  Significant at the 1 percent level 
 
Although this research is preliminary, it still provides some insights and possible reasons to 
discuss the Japanese FDI and sub-national level policy action. First, FDI has stronger influence on 
House member’s voting on 1988 Trade Act. Second, somewhat different from total FDI in the United 
States, Japanese FDI at state level helps to decrease protectionism. Third, the economic situation of 
states also affects member’s voting. Forth, ideological factors also matter. Those members who voted 
pro-business tend to vote against 1988 Trade Act. These findings not only reflect the economic 
consideration to votes and states interest, but also produce broader social concerns of politicians.   
 
 
4.3 State Competition: Policy Liberalization 
Although at a national level, the declining hegemony position leads to relatively similar 
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reactions to trade and FDI, the domestic politics is different. As discussed in Chapter 1, the domestic 
distributional effects of FDI and trade are somewhat different. In the trade area, tariff changes have 
little effect on the final cost to the consumer. That means consumers have no strong incentives to 
influence policy making. However, producers who need to import may be damaged under the high 
tariff so that they will against it. On the other hand, those exporters gaining from low duties may 
favor liberal policies. The trade politics at domestic level mainly take place between these two 
groups. In discussing FDI politics, the distribution of benefits and costs are different.  
The above econometric estimation also illustrates the different state policy reaction to Japanese 
FDI. To local government, FDI is more positive than central government as it brings out capital and 
jobs. Thus, states has competed Japanese FDI with each other during this period.  
This section discusses what power the states possess, relative to central government, in the issue 
of FDI, why some states were more concerned over Japanese FDI issues, and to what extent 
Japanese FDI entry changed institutions at the sub-national level.   
 
 
4.3.1 The Federalism 
Sovereignty has its economic origins and is related to rights of property. From military function 
underscoring feudalism to taxation for war, sovereignty gradually evolved from landownership to 
modern sovereignty. Modern nation state must deal with their internal affairs to win the external 
competition. In this sense, sovereignty is an institution designed to formulate internal and external 
relation with individuals in the domestic sphere and other nation states at the international level. To 
win war outside its own territory, state must mobilize efficiently. Domestic mobility of economic 
forces is widely considered much higher and much more important than movement at the 
international level. Thus, the problem of how to produce domestic mobility of welfare is important 
to decision makers. Sovereignty’s internal relations with the individual, as R. G. Hawtrey outlined 
nearly 80 years ago, is that  
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The State, like the family, is the embodiment of a code of motives. Its function is to 
influence conduct. But it exerts its influence along three discrepant channels. To those 
who identify themselves with it, it is a wider family, claiming allegiance and conferring 
benefits. To those within its jurisdiction it is a rule imposing its will by compulsion and 
threat of force. Finally to all concerned it is a rationally constituted instrument of 
organized action, to be controlled, regulated and directed as expediency may indicate, 
and to be valued and supported in proportion to its usefulness.453  
 
State exerts its influence through these three separate lines. The first is a survival of a primitive 
religious bond, while the third is modern rationalization. The second is more difficulty and 
challenge for state. How people accorded with state in national interest mostly depends on the 
public services state provides as well as foreign threat.  
The sovereignty of the United States is unique. The American form of sovereignty reflected the 
Founding Fathers’s political philosophy on liberty and democracy. In the United States, people prefer 
to talk about liberty rather than democracy. The independence is the most important value to 
American. Earlier immigrations from Europe to America had two main purposes: liberty and 
welfare.  
Federalism as a political institution strongly reflected the balance of these two aims. From a 
political economy viewpoint, the federal provision served to protect economic arrangements for 
national economic elites. The prohibition protected these elites from too great an influence by the 
masses through state legislatures. It also functioned as one of those checks “against the excess of 
democracy”. Thus, the contract clause both secured economic interests for the national elite and 
protected “political order” in such a way as to discourage mass challenges to elite power. Power 
                                                        
453 R.G. Hawtrey, Economic Aspects of Sovereignty, London, New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and 
Co, 1952 [1930], p.32. 
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distribution between the state and federal affected who wins and who loses in the competition to 
acquire political power, conduct business, and amass wealth.454 
International forces also contributed much to the formation of federalism. The war against the 
British helped the 13 colonies concentrate power in the federal government. Before the ratification 
of the U.S. Constitution, every state carried out its own trade policy, negotiating separate trade pacts 
with foreign nations. Britain used this institutions obscure to negotiate with states against a unitary 
national strategy in federal government.455 As a result, the founding fathers agreed with little debate 
that Congress should have the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations.”456 And the 
Constitution specifically grants trade power to Congress, “No state shall, without the consent of 
Congress, lay any imports or duties on imports or exports.”457 In Robert Reich’s words, “This 
unprepossessing clause in Article I become the charter of our national economy.”458 
From a purely legal standpoint, it is the national government that is charged with foreign affairs. 
The constitution grants broad authority to the executive branch for the president to conduct the 
country’s foreign affairs, while sharing the treaty-making power with the Senate. Furthermore, the 
states are specifically denied the common powers of international relations: “No State shall enter 
into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation… No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress…enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign power…”459 
In institutional historian Edward Corwin’s words, the powers that the Constitution confers to the 
States are “police powers,” while the federal government exercise its power to make treaties.460 The 
power distribution between state and federal governemnts evolved with welfare production and 
political power equilibrium. As Corwin remarked,  
                                                        
454 Christopher Hamilton and Donald T. Wells, Federalism, Power, and Political Economy: A New Theory of 
Federalism’s Impact on American Life, Englewood: Prentice Hall, 1990, pp.95-6. 
455 Edward S. Corwin, National Supremacy: Treaty Power vs. State Power, pp.23-7. 
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   The treaty-power is but one item of national power. The construction of it, the scope 
given to it by Constitutional Law, will be found to have tended to vary with those of the 
other principal items of national power; and with the measured swing of the pendulum 
from emphasis in the Federal period upon national rights to emphasis upon State rights…. 
and with the swing back again in the succeeding generation….461 
 
Since then, the responsibility for foreign trade policy was lodged in the federal government. For 
a relatively long period, trade policy was both economically and politically simple. The policy 
instrument used by the central government was tariffs. Evaluating changes in trade policy was 
simple, since those changes were reflected directly in increases or decreases in the tariff rate on any 
given line-item in the US Tariff Schedule. Politically, the situation was simple as well. The tariff was 
widely seen as a key issue in domestic distributive politics. Congress controlled the political process 
of tariff making. 
Under this condition, the evolution of trade regime lay in the cooperation and conflict between 
Congress and the executive. With the growing importance of U.S. economy in the world economy, 
the trade policy experienced change. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the RTAA of 1934 significantly 
changed the institutional structure of the U.S. trade policy making. RATT gave the President the 
right to negotiate tariff reductions. Thus, agenda-setting control was removed from the Ways and 
Means and Finance Committees to the President. At the same time, Congress sought to constrain the 
President’s authority in three ways: it set limits on the degree of tariff-cutting authority; it granted 
the tariff-cutting authority for a fixed and relatively short period of time; and it sought to find an 
effective institutionalization of the executive’s commitment that the tariff-cutting process would 
entail “no serious injury” to domestic economic interests. The last constraint became the basis for 
                                                        
461 Ibid., p.7. Italic is original. 
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domestic politics of foreign trade.  
Even so, the state’s shadow on commercial activities still matters. During the period of two 
World Wars, states began to gradually become more involved in international commerce activities. 
The competing concepts of federal supremacy and states’ rights have always been brought into sharp 
focus in the field of commercial regulation. The states also control commerce, and their power to do 
so is circumscribed by the Constitution. The commerce clause is a double-edged tool. Positively, it 
invests Congress with power; it also has a negative cutting edge which sets limits to state regulation 
and taxation.462 
In the years following the Second World War, the hegemonic position of the United States 
enhanced its national powers. However, the “New Federalism” began to rise with the staggering 
federal deficit and debt since the 1970s. President Reagan proposed “New Federalism” in the earlier 
1980s, which helped “bring questions about the health of the federal system into public debate.”463  
This fragmentation in turn limited the power of the national government and left economic 
forces relatively free from bureaucratic interference. State governments were hardly divorced from 
economic activity; they were responsive to emerging economic interests. As Louis Henkin writes, 
 
The principal influence of the states in foreign relations derives from the constitutional, 
decentralized, federal framework of government and the political forces that animate 
it.…where foreign affairs begin to touch the states, whether in their particular economic 
interest (as in issues of free trade versus protectionism), or even in small matters of pride or 
prejudice or principle, the plenary powers of the national government take on all the colors 
of federalism.464 
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4.3.2 New Economic Realities 
The power that Congress owned to regulate foreign commerce was gradually challenged by 
international economic integration. In 1977, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International 
Affairs C. Fred Bergsten told Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that the U.S. economy has 
became intertwined with the world economy, “it is thus immediately clear that the economic 
interests of the United States can be served only through effective integration of our domestic and 
international economic policies.”465 Integrated domestic affairs into the international economy could 
not avoid the growing responsibility of states.  
Inward Investment policy in the United States was introduced in the 1970s due to the expansion 
of OPEC oil dollars and rise of multinationals from the Europe and Japan. Thus, international 
economic integration gradually influenced U.S. domestic politics in the FDI field. Up to that point, 
the economic development of regions had not been constrained merely by traditional production 
factors fixed in the location, such as resource, land, and labor, rather it also depended on the degree 
of involvement in globalization. FDI is an important pivotal of globalization changed the factor 
prices and competition advantage. Thus, to local states in the United States, it has to participate into 
this global production system and value-added chain to compete with each other.  
At the same time, constrained by trade and fiscal deficits, state governments could not get 
enough capital from the federal government in the 1980s. From the depths of the Depression of the 
1930s to the late 1970s, scholars had debated hotly on the division of governmental responsibilities 
between the federal government and the states. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration called for 
major cuts in federal domestic spending. The push for smaller budgetary deficits at the national level 
had dramatically slowed the flow of funds from the federal to the states. According to the U.S. 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, as a percentage of state and local 
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government outlays, federal assistance dropped from 25 % in 1981 to 19 % in 1987. This tax reform 
accelerated transformation in federal-state fiscal relations, and formulated intergovernmental 
relations as “fend-for-yourself federalism.”466 
This new federalism produced profound impacts on state government. According to a study 
finished by Paul Brace, national level and state level forces accounted for equal proportions of the 
total change in per capita personal income in the period of 1980-1985.  Furthermore, his study 
found that institutional capacity and economic development policies supported economic growth 
within states. Those states best organized politically appeared to be more capable of competing 
economically.467 Thus, subnational governments needed the capability and incentives to find new 
economic development dynamics. Under these conditions, FDI became an alternative capital source 
these states.  
Many states and localities in the United States offer incentives including tax exemptions and 
targeted investment in infrastructure. However, incentives are just a small part of the success of the 
United States in attracting foreign investment. It is the investment climate in the United States, based 
on strong legal institutions, an open economy, an educated and productive workforce, and an attitude 
that welcomes foreign investment that has made the United States’ success in attracting FDI possible. 
Under these conditions, states must adjust theirs strategies to attract specific FDI. As national level 
environment is common to all of foreign investors, while one kind of FDI definitely located in 
subnational areas. Taking account of location advantage, foreign investors will rationally consider 
which state is more suitable for development. 
Thus, states activities in international economic policy were mainly driven by two reasons: on 
the one hand, internationalization provided new incentives to states; on the other hand, the federal 
government could not continue its fiscal support. These two reasons provide capability and 
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willingness for local governments to participate in international economic activities. In attracting 
FDI, state governments have some policy instruments, among them mainly are tax priority, financial 
assistance and employment at domestic level. At the same time, most of states began to dispatch 
their overseas offices to extend their economic interests.  
Corporate income taxes vary in rate and structure between states in the United States. In 1987, 
for example, five states exempted corporate income form direct taxation, while 45 states taxed 
corporate income at rates ranging from 3.4 percent to 12 percent. Some states impose taxes on the 
basis of world wide unitary tax systems rather than U.S.-based profits, including Alaska, California, 
Indiana, Montana, and North Dakota. James Hines in his 1996 study presents evidence that in the 
United States, states tax rates have significantly negative influence on the location choices of new 
businesses.468 In his view, all of other things equal, state corporate tax rate differences of 1 percent 
are associated with differences of 9-11 percent in shares of manufacturing investment.  
Another mechanism influencing location of Japanese FDI is that the United States and Japan 
are in the same international tax systems. This system can help to avoid double taxation through 
foreign tax credits. For example, if a Japanese investment in the United States that earns a profit of 
$100, it is taxed by the United States at the statutory tax rate of 10 percent. The net corporate tax rate 
in Japan is approximately 40 percent. The firm pays $10 to the U.S. government and has an 
obligation of $40 to the Japanese government, but it can claim a foreign tax credit of $10, reducing 
its net obligation to the Japanese government to $30.  
Fiscal decentralization led state to look for new revenue sources. States became stronger and 
more capable through their own economic development strategies. In the early 1990s, one of these 
arguments noted that “the states would be clearly and unequivocally in charge of human services, 
improving the skills of the labor force and upgrading most public infrastructure. Economic 
development, sometimes known as ‘industrial policy,’ would be the hallmark of activist governors 
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and state legislative leaders.”469 
Although a national industrial policy is difficult for the United States to accomplish, the 
state-centered nature of public policy left each state with the occasion to develop a growth 
management policy.470 The role of state governments in setting the framework and terms for 
economic intercourse within their boundaries has been inherent in their legislative and regulatory 
powers throughout the nation’s history. Given the traditionally beneficial effects of economic vitality 
on political longevity, it would seem likely that state politicians would pay attention to promote the 
economic growth of their regions. Major economic development projects included state government 
participation as far back as the early nineteenth century, including such basic infrastructure needs as 
the building and expansion of canals, turnpikes, and railroads. Following the Second World War, 
these agencies focused on industrial growth. Most development programs reflected three types of 
objectives: (1) expansion of already existing in-state industry; (2) attraction of out-of-state industry 
broadly; and (3) deliberate diversification of the state’s economic base through encouragement of 
specific industrial sectors.471 
Since the 1970s, the amounts and kinds of incentives provided by state and local governments 
to firms began to increase significantly. The most prevalent of these were tax breaks, 
low-interest-rated loans, site improvements, and direct grants. The Wall Street Journal reported that 
such incentives “exploded to unprecedented levels” in the 1980s.472 For example, Tennessee is one 
of the United States’ poorer states in terms of per capital income. Thus, foreign capital is critical to 
its economic development. In 1985, the state government spent $12 million for new roads to the 
Nissan plant and $7 million to help train plant employees. Furthermore, in the site of Nissan plant, 
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Rutherford Country gave a $10 million tax break.473 In considering such actions, we should 
remember that government intervention has been crucial to the development of the economy since 
the days of Alexander Hamilton.  
The new reality in the 1980s was that these new policies offered high incentives in an 
unparalleled scope in American history. With more and more states offering controversial tax breaks 
and even free land to lure big Japanese companies, Newsweek magazine called this competition was 
the “war between the states”.474 According to Kenichi Ohmae, “these states compete for foreign 
investments, transfer of attractive technologies, creation of jobs…they are competing among 
themselves within the United States or within North America.”475 In this regard, national borders 
became less important to specific regions in creating assets. Policies focused on boundaries, such as 
tariff, quotas should leave room for more specific state and local policies determining where to 
investment. 
With their increasing involvement in international business, the objectives of states on 
international promotion programs change. In contrast to trade, whereas states and the federal 
government commonly pursue export expansion through cooperative means, the states’ activities in 
attracting FDI may go beyond the U.S. federal government’s policy objective in international 
controls on investment incentives. Thus, in some detailed cases, it is expected to see confliction 
between the federal government and the states.  
Thus, local government actions in the investment area pose some difficulties for this U.S. 
policy position and negotiating initiative. As Bergsten recognized, “In the United States, many of our 
own laws, regulations, and policies affecting international investment have been carried out 
unilaterally, without full consideration of their international dimensions. Our own states and 
localities often extend incentives that attract investors from abroad, as well as domestic 
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investors.” 476  The Constitutional ambiguity and government practices worked in favor of 
subnational involvement overseas. As mentioned above, governmental authority is constitutionally 
divided among the national and local governments. This provides the states with their own 
constitutionally derived spheres of authority or reserved powers. In a study in 1983, John Kline also 
noted, “some friction may occur between the two government levels as state programs become more 
institutionalized in areas where there is an ambiguous boundary defining state and national 
action.”477 As a result, the states’ activities will affect the level of achievement of national policy 
goals, especially its international contracts and agreement obligations. 
The conflict between the federal and local states on foreign direct investment interest continued 
into the 1990s. Globalization created different economic incentives for the federal government and 
subnational governments. To the federal government, FDI entry probably poses challenge to 
technology priority or economic security consideration; to local government, it means important 
employment and revenue. Thus, states have the motivation to change the federal attitudes in some 
specific cases. The problem is deeply rooted in the America political system, as one observer 
criticized, “although critics see several problems with allowing 50 states to compete openly for 
foreign investment, any attempt (legitimate or not) to restrict such competition would be attacked 
immediately as an unconstitutional infringement on states’ rights.”478 In discussing Tennessee’s 
efforts to recruit Japanese investors, the Tolchins also stated that, “it is a conundrum of the American 
federal system that the states have taken the lead on the issue of foreign investment while at the 
national level public policymakers remain curiously inactive.”479 
In 1991, Robert Reich even argued “what is needed is a shift of authority over global 
investment, from states and cities to the federal government. What little authority the federal 
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government now exercises over global investment is negative.”480 In Reich’s view, the United States 
must improve its governance on investment compared with other nation’s increasing competition. 
Furthermore, he suggests that the federal government should establish an agency like USTR to deal 
with invvestment issues. 
 
 
4.3.3 Case Studies: Great Lakes Region and California 
Economic development leads to geographic concentration of economic activity. In the case of 
the United States, the regional pattern of economic activity also altered considerably. In the middle 
19th century, industry was concentrated in a manufacturing belt that included New England, the Mid 
Atlantic states, and the Great Lakes region. In the late 1980s, economic growth in the United States 
had shifted the locus of economic activity to the south and west. Despite the ongoing delocalization 
of industry, economic activity in the United States remains highly concentrated geographically. In 
1990, the 100 most economically active US counties accounted for 41.2 percent of US 
manufacturing employment, but only 1.5 percent of total US land area. 481 Thus, industry was still 
highly concentrated in and around a few major cities.  
Almost parallel to regionalization of economic development in the United States, international 
economic integration also spread into the United States. Since the early 1970s, the United States 
began to experience significant inflows of FDI, which added a new dimension to domestic economic 
development activities. In a General Accounting Office survey, only ten states were found to have 
committed budgetary resources to attracting FDI before 1969. Twenty-one states began active 
promotional efforts in the period of 1969-1975, while fourteen more began in 1975-1978 period. By 
the time of the 1979 survey, only three states reported no active program to encourage foreign 
investment.482  
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Alaska was the first state to receive postwar Japanese investment when Alaska Pulp 
Corporation was established as the first Japanese-affiliated company in Alaska. In 1965, Alaska 
responded to the growing importance of economic ties between Alaska and Japan by being the first 
state to open a trade office in Japan. In 1970, the Japanese government opened a consulate office in 
Anchorage to meet the demands of an increasingly important relationship. This office was upgraded 
to a Consulate General office in 1982, as the relationship flourished and gained even further 
significance.  
Most American states have international affairs offices that promote investment by offering a 
wide variety of services and information for companies interested in investing in their state. Many 
states even maintain offices in cities abroad to encourage trade and investment. Since the 1970s, 
states in the U.S. began their overseas competition for FDI. 33 states had offices at Tokyo in 1990. 
Among them, Illinois departed another office at Osaka, San Bernardino, California departed an 
office in Tokyo.483 Indeed, more American states maintained offices in Tokyo than in Washington, 
D.C. by the 1980s.484  
 Based on the previous analysis, we will attempt to examine briefly two cases to illustrate the 
attitudes of states which attracted the most Japanese FDI. Under the condition of new federalism and 
new economic realities, the states had the ability and willingness to change role in American 
international economic activities and the policy followed by this interaction.   
 
Great Lakes Region 
The Great Lakes region (which includes Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) is 
the automobile center of the United States. Prior to the 1960s, the Big Three automakers (General 
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Motors, Chrysler, and Ford), which are headquartered in the District, had a substantial stronghold on 
vehicles produced and sold within the United States. The automobile and steel industries are 
overwhelmingly important in formulating the Fordism production system and contributed to 
American hegemony. In James Kurth’s words, “it was the American, who with an almost 
single-minded, first took this path.”485 The American mass manufacturing way is the result of 
domestic competition and leads to overseas production. The expansion of the American production 
system would lead to technology spillovers. Japan’s lean production system also established a 
successful automobile industry. Since the later 1980s, these two production systems had to transmit 
into flexible specialization and global production network.486  
From the Great Lakes region, we can see the story of the competition and cooperation of these 
two industries and two production systems. The capital vs. labor logic would change with the 
sophisticated technologies and the growth of other new industries. In the earlier days the “political 
consequence” of these two industries is plentiful capital to compete for labor with agriculture or 
textiles. Since the 1970s, these two industries competed not only for labor but also capital for the 
most advanced industries. The transformation of this process is complex and needs more detailed 
study.487 Here, we only give a bird’s-eye view.      
Japanese corporations invested massively in steel plant and equipment from the 1950s through 
1970s. It caught up with U.S. steel output by 1975 and surpassed it in the early 1980s. Contrary to 
U.S. steel industry’s emphasis on short-term financial returns, Japanese investment created a highly 
automated modern steel industry. And it also was adopted a just-in-time production model in 
accordance with the automobile industry development. Japanese investment in U.S. integrated steel 
production reinforced an ongoing locational shift from the traditional Monogahela Valley toward 
automobile-related steel production in Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana in the 1980s. Japanese industry 
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has transformed the American steel industry.488  
American steelmakers required Japanese capital and technology to rebuild domestic steel 
operations. In the early 1980s, obtaining Japanese capital and technology became a survival strategy 
for U.S. steel units. For example, National Steel’s American managers lobbied against a proposed 
merger with U.S. Steel, while welcoming NKK’s investment were a way to rebuild their steel units. 
The United Steel Workers Union also accepted Japanese investment.489 One of the main reasons can 
be attributed to the increased local content in Japanese-affiliated automakers. According to GAO, the 
U.S. content of output by Japanese owned U.S. automobiles increased from 38 percent in 1988 to 50 
percent in 1989.490  
To compete with Japanese automobile makers, the United States manufacturers learned to 
cooperate and stimulate. According to GAO, the United States local suppliers used licensing 
agreements and joint ventures with Japanese affiliated suppliers, and established a representative 
presence in Japan to increase its ability. As a result, the local content increased. “The success of U.S. 
parts and component suppliers in selling to the Japanese-affiliated automakers would enhance their 
competitiveness worldwide, including their ability to sell to Japan.”491  
The influence of Japanese automobile makers on U.S. industry had profound significance. As 
one observer noted, “many of the changes taking place today in the U.S. auto industry—lean 
manufacturing, just-in-time inventories, and so on—are a result of efforts by U.S. manufacturers to 
compete with Japanese transplant operations.” Given that the job creation and new technologies and 
skills shift resulted from FDI, the author suggested that the federal and state policies should “foster 
and maintain international ties.”492  
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California 
California has a long history with Japan. In the early 20th century, probably the general 
impression held in California towards Japan and the Japanese was negative. California adopted a 
discriminatory alien land bills over national government objections and Japan’s protests. These 
incidents were brought to mind in the 1970s when urgent pressures again helped prevent the 
enactment by California of legislation restricting Japanese commercial activities. About one-third of 
Japanese FDI in the United States had been located in California untill the end of 1970s. However, 
the projects were small in size compared with other countries’ FDI, and used low technology. In 
those days, “there are no limits imposed by the federal government on investment incentives offered 
by the states,” although economists criticized that transferred income from taxpayers to private 
investors.493 In addition to some advantages all the states possessed in common, California had its 
own merits. California itself was a big market in the United States with a 10.2 percent of total U.S. 
population in 1978.494 Beside the size of big market, California has no “local content” rules with 
regard to output product by foreign firms, and no export requirements.  
California was the leader at luring foreign investment. It offered many kinds of incentives to 
foreign investors, including tax free industrial revenue bonds. Under guidance of Tokyo office, 
Japanese companies can get permits from the federal. Another way to assist foreign companies is 
export finance. For example, the Sanyo Corporation in San Diego once took advantage of this fund 
from California’s World Trade Commissions to export some of its products.495 
In terms of banking, California is among the most important locations for Japanese 
multinationals. The location of international trade and strong economic factors are the main reason 
for Japanese to choose California. The Japanese banks increased from 10.7 percent of all California 
banking assets in 1982 to 25 percent in 1988, and replaced the British as the dominant foreign 
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banking power in the California market.496 The surge of foreign-owned banks challenged to some 
U.S.–owned banks. The International Banking Act of 1978 subjected to interstate banking 
regulations. Although foreign banks are subject to the same laws that apply to domestic banks, some 
domestic banks argued that they are at a competitive disadvantage because they can not operate in 
another state. Furthermore, the close ties with home country nonbank subsidiaries in the United 
States were regarded as negative effects to U.S.-owned banks.   
California’s critics focused on its worldwide unitary tax system to multinationals. California 
used the average of a company’s payroll, property and sales in the states as a percentage of its 
worldwide one to determine its taxes. The underlying premise of the unitary tax system is that each 
component of a unitary business contributes proportionately to the income of the whole. This 
worldwide method was criticized by Japanese multinationals. According to critics, use of the 
worldwide unitary tax method by a minority of states interferes with the conduct of the United States 
foreign economic policy. In 1985, under pressure from Japan, Assembly’s Revenue and Taxation 
Committee of California issued Senate Bill 85 to revise unitary taxation. This new legislation would 
allow multinational corporations to use either the worldwide method or a “water’s edge” approach 
that bases the tax on a percentage of the company’s profits on its United States operation. However, 
this bill was defeated by a domestic coalition of multinational companies.497 In 1986, the California 
legislature passed Senate Bill 85.  
The problem of separate accounting system and identifying arm’s length transactions between 
affiliates was especially serious due to the fact that broader Japanese production networks lead to 
Japanese firms increase in the United States. As one observer noted,  
 
Unitary worldwide combination takes into account the activities and income of all 
members of a unitary business group to determine the California tax liability of those 
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members of the group that are subject to California's taxing jurisdiction. In many 
instances, a foreign parent's income and activities will be involved in such a calculation. 
That has offended not only foreign corporations, but their governments as well. The 
United Kingdom and Japan have been especially vociferous in their objections to the 
demands the unitary method imposes upon them.498 
The worldwide unitary system obviously influenced foreign economic policy in the United 
States. For example, in August 1993, many foreign countries, including Japan complained about 
California’s world-wide unitary system.499 Foreign countries threatened the Clinton administration 
with a tax war unless California restructured its corporate tax system. If President Clinton had 
supported California’s use of the worldwide unitary method, it might have a trade or tax war with 
foreign governments.  
For the state of California, the strong negotiation force vis-a-vis federal government is product 
of the federalism. In the earlier days of the United States, the saying “No Taxation without 
Representation” was well-known. In fact, as observers noted that “tax policy is one of the last 
bastions of a state’s sovereignty. It is significant that one of the blows struck against that sovereignty 
came from foreign interests. George Washington’s concern was forgotten.”500 California holds 54 
seats in the House of Representatives and maintains state’s rights in commerce activities. The White 
House had to balance its action between foreign economic policy concerns and an electorally crucial 
state. This paradox is not new, in fact, Presidents Reagan and Bush both actively supported 
foreigner’s concerns.  
The administration’s authority and obligation to speak with one voice in setting and 
implementing the foreign economic policy was challenged by California’s policies. As the Wall 
Street Journal suggested, “it is time for the Clintonites to urge the California legislature to consider a 
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retreat toward tax policies that more befit an American state than a sovereign government.”501 On 
September 10, 1993, the California legislature passed, and on October 6, the governor signed Senate 
Bill No.671, which allowed the companies to select “water’s edge” or worldwide unitary method. As 
one observer stated, it is “a significant turning point in terms of creating economic incentives for the 
California business community.”502 
The huge stock and active operations of Japanese FDI in California reflected and somewhat 
contributed to the shift in the United States’ economic center from Atlantic to Asia Pacific. In the 
1990s, two contrasting views highlighted the future of California’s economy.503 The first view, 
supported by most mainstream economists, argued that California would benefit from the emerging 
globalization. California is a vital channel for between East Asia with America. In contrast to the 
trade deficit of the U.S. with East Asia, California obtained much due to the fact that 40 percent of 
trans-Pacific trade passed through California’s air-and sea-ports.  
On the other hand, the more pessimistic argument mainly emphasized the negative effects that 
resulted from the federal defense cuts. Although the share of defense spending in California’s gross 
state product had fallen from 14% in 1970 to 8% in the late 1980s, California economy would be 
affected much due to the fact McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed had transferred defense work out of 
the state. Despite these two conflicting views on the future of California, all admitted the importance 
of trade and investment to California. Also, the relationship between the U.S. business cycle and the 
California economy is quite loose. Thus, some scholars argued that California needed to deal with 
economic policy based on its own foreign linkage.   
The unique linkage of the California economy with that of the United States requires a 
rethinking of the state’s foreign policy. This view was widely echoed. For instance, tn his 1992 
article “California’s Foreign Policy” published in Foreign Affairs, columnist James Goldsborough 
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argued, 
 
California is so big, and its problems so immense, that it needs its own foreign policy. In 
an era when economies command foreign relations, this does not mean embassies and 
armies, but it does mean more trade offices and state agents in foreign countries, its own 
relations with foreign nations and a governor and legislature willing to represent the 
state’s interests independently of Washington. California is a distinct region within the 
United States and needs greater freedom to act on its own—not to thrive, but as this 
devastating recession has shown, just to survive.504 
In summary, California had to increase its own strategy in a new era. Thus, it should balance its 
relations between the federal government and outside world. The Constitution defined the policy 
division between the federal government and the state: the states look after the health, safety and 
welfare of their citizens; they do not make treaties, regulate commerce or declare wars. However, 
things changed during the past two centuries. The world economy has significantly influenced the 
health, safety and welfare of citizens. In the early 1990s, California was the seventh economy in 
world, and its largest markets targeted to Japan, Canada and Mexico, respectively. Two-thirds of the 
state’s foreign trade was with Asia. It is obvious that the Pacific Rim had became more important to 
California.505 Thus, “like an independent nation, California must depend on its own wits to manage 
its future.”506  
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Chapter 5 Investment Asymmetry, Trade Linkage and International 
Economic Policy Coordination 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the United States uses bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy to adjust to investment problems. As a hegemonic power in the world 
political economy, the U.S. has the capability and willingness to manage economic conflict with its 
political partners. In the direct investment field, the U.S. has more policy control experience than 
Japan. As a consequence, the interest maximization cultivated by U.S. multinational led to serious 
pressure on the American government to seek overseas markets. In the 1980s, perhaps different from 
the earlier American affiliates in Europe, the emerging firm alliance between Japan and the United 
States not only brought with it interest conflict, but also produced mutual interest. This kind of 
mutual interests between U.S. and Japanese firms became a unique feature and challenge to bilateral 
as well as multilateral relations. 
In this chapter, we will see what kind of policy instruments was used by the U.S government at 
the international level to adjust to the investment friction. Based on investment asymmetry and trade 
linkage characteristics of Japanese FDI, policy makers believed that policy coordination between the 
U.S. and Japan redistributed their benefits from investment mobility. Furthermore, the U.S. 
government wanted to bring Japanese multinationals into a international investment institution 
framework. They created trade-related investment measures in the Uruguay Round of GAT to 
regulate the flow of direct investment. 
International investment institutions are important to help us understand how the U.S. dealt 
with the increasing mobility of direct investment. After the Second World War, the United States 
established many international institutions to maintain and expand its national interest. With the 
break down of the Bretton Woods system, many scholars in IPE argued that states had gradually lost 
authority in confronting economic globalization, because states need to open their doors to receive 
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outside economic resources for economic growth and efficiency improvement. In this chapter, 
however, we will see the process of globalization is still under the control of a strong state. The 
United States not only rearranged its domestic politics resulted from economic distribution, but also 
expanded its interest scope through international institutions. Specifically, under the leadership of the 
United States, the international community created regimes in the Uruguay Round to regulate direct 
investment. A hegemonic state wants to create investment regimes to serve its own national interest, 
although this process also creates mutual interests shared by other states. The question that needs to 
be probed is how the United States created international regimes to reduce investment friction with 
Japan.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we will introduce the fact that 
investment asymmetry existed between Japan and the United States, and how this situation created 
policy coordination demand in the United States. In the second section, we will illustrate the bilateral 
negotiations that resulted from the Japanese FDI as well the trade deficit between the United States. 
Direct bilateral negotiations on FDI framed only in the Clinton Administration. Japanese two 
“externalities”—asymmetry and third party in South East Asia to increase its investment in the 
U.S.—led to the creation of international institutions in investment. In the third section, we will 
examine the motivation, process and result of policy coordination between the United States and 
Japan.  
This chapter will note that the difference between Japanese capitalism and the United States 
capitalism led to their divergent preferences on international institutional design. To cooperate in 
investment field, these two states had to alter their policy preferences. Due to the fact that the U.S. 
and Japan controlled most direct investment and their dominant positions in world economy, this 
international institution adjustment should be desirable not only to the U.S. and Japan, but also to the 
international community. Thus, international investment institutions only partly used to solve 
investment friction problem. Its emerging normative end was used to control the pace of 
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globalization.    
 
 
 
5.1 Japanese Government and its FDI in the United States 
The main purpose of this section is to find out the implications of Japanese policy on the 
linkage on Japanese investment and trade. As discussed in Chapter 2, Japanese FDI was not a 
substitute for bilateral trade with the United States. In other words, the more FDI Japanese 
multinationals invested in the United States, the more products were imported from Japan. Thus, an 
important question is whether this issue linkage was a political problem, and whether it was created 
by Japanese government policy. 
 
 
5.1.1 Investment Asymmetry and Trade Imbalance 
Japanese competitiveness mainly comes from its manufacturing sectors. In his speech in 
February 1992 delivered at Chicago, business strategist Kenichi Ohmae provided a series of data on 
the economic structure of Japan and pointed to only 13 percent of the Japanese workforce engaged in 
strong competitive industries. In detail, Ohmae stated that “the belief that Japan in general is 
competitive is a complete fallacy….those included in the 13 percent are engaged in industries which 
are export-oriented and therefore we can hide all this weakness.”507 In fact, only some industries 
had stronger international competitiveness. The reason why perception on Japanese competitiveness 
hided the actual weakness facet partly was resulted from American pressure. Ohame continued to 
state that, “the Japanese people don’t realize this because President Bush comes to Japan with all 
those CEOs asking us to buy more from them and saying, ‘We are in trouble.’ He emphasized the 
weak industries in trouble, giving most Americans a feeling of humiliation. And it gave the Japanese 
an unnecessary feeling of arrogance.”508 
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The 13 percent of competitive industries were dominated by Japanese multinationals. As 
analyzed in Chapter 2, Japanese firms that invested directly in the United States owned firm 
advantages and international strategies, which is different from its predecessors in the South East 
Asia in the 1960s. In contrast to other Western countries’ FDI in the United States, Japanese affiliates 
imported much. In other words, intra-firm trade other than arms length trade contributed to Japanese 
industry competitiveness. According to Robert Lawrence, who has done a very in-depth study of this 
matter, “in 1986, Japanese affiliates in the U.S shipped 58.4 percent of all U.S. exports to Japan back 
to their Japanese parents. By contrast, U.S. affiliates in Japan imported from their parent companies 
only 13.6 percent of all Japanese imports from the United States.”509 Traditionally, general trading 
companies operated the majority of intra-firm import shipments in Japan. Government policies 
played a role in promoting this kind of monopoly. With the rise of manufacturing industries, 
Japanese FDI played this role. 
In public and policy circles, the view was held that Japanese FDI in the United States 
contributed to the expansion of the trade deficit between Japan and the United States. Charlene 
Barshefsky, at the time Deputy United States Trade Representative, stated in 1993, “Japan’s lack of 
receptivity to foreign investment serves as a trade barrier in today’s global economy, in which 
investment pulls trade.” The outcome of low stocks of FDI in Japan contributed low levels of trade 
between foreign firms and Japanese subsidiaries.510 On this point, E.D. Ramstetter and W.E. James 
shared the similar views: “there is no doubt that bilateral imbalances, in particular the persistent 
Japanese trade surpluses with the United States, are politically important and influence economic 
policies.”511 
Defeinitely, one of the reasons to promote the unbalance is the linkage between affiliates and 
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domestic firms. William E. Franklin, the president of American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, in a 
speech in Tokyo, pointed out that “in 1989, it is still easier for a Japanese company to start up a new 
business in the United States, than it is for a U.S. company to start up a new business in Japan. We 
won’t solve our trade deficit problem until conditions change so that it is as easy for a new company 
to start business in Japan as it is for a Japanese company to start business in the United States.”512 
Robert Lawrence also argued that, because foreign firms were highly depended on Japanese 
distributors for sale of their products in Japan, imports were complementary with interests of 
Japanese domestic companies may easy enter.513 The striking feature of Japanese affiliates’ imports 
raised the problem of whether market openness may increase U.S. affiliates’ import share from home 
country? 
In this regard, firm strategy must balance its local market as well as global market. The 
importance of alliance between American and Japanese multinationals used to explain Japan capital 
liberalization by Dennis Encarnation and Mark Mason. The two authors argued that it was not U.S. 
government pressure that led to Japan capital liberalization in the later 1960s; rather it resulted from 
Japanese private oligopoly’s demand, as well as foreign multinationals’ pressures. Since the early 
1970s, “the private oligopolists replaced government agencies as the principal impediments to 
market access by foreigners.”514  
Government liberalization policies affected and were influenced by competitive markets. Given 
a starting point, we can judge which factor is most important. In the real world, factors were used in 
conjunction with each other. An alternative is to focus on which kind of actor we want to emphasize. 
A firm should take every measure to win market share or increase profit, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
For a government, policy instruments are different. In a democratic regime, well-organized and 
strong societal groups not only expressed their policy preferences in public, but also pressure 
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government to support their views. 
Firms were increasing emerged as important actors to influence government’s policy. As 
analyzed in Chapter 1, traditional policy instrument, such as tariff has reduced its function to 
regulate firm behavior. In another words, firm could negotiate with home as well as host country to 
increase their voices. In particular, firm may increase their power under the condition in which 
governments could not effectively deal with friction between inter-states.      
Besides the dramatic difference between Japan and U.S. affiliates, perhaps a much more visible 
fact is the asymmetric situation between bilateral FDI positions. Parallel to the enlarging 
merchandise goods gap is the FDI gap between Japan and the United States. As Table 5.1 shows, the 
historical position of Japanese FDI in the United States has increased more quickly than the 
historical position of U.S. FDI in Japan since the earlier 1980s. Although the smaller gap in the early 
1980s seems less concerning, the gap came to much more obvious since 1987. In 1991, Japanese 
FDI in the United States was three times U.S. FDI in Japan. This enlarging trend was only slightly 
reduced through 1993 to 1995. However, after that time, the asymmetric situation continues to 
expand. 
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Table 5.1 Bilateral FDI Positions, Trade Deficit, and Economic Interdependence between Japan 
and the United States, 1983-2006 (Millions of US Dollars) 
Year JFDI UFDI U.S.GDP JGDP  
JFDI/U.S. 
GDP 
UFDI/JGDP 
Trade 
Deficit
1983 11336 7661 3405100 1186337 0.0033 0.0065  
1984 18044 7936 3777200 1265338 0.0048 0.0063  
1985 19313 9235 4038700 1343251 0.0048 0.0069 -3869 
1986 26824 11332 4268600 1985574 0.0063 0.0057 -5139 
1987 34421 15684 4539900 2408912 0.0076 0.0065 -4115 
1988 51125 18009 4900400 2898393 0.0104 0.0062 -3642 
1989 67265 18800 5250800 2871825 0.0138 0.0065 -3608 
1990 83091 20997 5522200 2932088 0.0150 0.0072 -2850 
1991 95142 22918 5722900 3350137 0.0166 0.0068 -3539 
1992 99628 26591 6020200 3656890 0.0165 0.0073 -3958 
1993 99208 31184 6343300 4190396 0.0166 0.0074 -3917 
1994 103120 34117 6931400 4590940 0.0148 0.0074 -4631 
1995 104997 37309 7397700 5247587 0.0142 0.0071 -4742 
1996 114534 35684 7816800 4635613 0.0147 0.0077 -3733 
1997 125041 33854 8304300 4258608 0.0151 0.0080 -4360 
1998 134340 41423 8747000 3856412 0.0153 0.0107 -4265 
1999 153815 56393 9268400 4368616 0.0166 0.0129 -4589 
2000 163577 59441 9817000 4667257 0.0167 0.0127 -5431 
2001 158988 64103 10128000 4095450 0.0157 0.0157 -5890 
2002 147372 66468 10469600 3918271 0.0141 0.0170 -4729 
2003 157176 57794 10960800 4229225 0.0143 0.0137 -5190 
2004 174490 69076 11712500 4606645 0.0149 0.0150 -5197 
2005 188687 79280 12455800 4548567 0.0151 0.0174 -6170 
2006 210996 91769 13246600 4366380 0.0159 0.0210 -6532 
Note: 1. JFDI donates Japanese FDI in the United States; UFDI donates U.S. FDI in Japan. 2. JGDP 
donates Japan GDP which is transferred by the author into U.S. dollars according to averge of years' Yen 
per US Dollar published by IMF. 3. Trade deficit only includes the U.S.-Japan merchandise trade.  
Source: FDI data draws from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 
August 1988, p.65, Table 29, p. 80, Table 22: August 1992, p.112, Table 16, p.141, Table 17: August 1995, 
p. 84, Table 16, p.114, Table 17; October 1998, p. 60, Table G. 4, p.153, Table 16; September 2002, p. 64, 
Table 16, p. 94, Table 16; September 2007, p.69, Table 16, p.111, Table 16. GDP data draws from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1996, pp.461,791; 2007, pp. 352,602. Trade data draws from 
U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5880.html. 
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Furthermore, JFDI is more dependent on America markets than UFDI is on Japan markets. As 
Table 5.1 shows, during the period from 1985 to 1993, the ratio of Japanese FDI to the U.S. GDP is 
dramatically rising. That shows the importance of America market to Japanese FDI. This kind of 
asymmetric dependence can be a source of power, allowing American government to exercise great 
influence on the Japanese government.  
Moreover, we should take a look at the merchandise trade between Japan and the United States 
during this period. The U.S. trade deficit with Japan can be traced back to 1964, and the first 
bilateral trade dispute took place even in the 1950s. Since 1973, the United States has had a 
substantial trade deficit with Japan. Entering into the 1980s, the magnitude of the U.S.-Japan trade 
imbalance grew dramatically. The industry focus of trade dispute evolved from textiles in the 1960s, 
steel and televisions in the 1970s, into automobiles and semiconductors in the 1980s. There are 
numerous micro and macro explanations on this kind of imbalance. Some argued that the reason can 
be attributed to firm behavior. As analyzed in Chapter 2, Japanese multinationals tend to seek for 
market share rather than profits. Those industries experienced the largest trade amounts are 
manufacturing industries, as Ohmae has already stated.  
On the one hand, the unique firm operation certainly linked to domestic economic structure, 
especially unit labor cost and capital returns. From the entire 1973-1987 period, increases in unit 
labor costs in the United States machinery sector exceeded those in the comparable Japanese sector 
by about 1% annually. During the same period, the annual growth of unit return to capital was 6.3% 
higher in U.S. machinery industries than in the Japanese industry. Overall, firm operation was 
influenced largely by financial institutions. In the United States, managers are expected to achieve a 
high return on stockholders’ equity.515  
On the other hand, it was strictly linked to intra-firm trade. According to the Wall Street Journal, 
intra-firm trade accounted for two-thirds of total U.S. merchandise imports in 1987. The 1987 trade 
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figures showed one-third of U.S. merchandise imports are products manufactured abroad by 
affiliates of U.S. corporations, and another third consists of foreign-made products imported by 
U.S.-based affiliates of foreign companies.516 Although intra-firm trade reflected the new realities of 
international business, it is not easy to measure and acutely grasp these dynamics.   
Centering on this asymmetric situation, some important and related questions need to be asked. 
For example, why did foreigners invest so little in Japan compared to large outward Japanese FDI? 
Did the Japanese government play a role similar to its outward FDI promotion policy? What effect 
does this asymmetric position have on Japan’s trade? Does this asymmetric position produce a 
serious adverse effect on other nations, especially the United States? And finally, what has the 
United States done to address this problem during this period? For the purpose of this study, we are 
more concerned about the U.S. policy response to this kind of asymmetric position. According to 
Thomas Jordan, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, “Why is the lack of FDI 
in Japan an issue of serious concern? Building on the perspective of American companies, the main 
reason is the clearly established linkage between trade and investment.”517 
Would this linkage between trade and FDI influence politics between Japan and the United 
States? Masaru Yoshitomi, in his introduction to a volume entitled Foreign Direct Investment in 
Japan, noted that “the low level of FDI into Japan constitutes one of three principal sources of 
economic friction with the United States; the other two are Japan’s large trade account surplus and 
its low propensity to import manufactured foreign products.”518 Akio Morita, Sony’s CEO, stated in 
early 1992 that “increasingly, sentiment in Japan holds that we have done a great deal to open our 
markets to foreign goods; increasingly, American sentiment holds that Japan is still a closed market. 
In fact, we have done a great deal to change the structure of Japanese trade-and that is one reason 
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why U.S.-based businesses will sell close to $50 billion worth of export goods to Japan this year.”519   
Not all industries contributed to the FDI imbalance between Japan and the United States. The 
most competitive manufacturing industries only contributed half of FDI into the United States, as 
shown in chapter 2. Another strong source of Japanese FDI is in service. In this area, the United 
States still maintained competitiveness. Representative Jim Kolbe, in his speech to the Heritage 
Foundation on October 6, 1994, sated that, “In contrast to trade deficit in merchandise goods, the 
U.S. service sector has been generating sizeable trade surpluses. Between 1986 and 1992, U.S. 
exports of services more than doubled to $179 billion, until now equals 41 percent of the value of 
U.S. merchandise exports in 1992. The U.S. surplus in services trade in 1992 was $56 billion, 
offsetting nearly three-fifths of our merchandise trade deficit of $96 billion. Trade in service clearly 
can be a major job creator in the U.S. economy if properly emphasized and nurtured.”520 
 
 
5.1.2 Strategic Investment Policy and Linkage Politics 
It is well known that American leadership has created the international environment and 
opportunity for Japanese economy development since the 1950s.521 In its early days, consolidating 
allies was more important to American interest for the containment of the Soviet Union than 
complaint to economic friction. The Bretton Wood System provided a stable international economic 
environment to promote U.S. allies’ economic growth. As one of the basic economic activities, 
international investment needs a stable environment ensures free flows of economic factors. As a 
result, foreign direct investment exerted by multinationals increased under the condition in which the 
United States was willing to maintain the open market. With the support of the United States, 
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Japanese economic influence was able to enter into South East Asia, and more importantly obtain 
access to America market. The background of Japanese FDI in the South East Asia was prepared by 
the international security system under the leadership of the United States. 
The economic strategy promoted by the Japanese government also played an important role. 
Beginning with it earlier successes as an exporter of manufactured goods using standard technology, 
through its foray into high-technology exports, and now its increasing dominance of global finance 
markets, Japan has come to rival (and in some areas surpass) the United States as the world’s leading 
economy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is the party of economic growth and global 
competitive success. The party’s general message of growth and international economic prestige is 
reinforced by the incentives to give key industries what they wanted in return for their political and 
monetary support. Once the domestic economy reignited, an export-oriented policy most easily 
harmonized the interests of those firms. Without Japanese FDI, Japan could not make such quick 
economic success.522 
In fact, Japanese government action played a vital role in reducing inward FDI and promoting 
outward FDI. John Dunning noted that the most visible Japanese government action was the highly 
discriminatory policy towards FDI in the first half of the postwar period. With the entry into OECD 
in 1964, Japan began to liberal its capital policies. However, the gradual liberalization of FDI 
policies since the 1970s has not resulted in quite the expected upsurge of FDI. The second aspect of 
government action was its attitude towards technology imports. For much of the postwar period, the 
Japanese government has deliberately limited licensing. Technology licensing was controlled by the 
MITI. The third way in which Japanese government sought to affect inward FDI was through 
industrial and competition policy. By such means the selective protection of domestic markets, the 
support of research consortia, the perpetuation of established institutional mechanisms and 
organizational linkages, the encouragement of oligopolistic competition, and a liberal interpretation 
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of anti-trust laws, both the entry and the operating costs of foreign owned firms in Japan have been 
raised. Since the mid-1980s, various agencies of the Japanese government have actively sought to 
encourage inbound FDI in certain sectors through a variety of incentives. In 1993, the Japanese 
government established Foreign Investment in Japan Development Corporation (FIJDC) to advise 
and counsel potential foreign investors.523 
 Robert Gilpin argued that in the long run U.S. outward direct investment would impair U.S. 
power. The logic behind this argument was that outward FDI compete with domestic investment. 
FDI only contributed to one kind of companies’ interest, while the latter served the American 
economy as a whole through enhancing of value-added production.524 Under this condition, the 
policy implication of economic strategy is that government should encourage trade rather than FDI. 
The context of Gilpin’s statement on the relationship between trade and FDI was based on Vernon’s 
product cycle theory of FDI developed in the 1960s, as discussed in Chapter 2. Since the 1980s, 
however, emerging academic study pointed out the positive relationship between trade and FDI, 
especially the Japanese FDI in the United States.  
The traditional view on the mutually exclusive relationship between trade and FDI was 
gradually replaced by a complementary one. Also since the 1970s, Kojima’s FDI theory based on the 
experience of Japanese FDI in South East Asia noted that government policies strongly influenced its 
operation. Since FDI flows are now acknowledged to encourage exports, and the intra-firm trade 
exceeds arm’s length trade, policies influencing flows of FDI have become as common as efforts to 
promote trade. Government trade policies also may affect the international competitiveness of 
domestic firms. This situation created demand for government policy to regulate FDI. In this context, 
“strategic trade and investment policies need to be seen as two synergistic pillars of state 
interventions to support domestic firms in the global economy.”525 Perhaps a much more important 
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change is the rising unacceptable attitude of the United States to Japan restrictions, this 
transformation is dramatically different from the liberal internaitonal condition which contributed to 
Japan’s economic growth.526   
The expansion of Japanese FDI reflected the fact that Japanese economic power partly 
depended on investments in the United States. Otherwise, to the United States, the challenge from 
the Japanese FDI might be enormous. American companies must compete with Japanese 
multinationals in market shares, profits and technology. Given the significance of the America 
market, Japanese multinationals have paid more attention to the United States since the early 1980s, 
and quickly shifts direct investment to the U.S. after the 1985 Yen appreciation. Despite the 
exchange rate, increasing hostilities in the U.S. toward Japanese companies’ exports and labor costs, 
also pushed Japanese business community to change their market strategies. The result was that 
Japanese had to adopt an international-oriented production strategy. As American University 
Professor Stephen Cohen suggested, “for the first time, Japan adopted an international economic 
strategy identical to one practiced by the United States: major exporters rapidly shifted to large-scale 
overseas production.”527 
In the meantime, measured by capability and willingness, Japan had increasingly emerged as a 
hegemon in East Asia. In Asia, Japanese investments were perceived went beyond American 
subsidiaries and may have diminished foreign investment and other economic opportunities for 
American firms.528 On the one hand, the United States continued to persuade Japan to absorb more 
Asian exports due to Asian new industrializing countries’ increasing exports to America; on the other 
hand, Japan’s investment drove the surge in trade and helped create new flows of products aimed at 
the U.S. market. Moreover, America was afraid that Japanese FDI was creating a regional economic 
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bloc.529 The Asian regional production structure had been changed by Japanese multinationals since 
the 1980s.530 
As mentioned before, Japanese economist Kojima developed a new theory of FDI, and 
emphasized that Japanese-style outward direct investment was trade complementary in the late 
1970s. This new idea about the Japanese outward direct investment was seen to be one part of the 
Japan economic development model. This idea shifted from academic thinking to government policy, 
as an important characteristic of Japanese-style capitalism. The relationship between business and 
government is more harmonious coordinated in Japan. According to Kojima’s acknowledgement, it 
was Okita Saburo, a famous Japanese economist and a foreign minister in 1980, who introduced the 
flying geese (FG) model to world. Okita presented a speech at the fourth Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council conference in 1985,  
 
The Division of labor in the Pacific region has aptly been called the FG pattern of 
development…Traditionally, there have been two patterns or types of international 
division of labor; the vertical division of labor such as prevailed in the 19th century to 
define relations between the industrialized country and the resource-supplying country or 
between the suzerain and the colony; and the horizontal division of labor typified by the 
EEC with its trade in manufactures among industrialized countries, often among 
countries at the same stage of development and sharing a common culture. By contrast 
with both of these types, the FG pattern represents a special kind of dynamism. In the 
Pacific region, for example the United States developed first as the lead country. 
Beginning in the late 19th century, Japan began to play catch-up development in the 
nondurable consumer goods, durable consumer goods, and capital goods sectors in that 
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order. Now the Asian NICs and the ASEAN countries are following in Japan’s 
footsteps.531 
 
Due to Okita’s status, the FG pattern has become very famous and popular not merely in 
academic circles, but also in the political, business, and even journalistic world. The pattern was 
thought to symbolize the Asian way of development that was creating the “miracle of East Asia”.532 
The rise of Japanese FDI was a global phenomenon. In the late 1980s, Japanese multinationals 
strategy was illustrated more clearly at global levels. In Europe, the dynamics of Japanese 
multinationals were also a big challenge to European business practices. The expansion of Japanese 
multinationals really meant the Triad triangle economy in the world economy.533 
The crucial problem that the United States should handle in the 1980s was how to maintain the 
economy gap with Japan. At that time, the economic challenge of Japan was noticeable. Douglas W. 
McMinn, while Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, noted in 1987 that, “Japan 
boasts a formidable array of competitive, export-oriented industries: from pharmaceuticals to 
consumer electronics to financial services. It is the world’s largest creditor, with $180.4 billion of net 
foreign assets at the end of 1986. In fact, Japan has become a first-class economic power.”534 While 
few observers actually deny that a significant shift in economic power and influence has taken place, 
the economic and political implications of Japan’s role as a major trading and industrial power 
remained matters of contention. As Robert Gilpin notes, “the transformation of Japan’s trading and 
financial status has made the question of where an expanding and dynamic Japan fits into the world’s 
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economic and political system increasingly urgent.”535 The problem confronted the United States as 
well as Japan. It was not easy to integrate Japan again in a more competitive world without any 
serious disadvantage to the United States. Although one of the features of United States hegemony 
was to share its power with other important developed countries on some issues, it is very difficult to 
improve its performance in the existing world market. 
On the other hand, Japan was willing to cooperate with the United States in many issues, 
because experience had taught Japan that capitalism was important to its economic growth. Japan 
benefited greatly from its special status in the postwar world. One of its advantages was that it joined 
the principal economic arrangements and institutions (most importantly GATT) and was also 
afforded special status in the American market. Japan was both a “system supporter” and a “free 
rider.” In its supporter role, Japan permitted the economic negotiating process to be dominated by 
American priorities and demands. However, the sore point for Americans is that its advantages in the 
negotiating process seem to have provided only limited benefits, especially on macro-economic 
flows such as trade and investment. 
The second reason was probably the interdependence between Japan and the United States, and 
the importance of the world market to Japan. As Raymond Vernon pointed out “a nation that exports 
a substantial part of its savings and develops a considerable market abroad acquires stature and 
power in the process. Still, as that nation’s stake in foreign countries grows, its autonomy declines. 
Unlike the exploitative hegemon of history, the modern hegemon intertwines its own well-being with 
that of the foreign countries with which it deals. On reflection, that proposition may seem 
self-evident, but it is overlooked too easily.”536 Japan’s transformation from primarily a trading 
nation to a major supplier of foreign direct investment gave Japan both a deeper interest in 
influencing foreign regulatory policies and a new geostrategic interest in the economic stability and 
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friendly political orientations of recipient nations. 537  This had special significance for the 
Japanese-American relationship because the United States was the principal destination for Japanese 
investment capital. 
In sum, the FDI imbalance created an opportunity for government action.538 If the FDI 
imbalance had been wholly caused by market forces, there are no place leaving for government. In 
new classical economic world, disequilibrium can be resolved by the market itself. Market 
competition can reconcile the asymmetric situation through the changed incentives. However, in the 
perception of U.S. strategists, the specific source of Japan’s success can be traced to government 
support. Moreover, the historical development of Japanese FDI had proved that third parties, 
especially the South East Asia, played a role in promoting its expansion to the United States. Thus, 
how to understand the government-business relation became a big challenge to U.S. policy makers.  
 
 
 
5.2 Bilateral Actions: U.S. Demand for an Open Market 
   In this section, we try to illustrate how the United States adjusted its investment and trade 
relations with Japan through bilateralism. U.S.-Japan investment issues were framed into the Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FNC) signed in 1953. The perception that Japan was 
different, especially the relationship between business and government, strongly influenced U.S. 
“Japan economic policy” during this period. Among the various economic schools of thoughts that 
were prominent during this period, the California economic school which emphasizes the U.S. 
government intervention into U.S. economic growth ultimately changed U.S. foreign economic 
policy towards Japan. At the same time, we will see bilateral negotiation could not solve the 
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investment problem, partly because the policy decision making systems in the U.S. and Japan were 
very different, and partly because of the externalities of the investment problem. Japanese FDI in the 
United States greatly complicated the interaction between trade and investment. 
 
 
5.2.1 Earlier Bilateral Managing Way  
The traditional view on investment issues emphasizes the protection of property of investors. It 
originated from European countries’ economic transactions for avoiding risks and uncertainties. The 
extensive and ongoing economic ties between these countries created the demand for guarantees 
against arbitrary seizure or confiscation. During the spreading of this norm, Great Britain played a 
vital role. In this sense, an equal and relatively open access principle that Britain pronounced trade 
policy came to be adopted in modern investment policy. With the rise of the United States since the 
late 19th century, the European powers faced challenges from the United States in the Caribbean 
region. The United States reluctantly recognized those norms that would permit European 
intervention on behalf of injured investors. The First World War and the Soviet Union created the 
opportunity to this accepted norms in international investment. The declining coercive capability of 
investors and their home states, the changing role of less developed countries, and the disorder of 
international financial system led to new norms of the international investment.539 
In the long run, the United States used the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
(FCN) to establish commercial relations with other countries.540 These treaties set the framework 
for U.S. trade and investment relations with foreign countries. Since 1934, the trade issues were 
mainly handled in the RTAA, and subsequently in the GATT enacted in 1948. These institutions 
provided the principal forum for negotiating tariff adjustment and trade liberalization. The FCNs 
were used to liberalize investment.541 They reflected the dominant belief in minimizing government 
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intervention in the decision-making process of individual investors. Perhaps the most important 
reason for the United States to commit to the national treatment principle was based on the 
government’s conviction that foreign investment behavior primarily reflects market considerations. 
However, the general liberal policy of the United States toward investment does not imply neutrality. 
There were a number of safeguards designed to protect essential security interests.  
After the Second World War, the United States decided to revise the FCN treaty and employed 
it to serve government diplomacy strategies. In contrast to its predecessors, which emphasized trade 
and shipping, the reworking of the modern FCN focused on the right of establishment and promotion 
of private foreign investment. The primarily purpose of the FCN was to protect the United States 
investment abroad. The new FCN identifies two principal standards: the most-favored nation clause 
and the national treatment clause. 542 By definition, national treatment of corporations means 
treatment equal with domestic corporations. This change in part reflected the fact that in investment 
areas U.S. economic position was the strongest, in part also reflected the separation between trade 
and investment. 
   On April 2, 1953, the United States signed an FCN with Japan. The motivations and intentions 
of policy makers in the United States was that reviving Japan’s economy would serve their political 
aims. After the Japanese Treaty was ratified, Herman Walker, a leading negotiator for the United 
States, stated that “although the United States may now in general be motivated primarily by 
investment considerations in seeking such treaties, the other side may share this motivation only to a 
secondary extent. For example, the preambles to the treaties with Japan and Germany, in 
summarizing the general purposes in view, list the promotion of commercial intercourse ahead of the 
encouragement of investment…” 543  As a legal instrument, FCN couldn’t guarantee the 
attractiveness of the market to investors. Under the security threat in the Cold War, the negotiation 
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between the United States and other major developed countries could be faster than ever. This 
situation as Robert Gilpin argued in his 1975 book was an exchange between economic interest and 
political protection. This asymmetric situation will lead bilateral treaty less effective.  
With the rise of trade deficit and asymmetric investment, the influence of sectoral economic 
interests became more apparent. Under the influence of domestic political economy, the effect of 
FCN was reduced. As one observer noted, “while the FCN does permit the imposition of trade 
restrictions, the problem arises over the degree to which these might be applied.”544 As a pluralist 
state, the domestic groups and local governments voiced their interest in the federal government. 
Thus, as Walker continued to argue that “the limits of an investment treaty are set by the degree to 
which the United States is willing to bind its own domestic policy and to waive the alien disabilities 
actually or potentially present in federal and state statutes.”545  
In an attempt to promote the free flow of investment internationally, the United States began to 
negotiate Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) from 1981. 546 In contrast to the modern FCN, which 
were directed primarily at developed countries, the BIT was targeted at developing countries. The 
BIT is designed to establish relationships with countries with whom the United States had not signed 
FCNs. Furthermore, the BIT was the only class of United States commercial treaties devoted 
exclusively to FDI. The program was designed to provide certain mutual guarantees and protections 
and to create a more stable and predictable legal framework for foreign investors with each of the 
treaty partners. It includes four core provisions: third party arbitration of investor-to-state disputes, 
compensation standards for expropriation, transfer of payments, and disputes provision. A special 
tenet of the program is to ensure that United States direct investment abroad and foreign investment 
in the United States should receive fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory treatment. Therefore, the 
BIT is the modern successor on the investment side to the FCN series. In comparison with its 
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predecessor, the BIT is far more detailed and provides greater protection for the foreign investor, 
including an investor-to-state disputes mechanism that guarantees to United States investors the right 
to binding arbitration against the host state without the involvement of the U.S. Government.547 
Overall, the FCN was designed to solve the dispute between investors-state, not state-to-states. 
The function of FCN is limited in the new circumstances of fierce international competition that 
resulted from the growth of multinationals. 
 
 
5.2.2 Japan Problem and Unique Japan Economic Policy 
In the late 1980s, “Japan bashing” in the United States was growing. The main point of this 
term is perception of discrimination by the U.S. against Japan. In fact, as one observer noted, “Over 
the course of our nation’s history, America’s anti-Japanese laws, attitudes and acts have become part 
of the normal state of affairs between the nations and peoples of Japan and the United States.”548 
The long history of bilateral relations is an interaction between two very different cultures. Thus, a 
certain amout of friction is unavoidable due to limited communication and crude understanding. 
However, the main cause of “Japan bashing” in the late 1980s was rooted in the economic success of 
Japan. As Stephen Krasner stated in 1986, “the ineffectiveness of policies based on diffuse 
reciprocity and continued Japanese success led American policy makers to adopt specific reciprocity 
in an ad hoc fashion.” 549  An emerging consensus in the United States was that “Japan is 
different”.550  
Centering on the Japan business system, scholars had two general views. The first was more 
based on the new classical economic model, which accepted that Japan was different, but their 
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emphasis focused on its economic phenomena, such as high reserves, low wages, etc. And this 
school also believed that Japan would shift to U.S.-style consumer-driven capitalism. The second is 
known as the “revisionist view”. The term “revisionism” was broadly accepted by academics as well 
as the public, after Robert C. Neff’ article “Rethinking Japan” in Business Week on August 7, 1989. 
551 In this article, Neff listed four prominent figurers on this new thinking, including Chalmers 
Johnson, Professor of University of Berkeley and the author of MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 
Karel Von Wolfren, a Dutch journalist, James Fallows, editor of the Atlantic Monthly and the author 
of Containing Japan, and Clyde V. Prestowitz, a former high official of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and the author of Trading Places.  
This latter school emphasized that “results-oriented” managed trade was essential. The issue 
was not Japan’s alleged unfairness, but rather its unique brand of capitalism. For revisionists, 
“revisionism is a clear improvement over ‘Japan-bashing,’ the previous witless label for any critical 
analysis of the Japanese system”.552 The core of revisionism was that the U.S. government should 
intervene more on economic activities. Although America often acts as if managed trade or industrial 
policy is unacceptable, in practice, the United States already engages in both practices. What they 
need is a slightly theoretical revision and better political propaganda. In the early 1990s, the United 
States policy makers and academic economists reached a consensus on this topic. In his lecture 
delivered at Tokyo in May 1990, C. Fred Bergsten stated “In America, many ‘liberal 
internationalists’—including many mainstream economists—have come to agree that ‘Japan is 
different’ and should be treated differently.”553 
In retrospect, we can conclude that during this period, it was the revisionist view that strongly 
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influenced U.S. trade policy making.554 A 1989 report of the U.S. President’s Advisory Committee 
on Trade Policy and Negotiations stated that, “Japanese government officials have a keen sense of 
where their national interest lies, and when faced with credible threats of retaliation that adversely 
affect that interest, they usually choose to accommodate requests from the United States.”555 The 
Clinton administration economic team, as mentioned in chapter 3, was strongly influenced by this 
new thinking on foreign economic policy.  
The difference between Japanese and American economies mainly concerned “methods of 
corporate governance, financial markets, labor-management relations, interactions between 
government and the private sector, and linkages among companies—the famous keiretsu system.”556 
The core of these differences was a different relationship between business and government. 
State-societal arrangements will strongly influenc the competitiveness of domestic firms. In a 
decentralized society, such as the United States, government policy cannot easily guide industry 
development. The executive may face strong opposition from states, as well as from the national 
legislature and competing bureaucracies. On the other hand, centralized and bureaucratic political 
regimes are inclined to adopt strong government interventionist policies. As one influential study 
pointed out, “In the Japanese variant of capitalism, markets are emphasized as a source of growth 
rather than of short-run efficiency, and a primary role of governing is to supply incentives to promote 
growth through markets.”557 The policy implication of this study emphasized that government 
policy could change resource distribution between the domestic and international markets. Thus, “in 
a dynamic world market, temporary policies to create competitive advantage for domestic producers 
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can have long-term effects that are difficult to reverse.”558  
 With this shift in thinking, the wave helped by empirical findings, the United States 
dramatically changed its policy towards Japan. Building on this perception of difference, there was a 
unique “Japan policy” in U.S. foreign economic policy. As C. Fred Bergsten stated lately, 
 
The United States has conducted a unique “Japan economic policy” during much of the 
period since about 1970. The substantive emphasis of that policy has shifted with great 
frequency, focusing variously on (1) increasing access to the Japanese market, (2) 
restricting Japanese access to the US market, (3) enhancing opportunities for US 
investment in Japan, (4) reducing opportunities for Japanese investment in the United 
States, (5) structurally reforming the Japanese economy, (6) fostering more 
expansionary Japanese macroeconomic policies, (7) pursuing a stronger exchange rate 
for the yen, and (8) seeking Japanese support for US multilateral trade and international 
financial initiatives.559  
     
This brief list illustrates that the core of U.S. economic strategy was to open Japanese market 
and control Japanese economic expansion. For American firms, the Japanese market gradually 
became more important with the rising of the Japan economy. The second largest economy in the 
capitalist world could certainly play a crucial role in formulating U.S. multinationals’ international 
competitiveness.   
 
 
5.2.3 Market Access Strategy: Changing Asymmetry 
In American philosophy, as President Ronald Reagan stated, “free trade is, by definition, fair 
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trade.”560 He stated, 
 
When domestic markets are closed to the exports of others, it is no longer free trade. When 
governments subsidize their manufacturers and farmers so that they can dump goods in other 
markets, it is no longer free trade. When governments permit counterfeiting or copying of 
American products, it is stealing our future and it is no longer free trade. When governments 
assist their exporters in ways that violate international laws, then the playing field is no 
longer level and there is no longer free trade. When governments subsidize industries for 
commercial advantage and underwrite costs, placing an unfair burden on competitors, that is 
not free trade.561 
 
The most important dynamic on opening Japanese market was originally resulted from U.S. 
business groups. Gilpin once predicted, “as the security concerns of the United States in the Pacific 
have receded in recent years, the complaints of American corporations against Japanese policies on 
trade and investment have been increasingly taken into account by public officials in the formulation 
of American policy.” 562 To those international linked corporations, liberalization is the most 
important thing to their survival and competitiveness.  
As demonstrated previously, Japanese FDI did not substitute trade between U.S. and Japan. 
Thus, policy makers in the U.S. realized that one way to reduce the trade deficit was to open the 
Japan market and directly invest in Japan. As Stephen Cohen noted, since the early 1970s, the 
economic problem between Japan and U.S. is  
 
Two unresolved, systemic problems—one originating in Japan, the other in the United 
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States. The first is the unusual difficulties encountered by foreign companies seeking 
access to the Japanese market, even those with an excellent product and a carefully 
crafted marketing plan. The second is the competitive shortcomings of the U.S. industrial 
sector as demonstrated in part by Japan’s record of successfully exporting to the United 
States a succession of increasingly sophisticated manufactured goods.563 
 
The manner in which differences have been handled demonstrates that the globalization of 
production and financial flows may have weakened the sovereignty of governments in some policy 
areas but that politicians remain politically accountable to citizens and bear ultimate responsibility 
for the nation’s economic welfare. 
 
Market Oriented Sector Selective (MOSS,1985-1986) 
In 1985, Japan had become the largest net creditor nation, while the United States became a 
debtor nation for the first time since 1918. Besides demanding market access to Japan, the United 
States also required Japan to stimulate its domestic market for reducing exports to America. The 
MOSS signaled a shift of US focus from restraining Japanese imports in the US to opening up 
specific Japanese markets for American exports. 
On April 7, 1986, after months of deliberation and meetings, Japanese Prime Minister 
Yasuhiro Nakasone revealed the Maekawa Report. This report was developed by a private study 
group on the Adjustments in the Economic Structure for International Cooperation. According to this 
report, the trade surplus were mainly resulted from Japan’s export-oriented economic strategy and 
emphasized that Japan needed to improve its domestic demand. This report illustrated Japan’s 
long-range plans for a truly responsible member of the world political economy. Also, the report 
concluded that “the government obviously has a very important role to play in transforming Japan’s 
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social and economic structure.”564 In Japan, this report received very strong criticism for its utopian 
goals. Japanese argued that the reason of trade surplus was located at the United States side.565 
In the United States, however, this report was highly appreciated. Although the report only 
meant a declaration of intent, it was politically desirable in the United States. The New York Times on 
April 14, 1986, reported that, “the moves are part of a program that the Japanese say they are 
undertaking to shift from an export-oriented economy to one more dependent on domestic growth. 
Officially, Washington is welcoming the new Japanese actions as an important shift in direction.”566 
In Washington’ views, the report behaved a new “industrial policy” for Japan, and marked an 
important move toward the opening of Japan. 
According to George Shultz, Secretary of State in Regan Administration, this report was 
influenced by his speeches delivered in April 1985 at Princeton University. In this speech, Schultz 
called for Japan to save less and spend more at home. Shultz himself stated that,  
 
As an economist and a believer in the benefits of free trade, I worried less about such 
developments than did most people in Washington. If the Japanese, as a 
producer-dominated and protected society, want to pay astronomical prices for goods that 
are cheaper elsewhere, that is more their problem than ours. Our problem—and 
challenge—is to produce goods that are competitive in price and quality. If we are 
worried about foreign financing of investment in the United States, let us increase our 
own savings to finance our own investment. In other words, I felt, if we wanted to see our 
real problem, we should look in the mirror.567 
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The problem since 1985 is not only the conclusion of economic issue, but a political dispute. 
Shultz also admitted that “my years in Washington had taught me that economics is one thing and 
politics is something else.”568 Market access barriers were regarded as the most important unfair 
trade behavior that resulted from Japanese government as well as domestic institutions. It is not 
merely a market mechanism determine the entry cost, but also numerous and complex Japanese 
domestic non-economic factors. 
 
Structural Impediment Initiative (SII, 1989-1990) 
In May 1989, USTR Carla Hills labeled Japan, India, and Brazil as unfair traders under the 
1988 Trade Act, subjecting them to possible sanctions if their import barriers were not lowered 
within eighteen months. It looked like a trade war was brewing when the Japanese government 
charged that the United States was undermining international accords by threatening unilateral action 
against its trading partners. This kind of trade policy was once labeled as “aggressive unilateralism” 
by Jadish Bhagwati.569 In fact, in John Ruggie’ words, Super 301 “would not have been adopted 
were it not for Japan,” and it reflected “a growing consensus in U.S. political circles that Japan’s 
domestic structures, policies, and practices keep Japan’s market relatively sheltered against foreign 
competition and boost Japan’s exports.”570 Japanese officials refused to negotiate trade issues with 
the United States while under threat of unilateral sanctions.  
At the same time, the Bush Administration launched the Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) 
negotiations with Japan. These negotiations ended in June 1990 and covered a striking variety of 
subjects. As SII demonstrates, the massive load of items on the negotiating agenda includes issues 
normally reserved to the independent decision of sovereign nations. Many issues covered by the SII, 
in fact, should have been solved internally by Japan’s own efforts. Due to the vested interest and 
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political selection institution in Japan, the LDP could not persuade societal groups to give up their 
excessive protectionist demands. On the other hand, the fundamental macroeconomic cause of the 
trade imbalance excess consumption in the U.S.  
During the SII talks, the Japanese side also made a range of suggestions. These included such 
things as the substantial reduction of the budget deficit, changing the short-term orientation of 
corporation management, improvement of the product-liablity system, and the adoption of the metric 
system. Many of these objectives are politically and socially difficult to achieve. On FDI, as Eiichi 
Nakao, the minister of MITI, stated in his speech delivered at the Foreign Policy Association and the 
Japan Society, in New York on May 3, 1991, “about foreign investment, especially about Japanese 
investment in this country, there are, of course, those who worry that it is detrimental to the United 
States. Restrictive regulations have been introduced in Congress, and some have even become law.” 
Minister Nakao mentioned that Japanese affiliates in the United States contributed an impressive 
24.5 billion dollars, or 7.6 percent, to the U.S. exports in 1988. This performance was the largest 
share among foreign groups in the U.S., four times more than the second-largest Canada contribution. 
Also, Minister Nakao pointed out that the joint venture between Toyota and General Motors 
contributed to the improvement of U.S. productivity. 571   
Cooperation presumably would take place when two sides could manage their differences by 
working voluntarily together towards compatible ends through combined efforts in which there are 
political conditions that require equal bargaining, mutual adjustment, trade-offs, reciprocity, and 
genuine negotiation. As Robert Keohane has written, cooperation “requires that the actions of 
separate individuals or organizations—which are not in preexistent harmony—be brought into 
conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination.” He later notes this means 
that “when cooperation takes place, each party changes his or her behavior contingent on changes in 
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the other’s behavior.”572  
It is hard to find many Japanese-American exchanges which fit this description of cooperation. 
Instead, as reduced to its basics, the political process linking these two countries has been 
authoritative and demanding: the United States prescribed what changes were required and, minimal 
deferential adjustment was made by Japan. Subsequently there was a great deal of real and 
sometimes feigned recrimination and conflict. The process becomes a game of political 
brinkmanship.573 This situation also was described by the U.S. side. Congressman Frank Horton, the 
ranking member of the Government Operations Committee, in his letter to the Committee on the 
Judiciary on April 28, 1992, stated that, “The talks plod along. Progress plods along. But in no way 
does progress on these talks keep pace with the problems posed by increasing trade deficits. Nearly 
30 years ago we recorded our first trade deficit with Japan—about $235 million. We initiated talks 
with Japan at that time. Several hundred billion dollars in accumulated trade deficits later, growing at 
a rate of between $40 billion and $ 60 billion each year, those talks continue.”574 
Shifts in relative power capabilities as a result of uneven economic growth are always difficult 
to accommodate. As Robert Gilpin once wrote, “the astounding rise of Japan in the latter decades of 
this century has brought to the fore the crucial issue of power transition and economic 
adjustment.”575 The problem for advanced states is that who would take responsibility for the 
adjustment costs. As one observer noted, “the underlying tension is rooted in disagreement between 
Japan and the United States over how best to understand and adjust to a rapid shift in relative wealth 
and economic power.”576 
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1993 July Framework for a New Economic Partnership 
    The Clinton administration launched the U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic 
Partnership on July 10, 1993.577 The Framework was a combination of the MOSS, the SII and 
sought results oriented “benchmarks” for measuring progress. The basic objectives of this 
framework were to create “balanced and mutually beneficial” new economic relationships between 
the United States and Japan. A new heading “Economic Harmonization” was specified to “address 
issues affecting foreign direct investment in Japan and the United States” as well as intellectual 
property rights, access to technology and long-term buyer-supplier relationships between companies 
in the two countries. This was the first time that the United States government tried to balance FDI 
between two countries through bilateralism. On October 5, 1993, Joan E. Spero, Under Secretary for 
Economic and Agricultural Affairs, also the chairwoman of “Economic Harmonization”, stated again 
that the United States was “looking at ways to achieve greater foreign direct investment in Japan, to 
allow U.S. firms to break into long-term Japanese buyer-supplier relationships.”578 
   The main purpose of this recent negotiation was to open Japan’s markets for particular 
products or alter its economy. In this “results oriented” framework, the Clinton administration 
attempted to combine specific sectors and structural changes in Japan’s economy. The framework 
talks covered five categories: increasing Japanese government procurement of foreign products; 
changing regulations that impede market access; “other major sectors,” aimed at increasing sales in 
Japan of foreign autos and auto parts; economic harmonization, address issues that make it difficult 
for foreign concerns to buy land or companies in Japan; and implementing existing trade accords.579 
 For the United States, the Japanese market is very important to help revive its domestic 
economy. The President Bill Clinton pointed out in his speech at Waseda University on July 7, 1993, 
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“our first international economic priority must be to create a new and stronger partnership between 
the United States and Japan.” This new partnership, as Clinton envisaged, should improve the 
balance and create a symmetric situation, by a broader negotiation framework covering trade on 
macroeconomic, sectoral and structural issues. Clinton acknowledged that Japan should not be solely 
responsible for trade balance. However, he said its government promotion policies lead to this gap. 
As Clinton noted, 
 
It is impossible to attribute this trade imbalance solely to unfair Japanese barriers from 
governmental policies to a unique distribution system. Indeed, it is part simply a tribute 
to Japanese abilities to produce high-quality competitively-priced goods and to the skill 
of Japanese businesses in piercing so many overseas markets including our own. Yet, it 
is clear that our markets are more open to your products and your investments than 
yours are to ours. And it is clear that governmental policies consistently promoting 
production over consumption, exports over domestic sales and protections of the home 
market contribute to this problem.580 
 
The growing interdependence between Japan and U.S. created the dilemma for policy makers, 
and leading to multilaeral ways. As discussed in Chapter 1, how to distinguish who is the America 
national economy is very difficult. As Raymond Vernon once stated, “the Japanese and U.S. 
economies have become deeply intertwined over the past decade. Indeed, with hundred of billions of 
dollars of Japan’s assets in the U.S., each country has a hand on the other’s throat. Threatening Japan 
in the press makes no sense than threatening a first strike in nuclear politics.”581 Susan Strange 
rejected the view which takes the economic ranking or capability of the nation and is bounded by 
territorial frontiers. In her view, “It is not therefore to be measured by the volume and quality of the 
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goods and services produced insider USA but more accurately by the goods and services produced 
throughout the world economy by corporations acknowledging the authority of the US government 
in Washington. The ‘American economy’ is thus far larger and more extensive than the American 
nation, or the territory of the USA.” 582 The reasons were based on the facts that many economic 
discussions between Japan and the United States involved substantial interests of other countries, as 
well as incompatible Japanese and American styles of conducting their bilateral discussions. 
According to Vernon, multilateral institutions are “superior to the bilateral channels of Japanese-U.S. 
relations” for the development of policy and the settlement of disputes.583  
 
 
 
5.3 Investment Issues at the Uruguay Round of GATT 
In this section, we try to illustrate the relation between economic interests and international 
institution building in the FDI area. There are two approaches to discuss the relationship between the 
hegemon and international regimes. One argument takes the hegemonic economic power as a 
prerequisite in maintaining a regime. Another influential school considers that institutions have their 
own functions even after hegemony declines. However, it is still depend on the relations between 
economic power and origins of institutional institutions.   
Investment issues at the Uruguay Round of GATT provide us with a case to test the relation 
between power and institution in world political economy. As far bank as the late 1940s, the United 
States attempted to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO), including the investment 
issues in its charts. Constrained by domestic business groups’ opposition, however, this initiative was 
not submitted to Congressional ratification. Nearly half a century later, investment discussions were 
put on the table again at the Uruguay Round of GATT.  
In September 1986, the Uruguay Round of GATT moved part of the regulation of FDI policy 
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into a multilateral forum. The Uruguay Round added three “new issues” of services, trade-related 
investment and intellectual property into GATT. These issues were largely concluded by December 
15, 1993, and formally concluded at the final Ministerial Meeting at Marrakech, Morocco, on April 
15, 1994. The three new issues integrated into GATT marked a crucial new phase for international 
trade rules. 
    Here, we are concerned with the relationship between U.S. international institutional strategy 
and the Japanese FDI problem. By introducing Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) in the 
Uruguay Round, the United States reshaped the GATT and balanced its asymmetric economic 
relations with Japan, even reconstructed the world economy. During the TRIMs negotiation, the two 
countries debated extensively on the purpose and scope of the TRIMs. This section proves that key 
countries’ activism is important for international institution building. International level negotiations 
are an alternative information exchange and accommodation mechanism for bilateral disputer. 
Moreover, international obligation to liberalization was used to as an instrument or signal for 
comforting domestic political pressures.  
 
 
5.3.1 Integrating Investment Issue into the Uruguay Round   
The most significant characteristic of the world economy since the Second World War was the 
growth of international institutions. The rise of the Bretton Woods System was supported by 
American hegemony and influenced this hegemony. In Richard Gardner’s words, the Bretton Woods 
system was a “political miracle” that was essentially created by Anglo-American enterprise. He 
summed up succinctly that,  
 
The ‘miracle’ was only possible because it was accomplished at the end of a war, when 
public opinion could be mobilized in the hopeful enterprise of building a better world, and 
because both countries were led by men of vision, surrounded by dedicated 
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internationalists of great intellectual ability. We may well ask ourselves how we can create 
the conditions for a similar ‘miracle’ as we face the task of future institutional adjustment 
without a war in a world where a consensus must be sought between dozens of countries, 
not just between the United States and Britain.584  
 
In the process of building the Bretton Woods system, ideological conflict between the Western 
and the Soviet Union was not important. As Robert Pollard argued, the Bretton Woods system was 
not designed to punish the Soviet Union; rather it attempted to reutilize the international economy. 
585 In this sense, we should keep in mind that Bretton Woods system was essentially framed as a 
way to facilitate hegemonic transition and manage the Atlantic economic relations. 
In the FDI area, America’s hegemonic status requires it to keep a relatively open international 
investment policy. After monetary affairs that were mainly resolved between Britain and the United 
States, trade and investment negotiations were launched. The U.S. negotiators attempted to insert, 
restrictive business practices and employment practices, and establish provisions designed to protect 
private foreign investment into what was to be a document on trade. The chairman of the U.S. 
delegation, Clair Wilcox, described the process briefly: “In response to suggestions made by such 
bodies as the National Foreign Trade Council and the National Association of Manufacturers, the 
inclusion of an additional article on international investment was therefore proposed by the 
American delegation at Geneva.”586  
However, the developing countries’ negotiators insisted that members had the sovereign power 
to determine foreign investment policy, and should put domestic policy goals over international 
standards for investment policy. The emphasis on economic development over property protection 
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triggered opposition to FDI issues in the ITO from U.S. multinationals. Eventually the plan to 
integrate investment into trading system was abandoned. The failure of the ITO was largely caused 
by the United States domestic politics, especially the business community’s opposition.587 
On the other hand, it also provided an opportunity for the United States to exercise flexible 
action in investment choices. As illustrated in chapter 3, the major U.S. multinationals’ FDI flowed 
into developed countries, such as Europe, Canada, and others. The developing countries’ position to 
U.S. multinationals was not so important compared to developed countries. Based on security 
linkage, as Gilpin argued, the United States government played a vital role in helping U.S. 
multinationals expanded into the Europe. Because of the domination of U.S. multinationals and 
because of its geographical distribution in the developed countries, the failure of investment in ITO 
did not prohibit the expansion of U.S. multinationals. 
Since the 1970s, the United States realized that it was impossible to bear the burden of 
leadership in the world political economy. The domination of United States multinationals in FDI 
had been challenged by European, and then by Japanese multinationals. In 1974, the Canadian 
government established the Foreign Investment Review Agency to manage inward FDI, in that time 
mainly from the United States. Since then, there were some disputes between the United States and 
Canada. The United States required other countries to open their doors and receive the reciprocity 
principle used in trade. Thus, before the 1980s, the asymmetry of regulations on FDI provided an 
opportunity to U.S. to reconstruct the balance of global economy. 
Despite the global demands during the 1970s for regulation of FDI, it could not be conducted 
without the support of the United States. By December 1974, the UN Commission on Transnational 
Corporation was born with the aim of manage relationship between multinationals and countries. 
Partly due to its hard emphasis on sovereignty, it could not get support from developed countries. 
Their declaration on nationalization, expropriation or transferring ownership of property strongly 
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challenged the interests of U.S. multinationals. The United States did not support this action due to 
its own strong legislation that resulted from firms’ lobbying. The United States opposed the 
international foreign investment code suggested by the “Group of 77” developing countries. Thus, at 
the end of the 1970s, developed countries, developing countries and socialist states remained sharply 
divided in international investment policy. 
As early as in 1970, Charles Kindleberger proposed a “GATT for Investment”. He suggested 
that “although there is little hope for a resurrection of an ITO-type code, it seems likely that a 
contractual arrangement could be developed agreement on a few fundamental concepts of substance 
and procedure.” Ten years later, when the investment treaties were separated into the OECD track 
and United Nations track, Kindleberger believed that “many issues would have to be returned to 
national or bilateral diplomatic action.”588 This judgment tells us half of the story of the 1980s. 
However, it began to change since the Uruguay Round.  
The next initiative of the United States concerning on trade related investment issues in GATT 
can be traced back to 1982. In March 1982, the United States managed to make investment a matter 
of significant importance at the Tokyo Round when it referred to Canada’s regulation of U.S. 
investments. The United States argued that employment requirement, local content and export 
performance in Canada was inconsistent with Canada’s GATT obligation. The GATT Panel ruled 
that specific trade related measures taken by Canada were consistent with Canada’s rights. Thus, 
the US-Canada investment dispute was the first motivation for U.S. action in multilateral level.589  
The subsequent Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada, which was 
signed in January 1988, partly resolved the bilateral FDI problem.590 The topics of FDI in this 
agreement set an example and provided models for the Uruguay Round. In April 1986, USTR, 
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Clayton Yeutter, declared before the Senate Finance Committee that the U.S. objective with regard 
to FDI was “to produce a Canadian policy environment as open to inflows of foreign direct 
investment as is our own.”591 Canada also required secure access to the American market for its 
products. In the spring of 1987, Canada rejected U.S. Treasury’s strong stand and broader 
requirement on this issue. In the end, the United States realigned negotiation objectives. U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury James Baker III, played an important role. He proposed the kind of 
binding, supranational tribunal that met Canada’s demands. In October 1987, negotiations on 
bilateral FDI concluded. The U.S. Congress and Canadian Parliament passed legislation approving 
the FTA with an effective date of January 1, 1989. Although both countries granted national 
treatment to each other, there were significant exceptions to this principle. Nevertheless, the FTA 
helped Canadian investors ensure that “no matter what restrictive policies the United States chooses 
to espouse in the future concerning FDI, they will generally not apply to Canada.”592 
However, the case of Canada and the United States could not easily be applied to other 
countries. Even in 1985, the figure for overall American control of all nonfiancial Canadian 
corporations still reached 21%. In retrospect, the agreement was a small step towards a North 
American Free Trade Agreement. It is an experiment of U.S. regionalism in confronting economic 
revival in the 1990s. Due to non-tariff barriers in Japan, the limits of FTA as a solution to 
U.S.-Japan bilateral trade imbalance are even greater.593 Moreover, as one observer noted, this 
agreement, 
 
Demonstrated the difficulties of negotiations between a major exporter and a major 
importer of foreign investment, although this negotiation was eased considerably by 
Canada’s increasing role as an exporter of foreign investment. In the Uruguay Round, 
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differences between exporters and importers of foreign investment are more profound than 
those between Canada and the United States, and as a result negotiation of this issue has 
been difficult and slow.594   
 
The increasing dispute between U.S. investors overseas and developing countries was another 
reason to propel the U.S. government to require an investment framework at the Uruguay Round.595 
U.S. government agencies, especially the Departments of Treasury, State and Commerce, the USTR, 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States were 
all concerned with U.S. investors’ overseas investment interests. They wanted the Uruguay Round to 
deal with this issue. 
With the launching of the Uruguay Round in September 1986, it covered four negotiating 
groups related to FDI issue. Among them, the (TRIMs) agreement is very important to help us 
understand the U.S.-Japan coordination on the FDI problem during this period.596 One part of this 
importance is reflected into the fact that the Japan-U.S. investment and trade problem was one of the 
biggest political as well as economic challenges at that time. Certainly this kind of trade was mainly 
focused on goods, not services. Although FDI in service areas was increasing, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, it was still not the focus of public concern at that time. Any serious discussion on 
investment and trade problem had to be established on the foundation of adequate empirical data. 
Even in the mid 1990s, there were still no enough data on service trade during the negotiation period 
of the Uruguay Round. 597 Furthermore, the United States maintained strong competitiveness in 
service. In other words, the trade conflict between the U.S. and Japan was focused in merchandise 
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trade. Thus, TRIMs is the center for my analysis in this section.  
The inclusion of TRIMs in the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda was part of a careful 
compromise. In the Ministerial Declaration of Punat Del Este, stated on September 20, 1986, issues 
on investment were drafted as follows, “following an examination of the operation of GATT 
Articles related to the trade-restrictive and trade-distorting effect of investment measures, 
negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further provisions that may be necessary to avoid 
such adverse effects on trade.”598 John Jackson, a leading GATT scholar, noted in early 1987,  
 
Investment questions are very complex. For centuries there have been many various 
kinds of international activity on investment questions such as compensation that is 
owned when property is expropriated or taken. Many countries in GATT opposed putting 
this heavy burden under the GATT umbrella. A compromise resulted that limits the scope 
of the investment measures that will be discussed in the GATT to those called TRIMs.599 
 
In the subsequent months, the Uruguay Round held a series of meetings dealing with 
organizational questions. The Negotiating Group on TRIMs, chaired by Tomohiko Kobayashi, 
Japan’s ambassador to the European Community in Brussels, drafted a Negotiating Plan. On 
January 28, 1987, the Negotiating Plan advised three stages on negotiations: first, identifying 
negotiating objectives; second, distinguishing some principal stages of the initial phase; and third, 
subsequent negotiating process.600  
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5.3.2 Two Types of the TRIMs 
The formal negotiations on TRIMs were based on proposals by participants that served as 
working documents of the discussions. During the period from 1986 to 1990, twenty-seven 
proposals on TRIMs were discussed. Among them, the United States proposed nine documents, 
while Japan submitted three (see Table 5.2). The last U.S. proposal was submitted on January 24, 
1990. From May 18, 1990, the first Chairman’s Draft was circulated around the Negotiating Group. 
On December 21, 1991, the Dunkel Draft, containing a draft text on TRIMs was circulated. 601 The 
concluding context of TRIMs in WTO is based on this text. 
 
Table 5.2 U.S.-Japan Submissions on TRIMs Negotiation, 1987-1990 
Year Document Date Document Source Document Number 
4/1/1987 United States MTN.GNG/NG/12/W1 
4/1/1987 United States MTN.GNG/NG/12/W2 
1987 
6/12/1987 Japan MTN.GNG/NG/12/W7 
2/9/1988 United States MTN.GNG/NG/12/W9 1988 
6/9/1988 Japan MTN.GNG/NG/12/W12 
2/6/1989 United States MTN.GNG/NG/12/W14 
7/71989 United States MTN.GNG/NG/12/W15 
1989 
9/13/1989 Japan MTN.GNG/NG/12/W20 
1/24/1990 United States MTN.GNG/NG/12/W24 
5/18/1990 Chairman’s 1st Draft  
7/19/1990 Chairman’s 3rd Draft MTN.GNG/NG12/W27 
1990 
12/3/1990 “Draft Final Act”  
1991 12/20/1991 Dunkel Draft  
Source: Treence P. Stewart, ed, The GATT Uruguay Round, pp.2075-77. 
 
For the purpose of this study, we are more concerned about the proposals submitted by the 
United States and Japan, not the other negotiators. The subsequent “negotiating process” on this 
measure illustrated the crucial thinking on Japan-U.S. trade and investment problem. At the initial 
stage, TRIMs attracted little concern compared to two other new issues. The reason was mainly 
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because there were no comparable negotiation experiences in the previous rounds of GATT. In the 
earlier 1980s, “negotiations on investment measures were launched with little prior discussion in 
GATT, and for many countries virtually without warning.”602 For developing countries, they feared 
losing of control over a key area of national economic sovereignty. Even in the United States, it did 
not reach consensus on negotiation, as “powerful industry lobbies, critical to eventual acceptance of 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round, maintained unremitting pressure for substantial agreements on 
services and intellectual property. They never showed comparable interests in the negotiations on 
trade-related investment measures.”603 
However, the importance of TRIMs evolved with the U.S.-Japan bilateral negotiation on 
asymmetric situation in FDI and trade. As demonstrated above, the U.S-Japan trade deficit and 
investment asymmetry were among the most serious political problems in the United States in the 
late 1980s. Another factor directly related to investment issues was that the United States, European 
countries, and Japan accounted for four fifths of total outward FDI. Without their concerns, the 
TRIMs could not make sense and be integrated in the Uruguay Round. Moreover, the key problem in 
institution building is how to accumulate and communicate information on the past behavior of 
players. The repeated negotiation behavior in the U.S. and Japan is a critical step helping to frame 
the focal point of the TRIMs negotiations. 
Prior to the first meeting held on April 2, the United States submitted two papers on April 1, 
1987 with procedural suggestions for the negotiating group. The first paper only contained 300 or so 
words and suggested that delegations “should identify categories or types of trade restrictive and 
distorting effects which they consider to result from investment measures, together with how they 
believe these effects should be addressed through the operation of relevant GATT Articles.”604 In 
the second, much longer paper (1700 or so words), the United States emphasized its objective on 
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TRIMs was to reduce “the trade restricting and distorting effects of investment measures.”605 
After the GATT Secretariat accepted the U.S. proposals and issued “Past Discussions in GATT 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures” on May 18, 1987, the United States submitted a third 
proposal on June 11, 1987 before the second meeting held on June 15. In this submission, the United 
States defined three general effects of TRIMs: (1) prevent, reduce or divert imports by limiting the 
sale, purchase and use of imported products; (2) restrict the ability to export by home and third 
country producers; and (3) artificially inflate exports from a host country, thereby distorting trade 
flows in world markets.606 Specifically, the United States listed local content requirements, local 
equity requirements, trade balancing requirements, technology requirements, licensing requirements, 
remittance restrictions, manufacturing requirements, and incentives. 
The list provided by the United State was very broad and comprehensive, to match its goals. It 
sought to secure an environment more favorable to its businesses by establishing certain 
international rules, an endeavor of which the TRIMs dispute was just one part. As one observer 
commented, “the United States regards the TRIMs exercise as part of a holistic approach aimed at 
reforming and revamping the GATT through a major revision of its legal framework..”607  
The motivation of the United States to launch FDI issue into the Uruguay Round reflected the 
trade and FDI interests involved. With higher involvement of investors’ interests and the asymmetric 
position between Japan and the United States, it seemed advantageous to expand the scope of the 
reciprocity principle into FDI. In October 1987, the United States International Trade 
Administration’s Office of Multilateral Affairs estimated that Trade-Related Performance 
Requirements imposed on United States investors abroad decreased United States exports by 0.7 
percent, or $1.6 billion in 1987.608 As directly dealing with the business affairs, lawyers supported 
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this negotiation. For example, Robert S. Rendell, at that time chairman of the American Bar 
Association, in late 1987 stated that “the American Bar Association can express its support for the 
effort by the United States to provide a means within the framework of the GATT to reduce or 
eliminate Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) that result in significant distortions of 
international trade and investment flows.”609  
Again, we need to emphasize that the United States began to realize the complex relationship 
between trade and FDI. Thus, the argument that the TRIMs were the outcome of North-South 
friction is not completely correct. We should keep in mind that the developing countries only 
attracted a small amount of FDI. According to one study, only 6 percent of all overseas affiliates of 
U.S. companies were affected by TRIMs.610 As quoted in chapter 2, Peter Drucker wrote that the 
relationship between trade and FDI has changed since the 1980s. In July 1987, Secretary Baldridge 
stated in a hearing that, “I believe…. that today in this interdependent world economy, investment is 
trade, and trade is investment. You can not separate the two. So any action we take on investment, 
we have to look on as affecting trade.”611 
   The general position of the Japanese negotiators in the Uruguay Round was also ambitious and 
reflected the economic success of Japan in the new international economy. It was well summarized 
by Hajime Tamura, head of the Minister of International Trade and Industry, at his statement before a 
ministerial-level conference, on September 19, 1986. Mr. Tamura declared that Japan would like to 
“strengthen the GATT system to increase its responsiveness to the evolving international economic 
environment, taking account of changes in trade environment, such as expanded trade in services 
reflecting results of technological innovation which have become increasingly marked since the 
Tokyo Round, growing importance of intellectual property rights and a greater amount of foreign 
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direct investment.”612 In this statement, Japan agreed with the GATT that three “new issues” are 
vital to the Uruguay Round. Trade in services, intellectual property rights and FDI became the focus 
on this important negotiation. As mentioned above, at that time, Japan had finished Maekawa Report 
on Japanese economic strategy. This statement was mainly consistent with that strategy. 
    On June 12, 1987, Japan became a member of the Negotiating Group. Somewhat different 
from the U.S. third proposal, Japan stated that TRIMs in GATT should encourage “the free flow of 
trade, and moreover to contribute to the development of the world economy through smooth 
development of the international exchange of investment which will lead to the economic 
development of host countries, creation of new jobs and to the realization of increased industrial and 
technological cooperation.” 613  Japan considered that FDI was essential to a host developing 
country’s economic development.  
In principal, this consideration reflected the Japanese FDI theory developed by Kojima and 
others. This school emphasized that FDI pulls trade and contributes to host countries’ economy 
development. On the other hand, it also reflected the importance of South East Asia to Japan. Prior to 
the 1980s, Japanese FDI had been concentrated to great effect in South East Asia. As discussed in 
Chapter 2. The proposal submitted by Japanese government sought to balance the economic benefits 
gained from developed countries as well as developing countries.  
Partly reflected the concerns from developing countries and different approaches on negotiators, 
the United States in its fourth submission delivered on June 12, 1987 advised World Bank, IMF, and 
UNCTAD become observers for helping to provide necessary technical support.614 
Furthermore, Japan argued that “not only the measures based on the legislation and the 
regulation applied by central governments but also those applied by local governments should be the 
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object of the negotiation.”615 Thus, Japan’s attitude to TRIMs strongly reflected its multinationals’ 
operation in western countries, especially in the United States. As analyzed in Chapter 4, U.S. 
federal government could not prohibit state and local governments in the United States from 
attracting and competing for FDI. In detail, Japan listed five individual measures that produced trade 
restrictive and distorting effects: local content requirements, export performance requirements, trade 
balancing requirements, domestic sales requirements, and technology transfer requirements. In this 
sense, as Theodore Moran noted, “at least 24 U.S. states, from Pennsylvania to California and 
Oregon to Georgia, and all 12 members of the European Community offer investment benefits that 
affect firm location similar to performance requirements in the Third World.”616 
In general, Japan sided with the United States in seeking an expanded form of TRIMs. As one 
observer noted, “The US list included many other incentives and restrictions affecting foreign 
investment, such as foreigners, or requirements on the transfer of technology. Most developed 
countries did not try to spread the net of the negotiations so wide, and virtually all developing 
countries—even those which traditionally favored and welcomed foreign investment—were strongly 
opposed to doing so. The Japanese came closest to the US position.”617 Particularly to local content 
requirement, the United States and Japan agreed quite deeply and put this first on their lists. In fact, 
local content requirements were long regarded as measures which distorted trade. One submission 
even noted that “the only one of the so-called trade-related effects enumerated in the submissions 
that were being considered which had a link with the Ministerial mandate would be local content 
requirements.”618  
However, the United States and Japan reached common ground on this point for somewhat 
different reasons. On this item (including local equity requirements), the United States only wrote 
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160 words, while Japan’s expression needed 400 words to emphasize its point. Japan noted that 
“With regard to the GATT Articles, local content requirements restricting the use of imported goods 
are inconsistent with Article III. The relation with Article XI must be considered with regard to 
measures having the effect of import restriction.”619 Although Japan agreed with the United States’ 
concern and recognized the need for a system within the GATT to regulate TRIMs, Japanese focused 
on means of distinguishing between TRIMs that were already covered by GATT rules and those that 
were not.  
Moreover, compared to the United States’ third submission, Japan was specifically more 
concerned about the export performance requirements and domestic sales requirements. These two 
items were strongly linked to Japanese affiliates’ operations in the United States. In bilateral 
negotiations between Japan and the United States, closed Japan market and large amount of Japanese 
intra-firm trade were criticized by U.S. negotiators since MOSS. The United States’ pressure on 
Japan’s negotiators was reflected in the proposals on TRIMs. Although the United States attacked the 
TRIMs for distorting trade, Congress has also supported the use of TRIMs in automobiles assembled 
in the U.S. by foreign-owned automobile makers. In practice, as Jagdish Bhagwati pointed out, “the 
USA was jawboning Japanese transplants into buying more USA components, virtually intimidating 
these firms into a ‘local purchase’ policy, while pushing for the adopting of trade-related investment 
measures (TRIMs) outlawing the use of ‘local content’ clauses by host countries for 
multinationals.”620  
Thus, beside the broader common interest with the United States to maintain and expand the 
GATT system, resisting U.S. government pressure became another hidden purpose for Japan during 
these TRIMs negotiation. According to Professor Takashi Inoguchi, although Japan was not good at 
dealing with multilateral diplomacy, it attempted to constrain U.S.’s unilateralism and bilateral 
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pressures.621 This concern was also shared by other contracting partners. As one scholar noted, 
“curbing US unilateralism in general was one of the major objectives of nearly all participants in the 
Round.”622 For Japan, the Uruguay Round “would alleviate the bilateral pressures on them: from the 
USA to open the Japanese market to foreign—read US—goods, and from the EC to curtail Japanese 
export growth.”623 
In the subsequent two papers submitted to the negotiating meeting, the United States realized its 
differences with Japan and tried to get firmer support from Japan. In fact, at the start of the initiatives, 
the United States officials already realized that the support coming from European Community and 
Japan would be an important source of  bargaining power as well as symbolic of its inclusion.624 
Partly influenced by Japan’s concerns on export performance requirement, the United States put this 
item first in its fifth submission delivered on February 9, 1988. In this submission, the United States 
carefully examined actual case on export requirements, local content requirements, trade-balancing 
requirements, technology transfer and licensing requirements, domestic sales requirements, 
investment incentives, remittance and other exchange restrictions, manufacturing requirements and 
limitations, product mandate requirements, local equity requirements. Compared to its previous 
submissions, this one adjusted the item order and added domestic sale requirements and product 
mandate requirements. Thus, the proposals provided by the United States considered more 
specifically on trade effects and to some extent approached to Japan’s proposal.  
In a submission delivered on May 31, 1988, the United States suggested “applying trade policy 
concepts to TRIMs”.625 As analyzed early, trade issue had became a big political topics in the 
United States since 1985, especially in early 1988. On March 24, 1988, President Reagan agreed 
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with Congress to negotiate the Exon-Florio Amendment. By May, the House and Senate began to 
vote on the 1988 Trade Act. Therefore, the United States government was empowered new authority 
to enter into international bargaining. Thus, it is not strange that the U.S. proposed that “TRIMs 
should be disciplined in a manner that takes into account their adverse trade effect on host, home and 
third countries.”626  
If we compare this suggestion to Japan’s 1987 proposal, we may see the influence of Japan’s 
view on the U.S. consideration of trade effects. In that submission, Japan suggested that “this 
document mainly examines the effects of the investment measures of the host country on the trading 
activities of the foreign enterprises established in that country, but it should be noted that these 
measures also affect trade between these enterprises and their overseas affiliates.”627  
The United States tried to link concepts of trade in GATT with investment closely, such as most 
favored nation, national treatment and prohibition. Besides that, the United States suggested that a 
number of other trade policy concepts and issues, including transitional arrangements, transparency, 
enforcement and dispute settlement, and development considerations, should be considered in 
TRIMs. The United States wanted to emphasize the value of existed concepts in GATT to reduce 
conflict with other countries. However, although GATT contracting parties agreed on the legitimacy 
of reducing trade barriers, GATT does not have jurisdiction over the sovereign rights of governments 
to control investment policies.628 Consider this point, in this submission’s conclusion part, the 
United States emphasized that “While the GATT already has provisions that incorporate these 
concepts, additional provisions will be necessary to ensure that the trade-distorting effects of TRIMs 
are avoided.”629  
Ten days later, Japan submitted the second proposal on June 9, 1988. In this proposal, Japan 
noticed that participants discussed much broader trade restrictive and distorting effects produced by 
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investment. However, Japan’s representative suggested that “discussions must be oriented towards 
the identification of trade-restrictive and distorting effects of investment measures and ways to avoid 
them.”630 For that purpose, Japan categorized the trade effects of TRIMs into two types: A: the old 
Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este statements, which were based on whether certain TRIMs 
were “inconsistent with existing GATT provisions”; B: certain TRIMs were “not considered to be 
obviously inconsistent with, but considered to have some relevancy to existing GATT provisions.”631 
Japan proposed that those TRIMs that are inconsistent with GATT (such as local content 
requirements) should be listed in detail and be abolished, and that those TRIMs that are related but 
consist with the GATT (export performance requirements) should be regulated in order to avoid 
comparative advantage distortion.  
The categorization of two types was Japan’s response to the American representative’s 
suggestion that “additional provisions” were needed. Compared to the somewhat formidable U.S. 
attitude, Japan listed five TRIMs and pointed out that “The latter two were added as Japan considers 
that these two measures, among the TRIMs identified by other participants, have similar effects to 
the ones Japan identified in its earlier submission.”632 This cautious but active pragmatism helped 
Japan to win support on the subsequent suggestion that non-discrimination, transparency, 
consultations and dispute settlement should be applied to all TRIMs. Another reason is that Japan did 
not expect the United States’ emphasis on bilateralism in dealing with the Japan problem. The 
proposeed Free Trade Agreement between Japan and the United States may have created enormous 
problems for other Asian countries. Moreover, the way the U.S. handled its economic 
interdependence with Japan, as Clayton Yeutter stated, was “if the Uruguay Round falters, it is 
certainly conceivable that we would shift to bilateral gear.”633  
Different criteria illustrated the contradiction in U.S. liberalization strategy. For the United 
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States, it must continue to expand its liberalization propaganda on the one hand; also it could not 
avoid ignoring the pressures came from domestic firms to protect local market on the other hand. 
Anne O. Kruger, an American trade economist, stated that “American trade policy is subject to 
conflicting political pressure, and the outcome reflects that fact. But there is also a sense in which 
the crosscurrents in US trade policy go far beyond that—both because US pronouncements often 
appear to be at odds with US practices and because the importance of the US in the international 
economy results in a systemic impact of American adherence to, or departures from, the open 
multilateral system.”634 
For Japan, the US market was the most important market for its survival and continued 
competitiveness. Under political pressure from the United States, it reluctantly respected U.S. claims 
on local content requirements. Many Japanese affiliates in the United States had already increased 
local parts to adapt to this change. For example, Sony Corporation of America was particularly 
successful in confronting this requirement. In August 1972, Sony established a small manufacturing 
plant in San Diego, California. By 1974, Sony managers continued to source locally some 
non-critical parts to save shipping costs. Thereafter, for more than ten years, Sony’s color television 
business unit in Japan performed R&D, product design and strategic planning. However, with the 
appreciation of Yen after 1985, it became critical for Sony to increase local content to save costs. 
Akio Morita, Sony’s CEO, coined the phrase “global localization” and developed this kind of policy. 
Sony managers began to work actively with US vendors to exercise local parts procurement on some 
key inputs. Then, some design functions were shifted to San Diego. By 1990, Sony Engineering and 
Manufacturing America (SEMA) was established. Although Sony gradually increased localization of 
activities in the United States, the strategic decision-making still remained in Japan. The location of 
central decision making is a politically sensitive operation because of control process was shifted 
from Japan to the United States. Sony’s location process in the United States critically reflected the 
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reality of globalization and investment induced trade friction between Japan and the United States.635 
In November 1988, chairman Kobayashi presented a report on “Future Work Program”.636 
Without much difficulty, the group agreed to recommend to ministers a list of five “elements” to be 
integrated into the future negotiations on TRIMs. The list amounted to little more than recognition of 
the main themes of the discussion so far: identification of the harmful effects of TRIMs that were or 
might be covered by GATT Articles; identification of similar effects not covered by GATT but 
within the group’s mandate; development aspects; means of avoiding adverse trade effects; and other 
relevant issues. Kobayashi emphasized that development aspects of TRIMs should be discussed 
within the GATT framework. The focus of this final report was the trade-distorting effects, rather 
than creating the broader framework proposed by the United States. 
In the months leading up to April 1989, the Trade Negotiations Committee issued the results of 
its mid-term meeting. The definition of TRIMs in midterm assessment was the same to Kobayashi’s 
final report. According to John Croome, “the mid-term review made little difference to the TRIMs’ 
negotiations, which had still not found a focus or aim.”637 The slow progress of the negotiations was 
partly attributed to insufficient political will of the United States. In contrast to its earlier days in 
GATT history, the United States now considered that foreign countries were demanding too many 
U.S. concessions in Uruguay Round.638 In Tomohiko Kobayashi’s words, “the leadership of the US, 
which used to be a decisive element leading to successful conclusions of previous rounds, seems to 
have weakened noticeably.”639  
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5.3.3 Delegation, the U.S. Leadership and Convergence of TRIMs 
With the passage of the 1988 Trade Act and new president taking office in the White House, 
negotiations on TRIMs followed a different course. The U.S. negotiator in the Uruguay Round 
obtained the new authority to conduct multilateral negotiation based on “fast-track” procedure. The 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 extended this authority for three years until June 
1991. President George Bush nominated Carla Hills as the new USTR in February 1989. The foreign 
economic policy of the Bush Administration, as discussed earlier, was to open other countries’ 
markets, especially Japan’s. Carla Hills stated this point clearly at a hearing of the Senate Finance 
Committee on February 3, 1989: “I would like to have you think of me as the USTR with a crowbar, 
where we're prying open markets, keeping them open, so that our private sector can take advantage 
of them.”640  
For all of 1989 and part of 1990, there were no major ministerial meetings taking place or 
progress made at the Uruguay Round. According to one observer, this period “were developed 
primarily to trade problems between the United States and Japan.”641 As analyzed earlier, the United 
States began to negotiate with Japan bilaterally on SII until the mid of 1990. This multitrack policy 
was a unique characteristic during this period.  
On February 6, 1989, the United States submitted its seventh proposal. The purpose of this 
proposal was to “consider the extent to which the GATT Articles are adequate to deal with the 
adverse trade effects of TRIMs.” Specifically, the United States listed three categories: (1) artificial 
reduction of imports into the country applying TRIMs; (2) artificial inducement or increase of 
exports from the country applying TRIMs, also including displacement of home and third country 
exports; (3) artificial reduction of exports from the country applying TRIMS. 642  
The United States submission was discussed in the tenth meeting, on May 8-9, 1989. The U.S. 
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proposal was the first new written submission since the Groups’ last meeting in November and 
mid-term meeting in Montreal. Partly because of its very detailed examination of trade effects 
induced by TRIMs, chairman Kobayashi invited the U.S. representative to present it at meeting. In 
the view of the United States, “the GATT already provided disciplines which appeared to prohibit 
the use of certain TRIMs and combinations of TRIMs, mainly in Articles I, III and XI. However, 
existing GATT Articles were in many respects inadequate and the relationships between Articles, 
trade effects and certain TRIMs were unclear.”643 The United States still insisted that the old GATT 
framework was insufficient for handling trade effects.  
The critics argued that the U.S. proposal was too broad and ambitious, although it provided a 
useful methodology to measure the effects. In replying to the comments, the United States noted that 
“the submission was intended to carry forward the analytical phase of the Group’s work.’644 The 
chairman Kobayashi suggested that the five elements agreed on the mid-term meeting should be 
integrated into the negotiating process. The participants were to make written submissions on these 
five elements.  
Early meetings of the group in 1989 led some observers to believe that the strongest opponents 
of new disciplines to regulate TRIMs might be coming round to acceptance of substantive 
negotiations. At the same time, a number of developed countries were meeting informally in Geneva 
as “Friends of TRIMs”, trying to define the coverage of an eventual agreement that would be 
generally acceptable.645 
Five months later, the United States submitted its eighth proposal, “A Structure for Negotiating 
a Comprehensive Agreement on TRIMs”. In this submission, the United States focused on the fourth 
point—means of avoiding the identified adverse trade effects of TRIMs. U.S. suggested that 
established GATT practice should prohibit three kinds of TRIMs related to adverse trade effects: 
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reducing imports; inducing or increasing exports; and reducing exports.646  
The dominant view on Japan’s trade pattern was “adversarial trade,” Peter Drucker coined this 
term in 1986, and attributed it to Japan. According to Drucker, the country practicing this kind of 
trade pattern is “a seller and not a buyer” and “Japan has been the only modern practitioner of 
adversarial trade.” Drucker suggested that the United States needed to “distinguish between 
competitive and adversarial trade”, and stated that “adversarial trade will not be tolerated very long. 
It was not planned as such, but it turned out to be a policy to beggar one’s neighbor. And that is 
always self-defeating.”647 In its eighth proposal, the United States mentioned “adverse trade”, a 
clear reference to Japan. 
Japan’s third proposal submitted on September 12, 1989, named “An Approach to Establish 
Disciplines on TRIMs.”648 In contrast to ambitious U.S. vision on “GATT for Investment”, Japan’s 
view was basically the same as the mandate since the beginning of the Uruguay Round. However, 
Japan was greatly influenced by the United States in agenda setting. The Japanese government’s 
purpose was to “facilitate substantive discussions on disciplines on investment measures which have 
trade restrictive and distorting effects, taking into consideration, in particular, the point (d) of the 
Agreement made in Montreal by participating Ministers—means of avoiding the identified adverse 
trade effects of TRIMs.” 649 In his proposal, the representative of Japan gave an attractive view on 
institution creation of TRIMs, “as overseas investments have increased in volume and number, the 
degree of effects of investment measures on trade have increased.”650  
The items that would be prohibited in the framework proposed by Japan covered such items as: 
local content requirements, export performance requirements, trade balancing requirements, 
domestic sales requirements, technology transfer requirements, manufacturing requirements, product 
mandating requirements. Besides this, Japan also proposed “TRIMs that should observe other 
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general disciplines” including export performance measures and product mandating measures. 
Compared to its first submission presented in mid-1987, the items on the list in this last proposal 
were much more comprehensive. In John Croome’s words, Japan’s submission was “working on 
similar lines to the United States.”651 
Less opposition from Japan encouraged the United States to insist on the contents of its 
proposals, although there was little change in this situation in the following months. Those 
developed countries which sought strong discipline to regulate TRIMs continued to bring forward 
new proposals or refine old ones, while the developing countries that were determined to preserve 
their ability to regulate investment held essentially to their existing positions. Among the developed 
countries, the Europeans had more limited ambitions than the Americans and Japanese, partly 
because they themselves had used local content requirements, especially to regulate Japanese 
investment. 
On January 23, 1990, the United States tabled a draft agreement.652 In its important proposal, 
the United States suggested “a draft TRIMs Agreement, applicable to all contracting parties, that was 
based on existing GATT Acticles and principles.” In this proposed agreement, seven Articles were 
formulated: obligations regarding investment measures which inherently restrict or distort trade; 
obligations regarding other investment measures; transition measures and development; transparency 
in the application of TRIMs; establishing a committee on trade-related investment measures; 
consultation and settlement of disputes; and future work.. The main feature of the draft was the 
prohibition of those TRIMs which had been identified as inherently restricting or distorting trade.653 
In May 1990, chairman Kobayashi “circulated informally to participants a draft Chairman’s 
paper containing suggestions on a possible framework for further negotiations.”654 This note was 
very simple, with less than 100 words. In the subsequent meetings, the chairman’s initial draft did 
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not satisfy any of the parties. The United States’ attitude in these meeting was somewhat 
contradictory. On the one hand, the U.S. noted that “in the broader context of the Uruguay Round, it 
was a matter of serious concern if at this critical stage…those groups would not produce results.” On 
the other hand, the United States could not accept the chairman’s draft due to its relative narrow list 
of items. Furthermore, the U.S. was dissatisfied that Kobayahi didn’t address “more TRIMs that it 
believed were trade distorting” and objected that “the discipline of ‘seek to avoid’ contained in 
Chapter 2:2 of the text did not set a clear standard and it was unclear what would be the result of the 
consultations referred to; and the specific exceptions identified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Chapters 3 
and 4 gave grounds for concern about whether they fitted the practices being addressed in those 
Chapters.”655 One month later, the United States suggested inclusion of the words “or manufacture” 
in “A” text.656 
From June 29 to the end of 1990, there were four other chairman drafts proposed by Kobayashi. 
“With the Chairman’s June text, the negotiations entered a stage in which there were concerted 
efforts to develop an agreed-upon working text that could be the basis for negotiations. Ultimately, 
this effort was unsuccessful...Their history provides insight into the major differences that divided 
the negotiators.”657 On July 19, 1990, Kobayashi presented the “Chairman Report on the Status of 
Work in the Negotiating Group”. In this report, Kobayashi responded to initial criticism of his first 
draft, but insisted that his proposal was “structured around the Punta del Este mandate and the 
elements of the negotiations that were contained in the TNC decision on TRIMs which followed the 
Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round in December 1988.”658 This proposal marked the United 
States’ proposal as “B” text, and developing countries’ proposals as “C”. In Kobayashi’s view, his 
informal Chairman paper marked as “A” text could be taken as the basis for further negotiations.  
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In the meeting held in September, the United States emphasized that “the TRIMs negotiations 
were an important part of the Uruguay Round. In a fundamental sense, TRIMs such as local content 
and export performance requirements were incompatible with an open market system and with 
reducing trade barriers, and effective disciplines were needed to avoid the adverse trade effects of 
TRIMs.”659 In the United States, business groups wanted more open. This expression by Senator 
Hollings (South Carolina) on October 1990 followed such a position,  
 
A great deal has been written and said about the "new issues" such as services, 
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) and trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs), but U.S. companies still stand to gain significantly from plain, old-fashioned 
tariff cuts on our exports of goods. Throughout much of the world, our competitors operate 
behind higher tariffs than our industries do. We endorse the efforts of the newly formed 
Zero Tariff Coalition, a group of over 100 U.S. companies which support the elimination 
of import tariffs around the world in many major industries.660 
 
 In his report to Arthur Dunkel, the general director of GATT, Kobayashi expressed his 
optimism to a contracting parties’ decision based on his A text. Kobayashi stated that parties had 
reached consensus on GATT obligation and development concerns. The problem focused on the 
measures not covered by the existing Articles. Developed countries hold that TRIMs should be 
prohibited.661At last, the Draft final Act submitted to the ministers in Brussels did not contain draft 
TRIMs Section. It included just one page of “commentary’ on TRIMS, which noted that “basic 
divergences of view continue to exist.”662  
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The deep and persistent disagreements on trade-related investment measures were demonstrated 
vividly by the lack of any proposal to ministers. However, consultations among ministers in Brussels 
quickly showed that most developed countries were not prepared to accept such an outcome. Two 
notable economists, Edward Graham and Paul Krugman had predicted just such an outcome, arguing 
that “the greatest discipline on TRIMs that can realistically be achieved in the Uruguay Round is a 
list of investment measures that are prohibited as a condition of entry or for doing business in a 
country.”663 
The Uruguay Round changed in character after Brussels, and it was to change again at the end 
of 1991. The months in between—effectively, from February to December 1991—were a period of 
transition, both for the negotiations in Geneva and in the context of world economic and political 
events in which the Round took place. Lester Thurow once declared that “GATT is Dead”, and 
suggested that “managed trade need not lead to less trade if it is conducted in the right framework. In 
essence, the existing rules of GATT need to be replaced by a set of rules governing what is and is not 
permissible in managing bloc trade.”664 This right framework for managing the regional production 
and trade had to consider the TRIMs. 
Work on TRIMs re-started after Brussels on an unpromising note. The green room agreements 
of February 1991 sought to put the Uruguay Round back on track by concentrating first on technical 
issues. For TRIMS, this required the negotiators to discuss how a “trade effects test” might be 
developed and applied in order to identify trade-related investment measures that were having 
adverse effects on the interests of other countries.665 The second formal meeting was held on July 
22-26, 1991. The new Chairman, George Maciel of Brazil, expressed his optimism. However, in 
spite of his efforts to consult with participants, the basic impasse continued throughout 1991.  
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 The U.S. leadership was still considered important to promote the success of the Uruguay 
Round. Some argued that Japan was not taking a responsible role in promoting the liberalization of 
world trading system. “Japan, on the defensive about impediments to access to its market and 
unwilling to negotiate any relaxation of its ban on rice imports, has played a basically passive role in 
the Uruguay Round.”666 This view was exaggerated and did not correctly describe Japan’s role in 
TRIMs negotiations before 1990. Japan had tried to make a compromise between various texts. The 
crucial dimension of the unresolved problem should be attributed to the United States. Sylvia Ostry, 
Canadian negotiator in the Uruguay Round, noted in June 1991 that the success of Uruguay Round 
depended gradually much on the Triad economies, 
 
It seems unlikely that the United States will soon return to the singly track policy of the 
post-World War II years, or its role as guarantor of the multilateral trading system. That 
must be kept in mind whatever the final outcome of the Uruguay Round. One of the 
main lessons of the round to date is that neither of the two other major trading 
powers—the EC and Japan—was prepared to assume the role of guardian of the system, 
perhaps because they were operating under the traditional, but outdated, assumption 
that the United States would do it.667 
 
For the United States, the important issue at this time was not GATT but NAFTA. On March 1, 
1991, the President Bush formally asked Congress for an additional two years of the “fast-track” 
authority to negotiate trade agreement. Congress had ninety days to approve or deny the president’s 
request. It debated the issue from March until the end of May, with the majority in favor of the 
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extension.668 Robert Zoellick, counselor of the State Department, in his statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, persuaded them that “we will take time needed to consider all relevant 
issues and to consult fully with you and the private sector. Until we arrive at good agreements—ones 
that we believe you will agree are good—there will be no agreements. We proved that in the 
Brussels negotiations of the Uruguay Round.”669Senator Bentsen warned those legislators who 
wavered that any attempt to kill the ‘’fast-track” extension would doom the Uruguay Round. The 
President Bush also envisaged that “we need this fast-track authority to negotiate trade agreements 
that will open markets, keep our exports strong, and create jobs, and frankly, sustain our leadership 
in the world economy.”670 In late May, Congress approved the “fast-track” legislation.  
From September 1991 onwards, Maciel put forward successive draft TRIMS agreements in a 
search for common ground among the participants. Starting from a point near the Kobayashi draft of 
November 1990, he pared down the proposals to an essential core, throwing out elements such as the 
lengthy definitions of TRIMS on which agreement appeared impossible. During this process, none 
of the participants publicly abandoned their earlier stated priorities. However, informal consultations 
made it possible for Maciel to decide what was essential (and what was not) to an acceptable 
conclusion. 
The TRIMS agreement sent forward by Maciel to the Trade Negotiations Committee and 
incorporated into the Draft Final Act of December 1991 was not a negotiated text. Five such 
measures, mainly involving local content or trade balancing requirements, were explicitly listed; 
countries maintaining them were to notify GATT of them and phase them out, developing countries 
being given longer to do so than developed countries. The Dunkel text met the requirements of the 
Punta del Este mandate while creating a compromise between the different views of the negotiators. 
For these measures, the principle of prohibition had been accepted, and the case-by-case 
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approach discarded. On the other hand, export performance requirements were not covered at all. 
Whatever might be said about their effects on trade, they were not contrary to existing GATT rules, 
and there was no basis for agreement to extend the rules to them. Finally, the draft agreement offered 
something to views at both extremes; it provided that five years after its entry into force, talks should 
begin on whether to complement it with provisions on investment policy and competition policy. 671 
 
 
5.3.4 Mutual Interest, Reciprocity Principle and Accomplishment of TRIMs 
After 1991, it was apparent that the new negotiators may accept limitations on TRIMs. One of 
the strongest reasons for this was that nearly all of the countries involved in the world economy 
became much broadly and deeply interdependent. As one observer stated,  
 
Crucially, the United States was no longer a huge net exporter of capital, concerned to 
remove barriers faced by its investors. On the contrary, US public opinion was now 
deeply worried about the growing role of Japanese and other investment in the United 
States. For their part, many developing countries that were opening up their economies 
and embracing free markets were now keen to attract foreign investment. On both sides, 
the hardest-line countries no longer held such passionate views, and were far readier to 
accept a modest compromise in the TRIMs negotiations.672 
  
Specifically, the growing cooperation between Japan and U.S. investment contributed to this 
process and trend. As the Economist reported, in the early 1990s “each American car maker owns a 
stake in a Japanese car firm and is engaged in a range of joint ventures with other Japanese 
companies. America’s car-parts suppliers have signed 200 such deals with Japanese partners. 
Supposedly bitter rivals, the American and Japanese motor industries collaborate with almost as 
                                                        
671 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System, p.309. 
672 Ibid., pp.308-09. 
 277
much zeal as they compete.”673 These alliance strategies had become the dominant strategy for 
multinationals; unable to beat each other in the U.S. market, they saw the advantage of joining forces. 
This kind of alliance between Japanese and U.S. firms makes the conventional “who is us” rhetoric 
more difficult. As discussed in Chapter 2, Robert Reich and other’s contribution on this debate 
proved that some critical high technology may require policy makers to make such a distinction. 
However, with more and more Japanese FDI becoming critical to some old manufacturing sectors in 
the United States, the contradiction of coherent trade policy appeared obvious to policy makers. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, some states did not accord with the federal government 
policy on limiting Japanese affiliates to get funds from federal government or local government.   
In the United States, President Clinton, after consultation with other countries, asked Congress 
to extend his fast-track negotiating authority, which was to expire on 15 April 1994. The date was 
chosen to give long enough to complete the negotiations, but not enough time for them to be dragged 
out. Allowing for the necessary notice to Congress, it would require the completion of substantive 
negotiations by 15 December 1993. Congress approved the new authority, effective from 30 June. 
After the delay necessitated by a change of the administration, the United States had a new 
negotiating team in place, headed by Mickey Kantor as US Trade Representative. 
The United States’ objectives on TRIMs, as stated in the executive summary by the United 
States government on the results of Uruguay Round completed on December 15, 1993, was to 
“reduce or eliminate the trade distortive effects of certain trade-related investment measures,” and 
the results of that kind of negotiation were that “the agreement prohibits local content and trade 
balancing requirements. This prohibition will apply whether the measures are mandatory or are 
required in return for an incentive/advantage.”674 According to Christopher Lion, an offiical of the 
Department of Commerce, the primary objective of the United States on TRIMs was to “explicitly 
impose GATT disciplines on trade related investment measures.” The first point of this GATT 
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disciplines was to eliminate unfairly restricted investment. The sectors that were strongly affected by 
TRIMS included motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and high-technology goods.675 
Under pressure from the business community, the U.S. asked for reciprocity principles in 
negotiation. In late 1991, some Senators introduced a new bill on reciprocity and requested that “the 
one-way street of foreign investment must end. An insistence on reciprocity for direct foreign 
investment will only enhance our ability to obtain further concessions in our effort to establish truly 
free and fair trade for all nations.”676 As mentioned earlier, the United States had authorized the 
president to block acquisition that might threaten national security. In late 1991, Bush also put it into 
a permanent law in the U.S.  
The United States could not escape its international obligation on national treatment and the 
nondiscriminatory principle. While the GATT’s purposes included protecting the right of free 
circulation of goods in the marketplace, the BIT’s purpose was to protect foreign investment. Both 
policies have the same goal of fostering free competition in the marketplace through limitations on 
government intervention in the marketplace. Before the Uruguay Round, the GATT dispute 
resolution process was multilateral, sovereign and politicized, while BIT dispute resolution 
processes are bilateral, private and depoliticized.677 The TRIMs agreement was an indication of the 
existing broad consensus on the foundations of investment liberalization and significant progress in 
the codification process of the international investment regime. The previous inconsistent 
international strategy in GATT and BIT could be integrated into a relative comprehensive framework 
to regulate TRIMs.  
While the preamble of the TRIMs includes the goal of “facilitating investment across 
international frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading partners, particularly 
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developing country members, while ensuring free competition,” Article 1 specifies that the TRIMs 
agreement “applies to investment measures related to trade in goods only.” The TRIMs agreement 
had also been criticized for merely focusing on the effect of trade related investment measures 
instead of addressing one of their basic causes: the distorting practices of multinational corporations. 
A further shortcoming of the TRIMs agreement was that it did not proscribe all sorts of 
trades-distorting measures, as it addresses only those export performance requirements. The serious 
attempt by the developed nations to link investment and trade had failed. Thus, some argue that 
TRIMs is only “a failed attempt at investment liberalization” by developed countries.678 
However, the mainstream view on the creation of the TRIMs mechanism in GATT framework 
is positive. This compromise text brought the Uruguay Round negotiations on trade-related 
investment measures to their end. It was not subsequently challenged, and was incorporated without 
substantial change into the package approved in Marrakesh. In itself, the TRIMS agreement is a 
useful if somewhat meager result from five years of tough negotiations. It allows continuing 
discussion of investment issues that affect trade, and in the longer run it opens the door to 
full-fledged negotiations. In one observer’s words, “despite the confining terms of reference for 
investment-related matters in the Uruguay Round, its completion has marked an important watershed 
in international rule-making by subjecting investment-related measures for the first time to the logic 
and disciplines of multilateral trade diplomacy.”679 
In their final statements on the Uruguay Round in the end of the 1994, the U.S. Senate stated 
that the TRIMs agreement “is a tiny first step toward bringing investment under the disciplines of the 
world trading system.”680 This “tiny first step” was mainly a result of cooperation between Japan 
and U.S. negotiators. As the Economist noted, “The most heated arguments over both barriers to 
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investment and competition policies are between—who else?—America and Japan.”681 Although 
the TRIMs only covered trade in goods, it resulted from the reluctant willingness of the United 
States to reconstruct the global trading system. The limited scope of TRIMs reflected the decline of 
the Japanese economy, and also it proves that “laws on investment and competition are difficult to fit 
into the existing GATT rules.”682 Laura Tyson, chairwoman of the President’s Council of Economic 
Advisers, asserted that “U.S. investors will benefit from systematic prohibitions of trade-related 
investment measures,” and “the agreement actually moves GATT procedures closer to U.S. 
procedures and complements U.S. laws for dealing with the unfair trade practices of foreign 
countries.”683 
The success of the Uruguay Round was important to revive U.S. political economy through 
adjustment between domestic and international interests. During this period, its main economic 
competitor lost dynamism. At the same time, this international level negotiation had integrated 
domestic level considerations in various issues. As John Jackson pointed out, “most (but not all) of 
the time when ‘sovereignty’ is used in current policy debates, it really refers to questions about the 
allocation of power; this is normally government decision-making power.”684 According to Jackson, 
the issues of allocation of power for all types of government can be divided into horizontal and 
vertical power allocation. In the case of U.S. ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreement, it needs 
to be accepted by not only the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, but also by local 
governments. In Raymond Vernon’ words, “the ratification of the WTO and its accompanying 
substantive agreements in 1993 demonstrated a new willingness of the United States to alter its 
domestic statutes in order to comply with an international agreement.”685  
The Uruguay Round was signed on April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, and was approved 
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by the United States in late 1994. In fact, the votes were held in the House of Representatives on 
November 29, 1994, with approval by a vote of 288 to 146. The Senate vote took place on December 
1, 1994, with approval by a vote of 76 to 24. During 1994, many Congressional hearings in a large 
number of different committees were held on the Uruguay Round results and the proposed statute. 
As Jackson stated, “1994 was a year for a truly major and historical U.S. debate about questions of 
this nation’s economic treaty participation and its relations to various concepts of sovereignty.”686  
The House version of the final approval of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act pointed out the 
historic nature of this accomplishment,  
 
During most of the time since World War II international trade in tangible goods, 
manufactured goods, has been governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
and by and large our observation of those rules has been good. Now for the first time in the 
history of civilization we have agreed to begin controlling not only the tangible goods, 
manufactured goods, but agricultural goods, intellectual property such as copyrights and 
trademarks, patents and so forth, and trade in services and the trade-related investment 
measures. If we are successful in passing this legislation through the Congress today, other 
nations will rapidly follow us. If we should fail somewhere along this road today or this 
week, then I think civilization would have a very, very rocky future…We do this today not 
just for civilization: we do it primarily because it is good for America.687 
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Conclusion 
 
In a world still consisting of sovereign nation states, we cannot expect the great powers to act 
like a benign hegemon. In Kenneth Waltz’s words, “benign hegemony is, however, something of a 
contradiction in terms.”688 Although the United States in part sought to provide public goods to the 
world in the post-World War II environment, the endeavor was still driven by national strategies and 
the interests of domestic political forces. The United States prefer to support openness because of the 
support of large multinationals and exporters. As an industrialized democracy, domestic political 
sources of support is important; thus, policy makers’ understanding of the rising importance of the 
country’s international ties may have been one factor propelling them to act “as [a] hegemon 
should.” 689 Therefore, when we probe the relationship between world welfare and American 
national interest, we should not take it for granted that the United States will promote world welfare 
if it means impairing U.S. interest. 
In coping with the investment challenge from Japan, U.S inward investment policy experienced 
a great change from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Based on the new discussions in the field of 
IPE, I argued that U.S. investment policy adjusted at three levels: national, domestic and 
international. The political economy of investment policy adjustment required us to examine the 
distributional interests of different groups as well as the political games in specified institutions.  
To some extent, U.S. inward investment policy experienced a similar change to trade policy. As 
Sylvia Ostry argues, U.S. trade policy experienced two great changes since the 1990s:  
 
First of all, from an exclusive focus on multilateralism and the GATT in the three decades 
following the end of the war, by the onset of the 1990s U.S. policy had become 
multitrack: multilateral, regional, and unilateral. Further, because of structural differences 
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of access and other system differences, the focus of U.S. trade policy increasingly shifted 
to what were once considered domestic policies and practices, and also expanded beyond 
trade to include investment and technology.690 
 
 The characteristics of “multitrack” and domestic-international combination are certainly 
suitable to describe U.S. inward investment policy. I argued that it was Japanese FDI rather than that 
from other countries that led to changes in U.S. investment policy. The high growth rate of JFDI 
aroused caution, debate and policy adjustments. During this period, the nature of Japanese FDI in the 
United States was in a transition from the Kojima Model to the Western Model. Given the diverse 
nature of JFDI, U.S. economic power and institutions contributed to policy change as well as 
institutional adjustment.  
 
 
Managing FDI Friction at Three Levels 
Generally speaking, U.S. inward investment policy experienced great change (see Table 6.1). 
This dissertation argued that U.S. policy adjustments were partly due to the nature of JFDI, and 
partly depended on the institutional context. The previous works on this topic igored the political 
implication of specific FDI, and payed less attention to the interaction of economic interests and 
avaiable policy instruments. Individuals, groups and governments at  different levels have their 
own and diversified objectives in economic transactions. With the growing involvement of national 
economy into global economy, the distributional problem of Japanese FDI among actors is parciular 
important. Hepled by the revised second generation IPE analytical framework, this study finds out 
that the United States copied with Japanese FDI challenge at three levels and adjusted investment 
policy and related institutions.   
At the national level, if the U.S. industries that JFDI entered would have created a national 
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economic gap between the United States and Japan, the U.S. government would strongly oppose this 
kind of FDI. Previous works in international political economy induced this argument from 
international trade politics under the condition which the trade leads to power transititon among 
nation states. This empirical study shows that FDI mobility between nation states also created this 
deilemma. Although there were debates on the appropriate policy response to JFDI among the 
executive, inter-executive branches, and Congress, they acted as a unitary actor in the name of 
national security, or, more accurately, national economic security. At this level, the demand and 
supply of policy were managed by the federal government.  
At the local government level, most states welcomed the entry of JFDI. Most of the JFDI in the 
United States provided tax revenue and jobs, and helped local governments to promote economic 
growth. To states in the U.S., national economic security was not the most important problem 
confronting them during this period. The jobs and economic growth, on the contrary, are the first 
important objectives. At the same time, the U.S. Constitution and America’s unique federalist 
institutional design does not allocate power clearly when it comes to regulating FDI. In the United 
States, “the war of the states” in attracting JFDI was a big problem in this period. Some issues, such 
as tax system reform, states’ role in international economic affairs, and local advantage in 
globalization were examined. The uneven distribution of Japanese FDI in the United States 
accerlated the power distribution between states and the federal governments, and led to the activist 
of local government and states in international economy.  
At the international level, the mutual interest resulting from the mobility of JFDI led to the 
creation of international investment institutions. Besides bilateral negotiation on investment issues, 
the unique complementary effects of JFDI on trade created linkage politics and resulted in 
multilateral solutions. It was in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) (1986-1993) that investment issues were successfully integrated into the GATT trading 
system. This dissertation argued that the cooperation between the U.S. government and the Japanese 
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government helped establish the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) in GATT framework. 
Moreover, without the mutual interest which existed between JFDI and U.S. multinational 
corporations, this kind of international investment institution building could not have been achieved 
in this period. 
 
Table 6.1 U.S. Inward Investment Policy Change and Institutional Adjustment 
Policy Levels Policy and Institution Function  
Exon-Florio Amendment 
 
 
Grant the President power to prohibit M&A 
types of FDI; Shifted weight to economic 
security 
Antitrust and R&D policy 
 
Distinguished U.S.-owned and U.S.- based 
multinationals; “4-4-50” rule 
New members of CFIUS Became a screening mechanism; Promoted 
the harmonization between domestic policy 
and international policy 
National 
International Data 
Improvement Act 
Provided more detailed data on FDI  
Tax policy Balanced between worldwide unitary method 
and water’s edge approach 
Domestic 
Local state power Increased participation of local states in 
international affairs; economic center shifted 
from Atlantic to Asia Pacific 
U.S.–Japan New Economic 
Partnership  
Opened the door of Japan market for U.S. 
multinationals, and promoted the alliances 
between two kinds of multinationals 
International 
TRIMs in the Uruguay Round 
of GATT 
Prohibited local content and performance 
requirement; reduce trade friction 
 
 
The Exon-Florio amendment forced the executive to make a policy choice between free 
investment flows or competitive freedom, and regulation to protect the national interest. In fact, this 
conflict between relatively liberal administrations and protectionism in Congress was not new in 
American foreign economic policy. As shown above, traditionally the United States maintained an 
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open door FDI policy in spite of Congressional concerns. This situation was consistent with the 
historical record: “the context of congressional critiques and their preference for executive-branch 
responsibility in recent IFDI [inward FDI] history resembles earlier U.S. experience with trade 
policy.”691 In the late 1980s, the United States began to learn experiences from trade affairs to deal 
with FDI issues. Many concepts and instruments used to deal with investment issues came from 
trade issues. In some sense, the function of CFIUS identified by the 1988 Trade Act was the 
equivalent of the 1934 RATT Act in the field of trade. The President received new powers in the 
name of national security and national economic security.  
The creation and evolution of the Exon-Florio amendment showed the capability and 
willingness of the United States to control and obtain benefits from economic exchange through 
power shifts from the Congress to the Executive on FDI policy. As discussed earlier, the 
semiconductor industry was a strategic industry for the United States and would determine the future 
of the United States in the international competitive market. When Fujitsu tried to purchase Fairchild, 
it was strongly opposed by the Commerce and Defense Departments in spite of the fact that Fairchild 
was already controlled by a French company. From the beginning, the reason to question and 
prohibit this acquisition was national security as well as national economic security.  
With the end of the Cold War and the reduced growth of Japanese FDI, the United States found 
an alternative way to evaluate the threat of M&A types of FDI. The broadly accepted “4-4-50” rule 
is the U.S. domestic rule to control the expansion of foreign investors in the United States. 
According to this rule, government should intervene if an industry’s concentration is higher than four 
companies or four countries’ controlling 50% of the market. The business-government relationship 
began to converge to a somewhat non-traditional U.S. model.  
This kind of transformation was related to the influence of the international economy. During 
this period, the issue of FDI contributed to a strategic shift in the U.S. from military security to 
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economy. Most scholars in the late 1980s agreed that the general principle of policy was to promote 
or preserve a country’s own market power and excess profits by deterring market entry of foreign 
competitors, because to do so was in the national economic interest.692 The debate on inward FDI in 
the United States also demonstrated that American elites share common policy criterion in the FDI 
issue area. The satisfactory evaluation of inward FDI must necessarily rest on a broader base, 
including autonomy, security and prosperity.693 
Beside these much more theoretical and ideological adjustments, the United States also 
removed barriers to data collection and inter-branch friction on the FDI issue. To cope with the 
economic challenge, theoretical and ideological consensus was necessary, but impossible to achieve. 
Information on economic transformation, especially detailed data on activities, were the 
prerequisites for further debate and policy making. In debating the Exon-Florio amendment, some 
feared that this provision would further encourage FDI, while others insisted that policy was not the 
determining factor in influencing the mobility of investment. With more and more data collected and 
shared between the executive, Congress, and mass media, the fear began to fade. Accurate data on 
Japanese FDI provided a necessary instrument to distinguish between the small potential threat and 
the large potential benefits of FDI. The United States tried to control the benefits and reduce the cost.  
Even so, executive official capability was also important to improve the quality of policy. The 
professional capability in government offices improved the bargaining power not only with other 
countries, but also with congress or interest groups. In the name of national security, or even national 
economic competitiveness, there was little disagreement. However, there were still different voices 
both for and against Japanese FDI due to the unique political institutions and the complexity of FDI. 
The reorganization of CFIUS illustrates the different capability of the U.S. government departments 
in dealing with FDI problem. Under the threat of Japanese FDI in some industries, such as 
semiconductor industry, autombile industry, and other capital intensive industries, the information 
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exchange between interest groups and executive official is very important to help understand the 
complex investment mobility. 
The local government policy action or reaction to Japanese FDI was especially unique 
compared with other international economic issues. The domestic political response to Japanese FDI 
was largely determined by two factors. The first was that Japanese FDI was distributed unevenly in 
the United States. Thus, to local government the benefits and costs were definitely different. The 
concentration of FDI was much more obvious than with trade. Those states that accepted Japanese 
FDI could get revenue, jobs, and economic development. Thus, Japanese FDI provided a strong 
incentive for local governments to compete with each other. From a national economy perspective, 
this kind of competition was not optimal.  
The second point was federalism, which gave states the power to deal with FDI in the United 
States. In the federal system, state and federal governments have overlapping jurisdiction on 
legislation that both directly and indirectly affects multinational operations. The influence of 
federalism on flows of FDI through reducing political risk proves that states in federalism have room 
to pursue their own policy incentives. Repeated games between states in federalism cultivate 
reputation and credible commitment between the federal government and the states in attracting FDI. 
In particular, local governments’ diverse tax base provided flexibility for investors to adjust their 
location strategy. 
The institutional context of shared power over FDI policy originated from American history and 
corresponded with the external competitive environment. Traditionally, the national government 
dominated international affairs, while states and local governments took responsibility for local 
affairs. Since the late 1980s, however, the role of federalism in the emerging global economy raised 
a great deal of concern in the United States. Scholars suggested that with the evolution into a global 
economy, the power division between the federal government and the states should be redefined. 
Some even argued that “American federalism is more than a kind of institution; it is a matrix of 
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reciprocal power relations.”694 Probably in three areas as mentioned below related to foreign policy, 
states should increase their roles.  
Firstly, economic development, sometimes called “industrial policy,” became the hallmark of 
activist governors and state legislative leaders. With the rise of FDI’s importance to economic 
growth, the global division of FDI increased the already dramatic competition between local 
governments. Secondly, international agreements threatened subnational sovereignty. The national 
role in enforcing various economic agreements reduces regional welfare and autonomy in areas such 
as government procurement, financial services, and tax policy. Thirdly, some regions can seek to 
promote their own foreign economic policymaking independently. Traditional top-down 
implementation relies heavily on marshaling enough resources to overcome the complexity of joint 
action, provided the national level policy goals are sufficiently clear. In contrast, bottom-up models 
stress the potential for defection or distortion of national policy by local authorities. One unique 
feature of FDI is that it is located and usually concentrated by region. Besides common national 
policies, local geographic characteristics, economic infrastructure, and human resources were very 
important in attracting FDI. Thus, regional governments were more capable of developing effective 
programs along these lines. 
The role of local government in FDI leads us to integrate our understanding of the various 
supplies of policy. Policy differences in specific issue areas require a different framework. For 
example, trade issues are more diverse than monetary affairs. Thus, the demand for policy is 
relatively less impacted by societal lobbying groups in monetary issues than in trade issues. On the 
supply side of policy, trade policy has been controlled mainly by the USTR since 1962; international 
monetary policy is undertaken by the Federal Reserve and Treasury in the United States. Almost all 
international economic policies in previous IPE works were controlled at the federal government 
level. The only exception or ambitious example of shared power between the federal and local 
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governments was FDI policy. Thus, it is not enough for the common interest between different 
agents to create unified policy outcomes; sometimes a single top policy maker is needed. In the FDI 
issue, this situation does not exist in the United States.  
On the question of why the United States created TRIMs in Uruguay Round, we can draw three 
points. The first point was that it was the United States as well as Japan’s interests to create this 
economic institution. The second point, related to the first, is that the distribution effect of TRIMs 
was compatible with state power. Small states, and especially developing countries, are constrained 
by limited policy instruments. By eliminating the ability of the nation government to put conditions 
on investment in their countries, TRIMs gave multinationals much more flexibility in the use of 
their investments. Because larger multinationals are still dominated by the Triad economies, the 
United States and Japan used this kind of linkage between trade and investment to shift their 
adjustment costs. Third, this kind of cooperation needs support from domestic and sometimes 
transnational groups’ support.  
The intersection of these difference resulted partly from the U.S. as well as Japan domestic 
institutions. According to Peter Cowhey’s analysis, the separate power system and electoral system 
in the United States helped it to bolster the credibility of the multilateral order after 1945.695 The 
basic political institutions are electoral, legislative and bureaucratic institutions. The functions they 
performed, as discussed earlier, are to resolve power delegation and interest aggregation. In the U.S. 
political system, the division of powers makes it harder for policy makers to initiate commitments 
and easier to prevent reversals of commitments. Helen Milner also emphasizes the role of Congress 
in the failure of ITO. Moreover, Milner argued that the degree of divided government, domestic 
groups, and ratification procedures taken together explained the international policy outcomes.696 
On the interaction of domestic institutions and international institutions, Daniel Drezner noted that in 
decentralized systems, the ratifier and initiator of international institutions are different. Constrained 
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by the veto player, international institutions provided necessary resources to implement policy that 
may have been impossible in the domestic realm.697 
In the case of Japanese FDI in the United States, the support of some multinationals in the 
United States was necessary for the U.S. government to initiate FDI institutions at the international 
level. The argument that U.S investment policy, especially outward investment policy, reflected (but 
not necessary resulted from) predominant corporate preferences has long been accepted by 
scholars.698 Given the history of business people as an influential group in American society, there is 
nothing exceptional about their incentive to influence the formulation of government policy. Using 
their broader private links with government and financial resource, multinationals involved in 
outward direct investment often attempt to affect the timing of initiatives, the specific language 
employed, the scope and central issues of the debate, and the legislative outcome.699  
Despite the policy disputes during the policy making process, the fundamental consensus about 
the objectives of investment protection were not challenged in the U.S. The base of this agreement 
between private firms and public authority was the mutual interest created by companies for 
increasing national power and the government policy used for companies to seek profits. 
Government stressed the positive contributions of foreign investments to domestic welfare. The 
famous slogan “better for GE is better for U.S.” typically illustrates this logic. However, this implicit 
link between corporate interest and domestic welfare had a complex effect on policy making. If 
either of these changed, a coherent policy may depend on specific context.  
Furthermore, the demand for international institutions in FDI was also influenced by Japanese 
multinationals. During the past several decades, the market had changed significantly due to 
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technological and political changes. As a result, the dynamic competitive environment created much 
more complex relations between firms. The demand for institutions did not originate merely from 
U.S.-owned companies; it was also complemented by Japanese multinationals. As John Dunning 
argued, “the combination of global supply and demand pressures on competitiveness has caused 
firms—and particularly larger hierarchies—to reconsider both the scope and organization of their 
value-added activities.”700 The result of this pressure on firms in the 1980s was the increase of 
strategic cooperation between firms. In some sense, this cooperation was parallel to state cooperation 
in economic relations. Dunning argued that market capitalism had entered into an alliance capitalism 
era, and “the thrust toward alliance capitalism first originated in Japan”.701  
The implications from this transformation are broad. As early as 1987, I.M. Destler and John 
Odell commened that “the policy choices facing the United States and other governments can no 
longer be captured by a simple, liberal trade-protectionist dichotomy” due to the rise of 
anti-protectionist industries.702 In the early 1990s, in her framework on New Diplomacy, Susan 
Strange came to a similar conclusion and a change in the traditional diplomatic conceptions of state 
to state relations.703 Introducing the new actor in diplomacy partly reflected this economic alliance 
relation between firms. This conceptualization was echoed by Peter Cowhey in his high technology 
competition study. He argued that foreign economic policy should look beyond the choice between 
free trade and protectionism.704  
 
 
Investment Mobility and Institutional Adjustment 
The FDI friction and economic imbalance between liberal capitalist countries brought about 
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these following questions: how to establish an effective political authority to rule over the 
powerfully integrated world market economy? During this process, how should government interact 
with the market? A much broader concern is whether the United States shifted its liberal philosophy 
in investment affairs into complete protectionism, or managed trade, similar to the policy it adopted 
in international trade relations? 
Nearly twenty years ago, Abraham Rotstein, a professor of economics and political science at 
the University of Toronto, in his appraisal of diverse views on Japanese FDI, argued that “the move 
toward globalism is a little like driving a car. The accelerator moves us toward the global village, or 
a reasonable facsimile, but it is dangerous to drive without a brake.”705 The “brake” in this analogy 
was a call for some kind of stable expectations from globalization. This view was once strongly 
developed by Charles p. Kindleberger who argues for the importance of leadership. Kindleberger 
argued that one state was necessary to maintain the stability of international economic order.706 The 
problem of the stability and mobility of economic benefits and costs lies in who can and should bear 
the burden of the costs. 
The territorial state is intangible, while most economic factors are tangible. The dilemma 
between mobility and immobility is thus not easy to solve. To some extent, each individual state has 
its own governance style in regards to its internationalization and its relationship with the 
international economy. Small states would like to integrate their economics into the world market, 
large states may like to open their door to welcome factor mobility, while middle-sized states face a 
relatively difficult selection. However, the basic problem facing policy makers in all states is how to 
control the process. Small states may be afraid of losing control. Large state also have to wrestle 
with uncertainty to grasp. 
The big problem in the contemporary world is which kind of economic transaction speed we 
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need? A general trend in our ear is the increasing interdependence and growing involved peoples in 
global economy. Or, in simple words, we are living with globalization. Individuals, groups and 
governments, however, have diversified senses to this process. Not only individuals, but also nation 
states try to live in a certain world, and obtain more benefits from economic exchange. One of the 
roles of institution is designed to control the economic transaction. Policymakers, scholars and 
business would like to develop and innovate institutions to reduce the globalization risk and control 
the speed of interantional economic transaction. The case of Japanese FDI in the United States 
shows that the economic powers can control the investment mobility between countries. One of their 
experiences is using institution to adjustment costs and benefits between individuals, groups and 
governments. 
To examine the puzzle of whether hegemony is important in maintaining international 
institutions, scholars argue that the role of an international regime is far more important than realists 
considered. Some prominent scholars, especially Robert Koehane, developed liberal institutionalism 
to examine why states choose to cooperate and establish international institutions. In international 
affairs, international institutions also play similar roles to domestic institutions through reducing 
uncertainty, increasing stable expectations and creating mutual interests. The information that 
institutions provide is crucial to state cooperation.707 Besides this rule-oriented explanation, another 
important consideration is that international institutions are the great powers’ instruments and reflect 
their intentions. An international regime is only an intervening variable in international cooperation, 
and without the support of the great powers, cooperation could not get ideal outcomes.708  
The difference between these two approaches should not be exaggerated. As Keohane and 
Martin recently argued, “from a theoretical standpoint, one of the most striking features of 
institutional theory, in contrast to the ‘liberal’ international relations theories with which it is often 
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identified, is that it embraces so much of the hard core of realism.”709 The most important difference 
here is that institutional theory expects that states will increase their benefits if they develop 
institutions, while realism may emphasize the worst situations for state action. Although the progress 
of international economic relations increases the expectation that we may improve our benefits, we 
should not forget that who receives the benefits is the question asked in IPE. As Robert Keohane 
reminds us, “we have not really seen a test of whether institutions will last ‘after hegemony’.”710 
Even on distributional effects of international institutions that Krasner considered, Keohane and 
Martin emphasize that “institutional theory never denied the reality of distributional bargaining.”711 
The future work for institutional theory study, as Keohane and Martin stated, should integrate 
domestic structures into analyzing the formation of state preferences and the roles of individuals.  
A further point on international institution building is that institutional forms reflects major 
groups’ power distributions in the FDI issue. Milner notes that rational choice institutionalism 
“brings with it a political understanding of institutions, viewing them as biasing outcomes in favor of 
certain groups as well as arenas for conflict and cooperation.”712 The basic empirical evidence 
supporting Milner‘s statement originated from Knight’s study on domestic institutions. Knight finds 
that the emergence of institutions was a by-product of distributional conflicts rather than a result of 
individuals seeking the collective benefits expected from them.713 
The mobility of investment necessitates an institutional environment that creates different 
interests. Modern economic and political institutions have been deeply rooted in countries since the 
Industrial Revolution or even before. With the rise of the global economy, the international 
institutional environment also assumed an increasing important role in transforming the mobility of 
investment. The crucial problem still lies in the value-added process and who bears costs. As an 
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aggregation and distributional mechanism, institutions matter in every stage of investment. The 
challenge for us to confront in relation to globalization and the spread of international investments is 
that policy adjustment and institutional design are uneven and constrained by various factors. That 
means the speed of investment mobility needs to be better controlled in a reasonable level. We can 
make a choice between stability and mobility. In Jeffrey Frieden’s words, “globalization is still a 
choice, not a fact.”714 
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